Who is HTS leader Julani?

Author: Independent Turkish Editor-in-Chief Nevzat Cicek wrote

Nevzat Cicek@nevzatcicek,  nevzat.cicek@independentturkish.com
Friday 6 December 2024

"What we are talking about, so to speak, is my life story, my experience, my history. This is a model and example of many young people and people around us. So I don't regret these choices because, as I mentioned, they took place in the context of the specific internal conditions of the time and place, the logical conditions at the time. No, we cannot judge ourselves in the past. These were natural and logical choices. I am speaking today; I don't want to make political speeches or praise certain parties. No. We are talking about reality and we want to analyse reality. This is who I am. This is who we are. That's how we grew up and that's how we got where we are."

These are the words of Abu Mohammad al-Julani, real name Ahmed Hussein al-Shara, who has made a name for himself by capturing different cities in Syria after a long time, fighting for the Syrian Revolution with his friends, for whom the US has put a $10 million bounty on his head, and whom many intelligence organisations are looking for step by step.

In his first television interview in 2013, Julani gave his back to the camera and covered the visible part of his head and face with a black scarf.

Until 2016, Julani, whose face we did not see until then, began to show his face openly in interviews with foreign media.

In 2021, when we asked him the reason for this in our interview with him in Independent Turkish, he said:

"The Syrian revolution went through many stages. In the first period, showing my face would have caused some problems. But after the Syrian revolution found its own character, I opened my face. Giving interviews is my duty. I have to explain what is happening in Syria. We are one of the main elements of the country, but we took behaviours according to the period."

He wore a suit in the interview, preferred sports clothes during visits and tried to give a ‘modern’ image.

In an interview with CNN, broadcasted today, he wore the Syrian revolutionary flag, which was rejected by the Al-Nusra Front as an atheist symbol.

An important detail that signalled all this change was his public announcement on Thursday that he had changed his pseudonym Julani to his real name, Ahmad al-Shara.

Now Julani was gone and Commander Ahmed al-Shara had arrived.

Caption: HTS leader Mohammed al-Jolani answers questions from Independent Turkish in Idlib, 5 September 2021

Since the beginning of the civil commotion in Syria, I have been trying to follow the Syrian civil war and organisations. What I see on the ground often differs from the widespread stereotypes, but it is not easy to explain this.

The biggest reflections of this are the "Deterrence of Aggression" and "Dawn of Freedom" operations. With these operations, the rapid progress of the opposition in Syria turned the eyes back to Syria, SMO, HTS and Julani.

In fact, not much was written about Julani, and even when his own narratives were available, even his place of birth and date of birth were written differently. So I decided to write a portrait of Julani based on the notes, interviews and interviews with Julani.

In fact, I had told my field sources, who told me that I should have written this portrait before, ‘we will write it when the time comes.’ That time is now.

caption: Julani gave his first interview to CNN after the capture of Aleppo and Hama, speaking under his real name Ahmed al-Sharaa / Photo: CNN

In order to get to know Julani, it is first necessary to look at the environment in which he grew up. In this regard, the narratives of those who accompanied him in the field and the statements in his interviews guide us:

His family originates from the Israeli-occupied Golan. His grandfather was displaced from the Golan after Israel entered the region in 1967. His grandfather was a key leader in the resistance against the French occupation of Syria during the French occupation of Syria.

Born in 1946, his father was an Arab nationalist influenced by Gamal Abdel Nasser. His father's upbringing also coincided with the union between Syria and Egypt.

Julani explained his father's influence on Abdel Nasser as follows:

"Gamal Abdel Nasser's style was to appeal to the masses, the poorer classes and rural people as a reaction against feudalism and the bourgeois class. But this was realised in Egypt and copied in Syria only after unification with Egypt. The people in the countryside saw that they benefited from this new policy of Abdnasser, and that is why Abdnasser's Arab nationalist socialist orientation appealed to many young people at the time. One of them was my father."

Father of Julani and Hafez Assad were fighting for the same idea: Unity with Egypt.

In 1961, on 28 September 1961, officers of the Syrian Army staged a coup d'état against the United Arab Republic and proclaimed the Syrian Arab Republic. A group led by Colonel Abdelkarim Nahlawi seized power and ended Syria's union with Egypt, which disturbed people, especially those influenced by Abdel Nasser, and led to protests.

