Risks and vulnerabilities of Azeri mobile phone services

   The recent report from Freedom House on "Safety on the Line: Exposing the myth of mobile

communication security" evaluates the risks and vulnerabilities of mobile phone services and apps in 12 specified countries, including Azerbaijan.

    Researchers found that the very features that make a phone “smart,” (Internet access, camera, GPS, etc.) can in some cases be activated remotely, making the phone an insidious tool for invading privacy; virtual private networks (VPNs) provide inadequate security on mobile platforms, with VPN service failing as mobile devices switch from one network to another; mobile platforms popular in repressive regimes do not come with sufficient pre-installed security options, and overriding standard programming is both difficult and risky; and the impending worldwide switch to IPv6 Internet addressing protocol provides openings for anti-censorship programmers and government blockers alike.

   "With relatively high mobile and regular internet access availability, Azerbaijan is an opportune market for actors in the mobile internet freedom area. Limited use of circumvention technology is observed despite a majority of participants reporting some form of government blocking and monitoring. The government is actively pursuing more control, as is evidenced by recent initiatives imposing stringent registration requirements on mobile phones using the countries network infrastructure".

TURAN’s Washington DC correspondent interviewed Ms. Sarah Kendzior, a writer and academic focusing on digital media and politics in the former USSR, about the main challenges/problems of mobile communication security in Azerbaijan.

  Ms. Kendzior is a PhD working at Washington University’s anthropology department.

She is also a regular contributor at Registan.net.

Question: As the mobile audiences grow fast around the world, security concerns keeping pace. According to the recent FH report, mobile device users in countries with repressive regimes face mounting challenges to their privacy. How would you highlight the main challenges/problems of mobile communication security in Azerbaijan? What should Azeri people know before using their cell phones?

Answer: Azerbaijanis are increasingly accessing the internet through mobile phones, so to understand the risks citizens face, it is useful to examine state policy toward the internet. The government of Azerbaijan rarely blocks the internet outright. Instead, it relies on psychological methods of control.

 They have two main tactics: First - punish targeted internet users through arrest, public humiliation and violence; Second - portray internet use as an immoral activity in state-sponsored media campaigns. These tactics seem to have deterred many Azerbaijanis from using the internet for political purposes, and some from using it at all.

  The difference between mobile and non-mobile internet is that the penetration rate for mobiles is much higher. Because mobile phones are a rote part of everyday life, propaganda campaigns against them will not work. Instead, the government takes advantage of their ubiquity by using them for surveillance. Mobile users should be aware that their networks are likely being monitored and that the government may persecute people who transmit content deemed to be offensive. Unfortunately for Azerbaijanis, the state’s definition for what is offensive can be very broad.

Question: Why exactly do the governments in countries like Azerbaijan need to block or monitor people on the phone? What they are up to?

Answer: I don’t know what they’re up to – that’s part of the problem. The government likes to know what everyone is doing while revealing little about itself.

That’s why journalists like Khadija Ismailova, who have exposed state secrets, are such a threat. There’s a famous essay on political paranoia by Elias Canetti where he says, “Power is impenetrable. The man who has it sees through other men, but does not allow them to see through him.” That’s what Azerbaijan and other authoritarian states are attempting to do in their approach to communications technology.

They are less concerned with blocking information than with gathering it and persecuting people who may expose their own weaknesses. The government may argue it is about state security, but I would argue it’s really about the personal insecurity of state officials.

Question: Many in Baku still remember the story of 43 Azerbaijanis who sent a text message voting for the Armenian entry in the continent-wide Eurovision music contest in 2009 were summoned to the Ministry of National Security. How does this story describe the problem? Where do you come down on that?

Answer: This story is a good example of how broadly the Azerbaijani government defines threats to the state and how seemingly innocuous actions can be politicized. The arrest was meant to present the Azerbaijani government as the paragon of patriotic virtue, but it was also a fear tactic to show that no one’s information is truly private.

Question: When and under what conditions are the government forces allowed to monitor or block their citizens' phone or internet connections in the western democracies?

Answer: The issue of when a government can monitor or block citizens’ phone and internet connections is a subject of great debate in Western democracies. No country has a clean track record on this. Everyone is struggling with questions of privacy and security. However, I do not think interrogating someone because of their vote in a musical competition is a judicious use of security resources. This is very unlikely to occur in a Western democracy.

Question: Last July President Aliyev stated that there were no restrictions on access to internet in Azerbaijan because of the government’s desire to promote media freedom. So, the government, as a rule, is denying all the accusations. How to enhance awareness of security risks among users of mobile devices in this case?

Answer: Aliyev is right that the internet is free in Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, the people who use the internet are not free. An open internet is of little consolation to people living in a state that punishes them for using it. I am not sure whether Azerbaijanis consider mobile phones to be safe and secure. I tend to doubt it, as state surveillance dates all the way back to Soviet times. I don’t think people feel like they can speak freely, and this attitude probably extends to how they use their phones – it is likely that people self-censor. I know initially some Azerbaijanis thought the internet was a reprieve from repression, and learned the hard way that it is not. Azerbaijanis should treat the phone like the internet, and use it with caution, and try to educate themselves on circumvention and security techniques.

Question:  What do you believe the international community should do to help provide internet-mobile freedom in such countries, as Azerbaijan?

Answer: International organizations with expertise on mobile technology should provide information to Azerbaijanis about how to make their mobile phones more secure. This information should be available in Azerbaijani and Russian. However, technological solutions will only go so far when the problem is political. The international community should pay close attention to the political situation in Azerbaijan, and not only focus on it in times of crisis or during events like Eurovision. Azerbaijan is an important case study in how authoritarian governments take advantage of the open internet to hurt their own citizens.

Alakbar Raufoglu

Washington DC,

07/31/2012