Did the secret war become apparent?

We have repeatedly written that the issue of Idlib is a rifle hanging from the wall at the beginning of the work: Is the principle set out by Anton Chekhov for dramatic works true in another example of life? In fact, President Erdoğan’s words indicate that there is not too much time left for firing the riffle: “Stop these bombings in Idlib, if you do not stop, our patience is already over. We will do whatever we need after this.”

Mr. Erdoğan’s warning is to stop the air and land operations against radical groups carried out by the Russian-backed Syrian state army in Idlib, which has become a lock region of the country. With the launch of decisive operations in the region in September 2018, although Erdoğan achieved a ceasefire with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi, radical groups had not left the region under Turkey's control within a 1-month deadline given to them to leave the region. The ceasefire, which has been broken several times, has been re-enacted with President Erdoğan’s request from Vladimir Putin, as a result, the radical groups have strengthened their positions in the region. You read above Mr. Erdoğan’s reaction to the violation of the ceasefire again a few days after January 12, on which it came into force, with the operation of the Syrian state army; as if Turkey and Russia are on the brink of war in the region. But what about persistent friendship and cooperation since August 24, 2016, and its mutual benefits?

The Kremlin's response was not delayed, press secretary Peskov stated that “they did not accept the accusations of the Turkish president and fulfilled all of the obligations under the Sochi agreement to ease tensions in the Idlib region.”

Russian authorities play on the same curtain and on the same string. This is because the press secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, has repeatedly said this. Strangely enough, Ankara also points to the Astana and Sochi agreements to justify themselves in the case of Idlib. However, forgotten nuances are that the situation has not changed, even though 16 months have elapsed from the 1-month deadline given in September 2018 to take radical elements, especially those who were the Chechen origin, out in the region. Groups in Idlib have not decided to leave the region; on the contrary, they remained there and expanded their influence.

Well, who is the address of such a harsh reaction of the Turkish president against the Russian-backed Syrian army's bombing Idlib, but if the bombing is not stopped, to whom Turkey will respond: Damascus or Moscow? It is no doubt that the answer is Russia because shortly after Erdoğan’s statement, Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov was in on the issue. So if Turkey does what it needs as President Erdoğan says, wouldn't it be a Turkish-Russian war on Syria? Would the parties take this step? If so, won’t the war, that actually goes on tacitly, between the two countries (Turkey and Russia) become apparent? What could happen unless President Erdoğan recedes from his recent statement on the bombing in Idlib, that is to say unless the presidents of Russia and Turkey rush to meet again and demonstrate a friendship? What would be Turkey's response to the bombing? Should Erdoğan's statement be regarded as the next example of rhetoric that he has shown in his stiff style and then taken a step back? Or, in relations with Moscow, as saying the most appropriate word of the Turkish literary language in this context, is it “neck or nothing”?

Turkey is a member of NATO, how will the alliance react if it comes face to face with Russia in Idlib (then naturally in Afrin and al-Bab)?

In all cases, let's note the possibility of the two presidents’ agreement.