Julani's father, who was a student at the time, took part in some protests against the Baathist regime in Syria and was imprisoned. In the meantime, his father Hafez al-Assad, who would later come to power in Syria through a coup d'état, was actually in favour of the same ideas as Julani's father.

During this period, the groups in favour of unity with Egypt and against secession were being purged from the army and Hafez al-Assad was dismissed from the army in 1960.

Julani's father later escaped from prison, travelled to Jordan and was imprisoned there again. It is estimated that he was 19 years old at the time. In Jordan he was given a choice between going to Saudi Arabia or Iraq, and he chose Iraq.

It is very interesting, especially in 2014, when I was doing field research on ISIS, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of ISIS, was in prison in Jordan, but he was released with the general amnesty issued in March 1999 after the death of King Hussein, and he was offered two offers; if he stayed in Jordan, he would be arrested again or he would be allowed to leave Jordan. Zarqawi went to Pakistan.

Julani's father, who was dropped off at the Iraqi border, travelled to Baghdad, where he continued his education. He graduated from high school and university. He studied economics and political science. During his studies, the Zionist occupation of the Golan took place, so he went to Jordan and started working with the Palestinian guerrillas.

He then returned to Baghdad, where he stayed until 1971 and then returned to Syria. On his return he was arrested. Julani says that his father reached an agreement with the Directorate of Political Security and was released. His father ran for parliament but failed to win due to his political background and then travelled to Saudi Arabia.

In the early 1980s, the father worked in the oil ministry in Saudi Arabia for 10 years as an oil expert, as he specialised in oil. The father returned to Syria in 1989 when Julani was 7 years old.

Julani was born in Riyadh in 1982

Julani was born in 1982 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and returned to Syria with his family when he was 7 years old.

Julani emphasises that his father had a great influence on him and that the seed of defending the oppressed was in their family.

His father's focus was on the Arab nation, but for him it was the Islamic movement, Julani said, ‘I mean, my father and I didn't really agree on our ideas, but he definitely influenced us. For example, the love of Palestine, the desire to defend Palestinians in general, these things were planted in our home around the clock.’

But how did Julani, who came from a family of Arab nationalists, become an ‘Islamist’?

Let us look at this question again from Julani's own answers.

The Mezzeh neighbourhood of Damascus, where Julani grew up, was considered one of the most luxurious neighbourhoods in Syria. Inhabited by the middle and wealthy classes, it was also home to Syria's security and military headquarters, as well as embassies and United Nations (UN) organisations.

Hassan Jafar Kassir, the son-in-law of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who was recently killed by Israel in Beirut, was also killed by Israel in this neighbourhood in October 2024.

The Mezzeh neighbourhood of Damascus was a largely liberal neighbourhood. Compared to other neighbourhoods in Damascus, its Islamic tendencies were not so strong. Julani, who belonged to a middle-class family, grew up in such an environment.

The Second Intifada (Palestinian Popular Uprising) that started in Palestine in 2000 affected individuals as well as neighbouring countries. One of those affected by this Intifada was 18-year-old Julani.

Julani described those times in the following words:

"I was still a young man, 18 or 19 years old, and I began to think about how I could fulfil my duty to defend the nation that was being persecuted by the invaders and occupiers. But we must put this way of thinking in context. I was a young man of 18, so it was a spontaneous, innate thought. I was not politicised or directed."

Julani says that he was 67 or 68 years old at the time and that he was searching for the truth according to him, guided by a cleric whom he does not want to name:

"Then someone advised me to go to the mosque, to pray in the mosque and to devote myself to praying in the mosque. So I went and I started to devote myself to praying there and I felt that life has a different meaning than the pure worldly meaning that we are looking for. So I started to search for this truth. There was something inside me that pushed me to search for the truth. How can we achieve justice? How can we liberate people from oppression? How can we spread goodness among people? I began to look for all these meanings in the Holy Qur'an, the book of Allah Almighty, and in the practices of the Prophet. Then I studied its exegesis with a sheikh."

Julani in Iraq

Thinking that he had completed his search in Syria, Julani first travelled to Baghdad about 2-3 weeks before the war started in Iraq. After staying in Baghdad for a while, he travelled to Ramadi. Julani, who was in Baghdad when the war started, returned to Syria after a while and then returned to Iraq.

