Azerbaijan: Balancing on the Verge of NATO-CSTO

- Ali Huseynli, head of the Azerbaijani-Russian interparliamentary group, and chair of the parliamentary commission for legal policy and state-building, announced that under new geopolitical conditions it would be possible to consider Azerbaijan's participation in the CSTO. Do you think this is a casual statement?

-This statement of the Chair of the Milli Majlis Commission cannot be considered casual. Before this announcement, he made another about turning this topic into a subject for discussion in the press. And a day after that the chair of the parliamentary commission made a lengthy statement. It can be argued that this was done to learn public opinion. Of course, behind this are very serious political motives. For me personally, there is no doubt that this issue should be considered directly in connection with the settlement of the Karabakh problem, because it is another reason for raising the issue with the public. There is only one possibility- the talk is about some major behind-the-scenes political agreements in connection with settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

-Who is behind such statements and what goals do they pursue? To whom are these messages addressed?

- Partially, I have already answered this question. A few years ago, after the April 2016 armed clashes, everyone saw the obvious advantage of the Azerbaijani army over the Armenian Armed Forces. It was from that period that certain political negotiations were held in connection with the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For example, at that time the President of Azerbaijan spoke about the possibility of the country"s joining the Eurasian Economic Union within the framework of certain conditions and interests. The essence was that Azerbaijan does not have any serious need to join the Eurasian Economic Union. However, if there are any interests or motives, then Azerbaijan could consider this. Many experts have linked this statement to behind-the-scenes negotiations in connection with the Karabakh problem. Of course, the talk is not about the negotiations between Baku and Yerevan. It is a question of direct negotiations between Baku and Moscow. And the current statement of the chairman of the parliamentary commission should be regarded as a continuation of this topic. I believe that the message is primarily intended for Azerbaijani public opinion. However, bringing this message to Moscow does not require Azerbaijani press. Probably, the reaction of Azerbaijani public opinion to a possible agreement is being studied - let's say that the Karabakh issue is settled and Azerbaijan enters the CSTO in exchange. I still think this is being done to learn public opinion.

-Extremely interesting statements have been received from both sides on the issue of rapprochement between Russia and Azerbaijan. For example, Azerbaijan is Russia's only strategic partner in the Caucasus. Do these types of statements meet the interests of Azerbaijan?

-All these issues should be considered from the point of view of Azerbaijan's interests. Within the framework of our interests, settlement of the Karabakh problem, the liberation of the occupied lands, and the restoration of territorial integrity is our priority. This is our foreign policy as well as the main priority of our national security policy. Everyone knows that the main culprit in the occupation of Azerbaijan today is Russia, which provides political and economic support to Armenia. It is not accidental that, despite the serious success of the Azerbaijani army during the April clashes, the Azerbaijani president issued a statement stating that the Azerbaijani Armed Forces should unilaterally stop operations. After that, some officials said this was done at the Russia"s request. In any case, everyone understands that absent Russia's support, the territories could not have remained occupied for so long. Everyone understands that were the Russian factor neutralized, Azerbaijan could quickly resolve the Karabakh issue. From this perspective, the Azerbaijani public greets the Russian representatives" statements supporting Azerbaijan on the Karabakh issue positively. Additionally, there are other issues that differ in opinion and personal approach in Azerbaijani-Russian relations. However, the Azerbaijani public is interested in Russia's attitude towards the Karabakh problem. And if there is a change in attitude, which leads Azerbaijan closer to the liberation of its occupied territories, the Azerbaijani public"s attitude toward this issue will, in general, be positive.

-Look back at recent developments, the talk concerns the warming of relations between Azerbaijan and the West, on the one hand, and the warming of relations with Russia, on the other. What's happening? Could this be called a power-sharing disagreement?

- The foreign policy of Azerbaijan is officially balanced. This means that Azerbaijan should try to build strong and effective relations with the West, as well as with Russia and other countries. However, in the early years this approach was not very effective because of our good relations with Western countries. Oil contracts, as well as other political projects implemented by Azerbaijan, established relations with the West to a rather high level. With Russia at the time there was a chilly debate. It is no coincidence that Russia failed to make oil contracts. At that time, Russia provided diplomatic, economic, and military support to Armenia when it seized the Azerbaijani territories. In recent years, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia began to change, creating a more balanced policy. It is no coincidence that the leaders of Azerbaijan and the United States chose Baku as a neutral platform for their negotiations. In recent years, they met twice in Baku and this is reflected in the concept of a classical balanced policy. Azerbaijan is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. If I am not mistaken, the Movement"s next summit is planned to be held in Baku. If we proceed from this context, then the Azerbaijani press statement can be understood correctly. That is, if in a country that is an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement, in the capital of which the next summit of this Movement is being prepared, and such a question is being discussed, then there are serious reasons motivating that. As I have already said, the only serious reason for Azerbaijan is the complete solution of the Karabakh problem.

