Deep games on two fronts

In Sevastopol, on March 18, Vladimir Putin made clear the deepest points of the Kremlin's policy on Crimea: “The foundations of the Russian people and its beliefs, as well as those of Ukraine and later Belarus, have been laid here. That is why this place is so sacred to us. After Vladimir was baptized here and had his druzhina baptized, the baptism of the whole of Russia began. All of them (folks – M.A.) was called Russians. There was even no difference between their languages. But after the 13th century, the language began to become different.”

That is, behind the scenes we can talk about the re-establishment of a new empire consolidated under the same umbrella of "Russianness" (Slavism) and "Christianity". A new Byzantine? What else could it be? Is this the reason behind the annexation of Crimea to Russia? Yes, as at the very beginning of the Slavic-Christian union (Tavrida), Crimea is considered the ideological center of the Slavic-Christian union in the new era.

In fact, this process has begun several years before the annexation of Crimea, and Vladimir Putin announced it for the first time by revealing it. Along with the Russian Church, Christian Turks (Gagauzes), and Muslim Turks (Tatars, Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis, etc.) participate in this process. Along with Russians, Tatars, Azerbaijanis, and Gagauzes are closely involved in mobilizing the church's potential in Turkey to rebuild the Byzantine Empire. Moscow's new map of the Byzantine Empire begins in Greece and covers Georgia, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, ethnically and religiously, and Armenia geopolitically. The Russian President's speech in Sevastopol on March 18 is the starting point. Therefore, we will see that the importance of Crimea for both Russia and its opponents will increase in all respects. In this case, how will Turkey's position, "we will not accept the annexation of Crimea to Russia", be able to maintain its power? We will see this too.

Russia took the second step in Syria in the near future, which could create problems for Turkey. Despite the terms of the ceasefire agreement reached in the Kremlin on March 5 and come into force on March 15, as it has not been possible so far for Turkish and Russian troops to effectively cooperate in the Idlib region, and the fact that jihadist groups do not leave the region increases Moscow's dissatisfaction with Ankara. The fact that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu met with senior Syrian officials in Damascus to discuss the latest situation by ignoring the threat of a viral epidemic and later met with PYD / YPG commanders, whom Turkey considers terrorists, on the right bank of the Euphrates River did not provoke a strong response in Ankara. What to connect it to? Did Ankara agree to Shoygu's visit to the region? If so, what did it receive instead? Or does Ankara not want to enter into a serious conflict with Moscow again 15 days after the ceasefire agreement entered into force? What could be the reason for its reluctance? Was it powerless or did it consciously turn a blind eye to Shoygu's visit because it was trying to gain other things in northwestern Syria? Or is it no longer able to resist Russia in Syria, and Russia knows that? And one more question: did the US allow Sergey Shoygu to go to the right bank of the Euphrates and meet with the PYD, or was there no need to get permission?

In any case, both Vladimir Putin's statements in Crimea on March 18 and the meetings of Defense Minister Shoygu in Syria a week later do not bode well for Ankara in terms of foreign policy parameters.