In Iraq, Julani travelled to Mosul, where he spent most of his time and was placed in Abu Ghraib Prison. After some time there, he was transferred to Bucca prison and then to Cropper prison at Baghdad airport. After interrogations, the American forces handed Julani over to the Iraqis, who put him in al-Taji prison.

He was released from Al-Taji Prison after serving a total of 5 years.

Julani came as a soldier and joined the ranks of Al-Qaeda to fight against US forces in Iraq.

One of the most curious questions about Julani is whether he met ISIS founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Julani states the following in this regard:

"I did not meet Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was mostly in Fallujah and Ramadi and I was in Mosul at the time. I was an ordinary soldier. I was not involved in any major operation where I would meet al-Zarqawi. There was a strict security protocol around al-Zarqawi. It was not an open war; it was more of a security war, so people were hiding."

Julani, who had no contact with Zarqawi, started working under him because Zarqawi was the overall commander. After Zarqawi pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, many of the Iraqi groups joined Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and I was part of those groups that joined him, and Julani was part of them. Zarqawi, who was named as the founder of ISIS, died in 2006 while Julani was in prison.

In order to better understand Julani's life, it is necessary to analyse the political situation in Iraq, where he went to fight.

After being released with an amnesty in Jordan, Zarqawi was interrogated in Pakistan and then travelled to Afghanistan, where in December 1999 he gathered his followers, known as the ‘Army of Damascus ’, in the Herat barracks. Zarqawi met Osama bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2000. Two years before the invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi crossed into Iraq from Iran and northern Iraq to prepare for the US invasion. On 19 March 2003, US President George W. Bush launched the invasion of Iraq.

In 2003, Zarqawi founded the organisation ‘Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad’ in Iraq. In May 2004 it merged with another militant group, Salafiah al-Mujahidiah. In October 2004, the organisation was renamed ‘Tanzim Kaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn’ or ‘Al-Qaeda in Iraq’. In January 2006, Al-Qaeda in Iraq took the name ‘Mujahidin Shura Council ’. On 7 June 2006, US forces killed Zarqawi. He was replaced by Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.

In October 2006, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq was Omar al-Baghdadi, whose real name was Hamid Daoud ez-Zawi.

In 2007, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who would later become the leader of ISIS, founded an organisation called the Army of the Ahl al-Sunnah, joined Al-Qaeda and became the third man in the organisation. On 17 April 2010, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Hamza al-Muhajir were killed in a US attack.

On 16 May 2010, al-Qaeda announced that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, whose real name is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Bu Bedri bin Armus, is the emir of the Islamic State of Iraq. On 15 March 2011, demonstrations broke out in Syria and spread across the country. On 29 July 2011, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was founded by Riyad al-Assad. In August 2011, Julani, who would later found Jabhat al-Nusra, crossed into Syria with 8 others.

Julani's popularity began to grow in prison

In 2006, Julani followed developments in Iraq from prison, unaware of what was going on outside because of the American ban on communication, but running a programme of his own.

Julani was opposed to the work and methods of former police officers in the prison who had been arrested for leading al-Qaeda in Iraq. Julani's popularity grew as people started to come from their sections to Julani's section.

Julani describes that process as follows:

"I realised that in prison there were a lot of misconceptions about the real meaning of Islam, about the real meaning of defence, about the process of jihad, but I preferred not to get into confrontation with anyone there, so I started teaching people about the real concepts until I gained some popularity among the inmates, so my methodology was completely different from the methodology of others who were former police officers before they became emirs in the Al-Qaeda organisation.

They were trying to turn the prison into an Islamic emirate, trying to force people to behave in a certain way, punishing them. They were using horrible measures to hold them accountable, that's why a lot of crimes were committed in the prison, including killing. For various reasons, I largely rejected this and did my best to spread the right ideas in the departments where I was. It reached a stage where people moved from the departments where those leaders were to my department."