-Considering the issue not only from the Karabakh perspective, but also in general, what can the CSTO give Azerbaijan and what can Azerbaijan lose?

"The statement in early 2016 by the Azerbaijani president concerning the Eurasian Economic Union, probably stemmed from the issue of whether to belong to the CSTO. Now there is no other problem pushing Azerbaijan to become a member of this organization. Azerbaijan is conducting a balanced policy, trying to build relations with the West, Russia, and other countries. With this policy, joining a block is not really a matter for discussion. Remember that Azerbaijan used to belong to the CSTO. When this organization was created, it had 9 members; later, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan left the organization. Sometimes, this structure reminds me of the CIS. When the Commonwealth was first created, many thought that joining it meant a virtual loss of independence. However, later it became clear that it was created to speed up the process of USSR disintegration. Eventually, even Moscow realized that the idea of turning the CIS into some kind of serious international organization, to create in it an extraordinary national structure to manage the republics previously represented in the USSR, had failed. Very interesting developments are also evident in the CSTO itself. Some members say that it is not a military bloc, but rather an international organization - a small regional form of the OSCE envisioning not only military security, but also environmental, informational and other aspects of security. The US and NATO military bases operated in some cases in countries not allowed in the CSTO, for example, in Kyrgyzstan. Most CSTO member countries also operate in conflict regions as part of NATO-led peacekeeping forces. However, the CSTO cannot be called a military bloc, an alternative to NATO. For example, after the Crimean events, none of the CSTO members supported the Crimea's accession to Russia; they did not officially accept it. Therefore, the fate of CSTO is still unknown. CSTO members Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan support close cooperation with the West. Nazarbayev's visit to the United States and the results of his trip clearly demonstrated this. Therefore, the CSTO"s fate will repeat the fate of the CIS, and perhaps it will turn into a regional copy of the OSCE. Meanwhile all this is speculation.

-Some experts think that joining the CSTO can cut off the only opportunity for Azerbaijan to join NATO. Is it possible to remain in both organizations simultaneously?

-Unfortunately, at present the idea of ​​Azerbaijan or any CSTO member-state"s joining NATO may look like a fantastic idea. Recall that there was a time when even the issue of signing an associative agreement with the EU caused a serious crisis in relations between Russia and Ukraine. Russia was too zealous about this issue. As for NATO, Azerbaijan has not officially declared its membership in NATO. The official position of Azerbaijan is cooperation with NATO in the framework of certain programs. Unlike Ukraine and Georgia, Azerbaijan has repeatedly stated that it does not claim to be a NATO member. All this must be taken into account.

-Which step will be cleverer for Azerbaijan - CSTO or NATO?

Theoretically, it is difficult to answer such a question. We live in the real world and Azerbaijan has real goals. NATO is considered the strongest military bloc, and includes leading democratic countries. To become a member of NATO, one must undertake a very serious path and implement certain reforms. One proposal is enough to gain membership in the CSTO; but to join NATO you must knock on its door for years. NATO sets very serious conditions, and it is necessary to comply with NATO standards: military field, within countries, the rule of law, and civil society control over the army, must be respected. Such requirements are absent for CSTO membership. However, one should not compare the two organizations on these criteria. I suppose that many countries that have joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization, in particular Kazakhstan and Belarus, and sometimes Kyrgyzstan, do not adopt a policy of confrontation with NATO. They are more willing to stop cooperation between NATO and the CSTO. When the CIS was created, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Moldova were categorically against transforming the Commonwealth into a new Warsaw pact. As a result, the CIS could not be turned into a new Warsaw pact. I hope that inside the CSTO there is no consensus on the West. Relations between Russia and the West are very tense. However, Kazakhstan is interested in cooperation with the West. After the changes in Yerevan, Russia thinks that if the new government in Yerevan had the opportunity, they would prefer NATO, and not stay in the CSTO. The strategic view of Azerbaijan in these processes should be related to the issue of Karabakh, because such organizations as the CIS, the Eurasian Union, and the CSTO are first created, become strong, and then weaken. We have seen their creation and development. I believe that they cannot be called sustainable, capable of implementing projects for many years. Some CSTO members call it a military bloc, some call it an international organization. It looks like a small version of the OSCE, so it should not be compared with NATO.