Julani describes prison conditions in the context of Bucca Prison as follows:

"I didn't experience much pressure on my part, they just took away my freedom for five years without any law. I was not tried for five years, this was the most serious for me, the thing that affected me the most. As for the others, there was the Abu Ghraib scandal. Then it continued after the Abu Ghraib scandal. Certain people, not everyone, were subjected to torture, coffin torture, waterboarding and so on. These things existed and continued. Sometimes they sent the detainees to secret Iraqi prisons. The torturers were Iraqis, Shiite and Iranian militias, who interrogated them and extracted information. The Americans then came as liberators, treated them in hospital after they had been debriefed, and took them back to a normal prison."

The release of the al-Qaeda commander in prison, who was impressed by Julani's work and suggestions in prison

The release of the al-Qaeda commander, who was impressed by Julani's work in prison and took his suggestions into consideration, and his appointment to the Northern Province, including Mosul, brought a new era for Julani. Because there was a communication between the released commander and Baghdadi, and this commander had told Baghdadi about Julani.

When Julani was released from prison (reportedly in 2008), the first person he met was this commander. On the day the Syrian revolution started, the commander, who was his prison mate, asked Julani what he thought. Julani said that he wanted to go to Syria. It is very interesting that at that time very few people knew that Julani was Syrian and everyone thought he was Iraqi.

While trying to get permission from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to go to Syria, Julani prepared a 50-page document and sent it to Baghdadi. Julani emphasised and warned that the mistakes in Iraq should not be made in Syria.

Writing his thoughts on Syria, Julani focussed on the basic rules:

"I described the history of Syria, its geography, the sectarian diversity in Syria, the mechanism of governance, how Assad's family came to power, etc. Because to some extent the Iraqi culture - some of the leaders in the Islamic State, their culture limited their knowledge of what was going on around them, because they had lived under sanctions and during the long wars in Iraq, so to some extent they were isolated. Iraq was isolated from its neighbours. So these were the ground rules and he fully agreed with them."

After the report, Julani began to prepare himself to go to Syria. In preparation, he went to meet al-Baghdadi and got to know him.

Julani describes the meeting and the impact it had on him as follows:

"I met him, and to be honest, I was a bit surprised by him. He didn't have a great ability to analyse situations. He didn't have a strong personality. For a long time he was detached from the Iraq war, because after he was released from Bucca prison he went to Syria and stayed there for 3 to 4 years before returning.

He was not known among the leaders of al-Qaeda and ISIS. I had to recognise him. He was going to communicate between us, and when communication is through letters, you cannot know the person well.

I was going to take on a big responsibility, Syrian responsibility, so there had to be a personal relationship, I had to let my eyes recognise him properly, I had to let my brain listen to him properly, so that I would know how to talk to him or how to assess his ability to assess situations and give orders.

Is he analysing it properly or not? That's why I gave myself the opportunity, that's why I requested it, I said, ‘We should meet before I go,’ and he welcomed the idea and responded immediately."

One of the criticisms levelled at Julani during this period was why he had turned to al-Qaeda, whose tactics he did not like. Julani, despite his objections, says that he is affiliated with al-Qaeda and that he cannot leave without permission. On the other hand, he knows that he needs people, money and weapons to fight in Syria and that he can only get these from al-Qaeda.

Julani asked Al-Qaeda for 100 men to go to Syria, but he could only get 6 because of those who were not in favour of his going to Syria. When Julani travelled to Syria, he received 60 thousand dollars. He used the money to buy some weapons (about 40 rifles, 50 rifles).

"We used this money to stand up to an unjust tyrannical regime that was killing people, and we defended these people’, Julani said, and within a year he had built a force that grew from six to 5,000 people. Half of Julani's friends with whom he travelled to Syria would later abandon him in disagreement with ISIS."

What caused the conflict with ISIS?

To understand the rift between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, which Julani headed, we need to look at what happened in Syria and Iraq.

On 24 January 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra was declared in Syria. The organisation, which had previously been named the Islamic State of Iraq in April 2013, became the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’.

In April 2013, the leader of the organisation, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, announced that Jabhat al-Nusra was founded by the Islamic State of Iraq. He announced the merger of these two groups under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Al-Nusra Front leader Julani did not accept this.

In 2013, Al-Qaeda's leadership condemned Baghdadi's actions in Syria. In February 2014, Al-Qaeda announced that it had severed all ties with ISIS. On 29 June, ISIS declared the restoration of the caliphate. Al-Baghdadi was declared caliph and took the name Caliph Ibrahim. The name of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant was changed to the Islamic State.

Julani explains why they founded al-Nusra and pledged allegiance to Zawahiri at that time:

"I was the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Baghdadi was the leader of the Islamic State. So who should we turn to? We needed a big personality who carried the symbolism. A conflict at this level needs a person of symbolic importance so that the base, the people who hear their message can be influenced by it."

Julani cites the deviation from the rules and parameters of the 50-page report he sent to Baghdadi after his release from prison as the reason for leaving ISIS:

"So, a year after I came here, after we had won some victories, established some contacts and gained a certain popularity among the people, some of the leaders of the Islamic State became interested in Syria. So they started coming here. The leaders of the Islamic State made many attempts to force us to start a war against other groups. We refused, we stood against it. That's why it issued the voice that everyone heard, announcing that the Al-Nusra Front was linked to the Islamic State. There was an agreement between us that if there was any disagreement, it would be taken to Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri by the al-Qaeda organisation. So we raised the issue and the rift between us began."

In 2014, in Habertürk newspaper, in the article series "The Inside of ISIS, a Terrorist Organisation", I wrote the chronology of the split between Nusra and ISIS as follows:

"ISIS announced the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, which had received great popular support when it was included in the US terror list. Jabhat al-Nusra leader Julani politely rejected ISIS's announcement on the grounds that it would harm the resistance and spoke favourably of Baghdadi. He declared his allegiance to the leadership of Al-Qaeda. ISIS attacked Jabhat al-Nusra with heavy expressions, captured its military centres and confiscated almost all of its equipment.

In the process, the image of Julani as a rebel was popularised, leading to the defection of many fighters. The parties tried to resolve the issue through the intervention of mediators, but when no results were achieved, Ayman al-Zawahiri, as the leader of both organisations, took control of the situation. Zawahiri decided that Jabhat al-Nusra would continue its activities in Syria and ISIS in Iraq. ISIS declared that Zawahiri's decision was un-Islamic, that the emir could not be obeyed and that it would continue its activities in Syria.

After a long period of silence, fighting broke out between factions in Syria, killing nearly 3,000 militants. Some prominent figures called for an impartial tribunal for a solution; this was called the Ummah Initiative. However, Jabhat al-Nusra and other factions accepted this shariah court, while ISIS rejected it. Al-Qaeda's leadership declared the end of all relations with ISIS."

ISIS accused Al-Qaeda of descending from the nation of Abraham, thus committing takfir. In a final statement, Ayman al-Zawahiri refuted the claim that ISIS had never pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda. He called on ISIS for the last time to withdraw to Iraq and stop the bloodshed. He also asked Jabhat al-Nusra to stop the fighting.

Jabhat al-Nusra declared that it would carry out Zawahiri's order and defend only itself; it called for an independent tribunal. ISIS spokesman Adnani responded to Zawahiri's calls with insults. He asked Zawahiri to withdraw his support for Jabhat al-Nusra.

Adnani asked Zawahiri to declare the soldiers of Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan, Egypt and many other countries as infidels and rejected the call for an impartial tribunal. Finally, Adnani claimed that Al-Qaeda had apostatised from the religion and that Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda leaders had deviated from the path of the former leaders and were therefore ‘apostates’.

Julani summarises his approach to ISIS and the reasons for his departure as follows:

"At the beginning of the work, the plans and strategies I put in my report were approved. Afterwards, perhaps they did not have much hope that we would succeed in Syria. Within a year, our numbers increased, we expanded, and we had a very large territory. At that time, the Islamic State's interest in the region increased, so al-Baghdadi sent some leaders who had a direct relationship with him. These leaders tried to change some of the points we had agreed on in the past.

They were trying to shift it towards the expansion of the sectarian war. We did not agree on this, so this was the beginning of the disagreement. When al-Baghdadi saw that we opposed these policies, he tried to change the leadership structure around me, so we responded to him. Then we refused and demanded to leave the Islamic State. They are an organisation that uses the name of Islam, but they harm Islam.

They have caused Islam to be looked down upon in the West and have fuelled Islamophobia. Here, too, they caused great damage to the Syrian revolution. The revolutionaries had reached as far as Damascus, but their emergence gave the regime a breathing space. A similar process is currently taking place in Afghanistan. They wanted to shake the agreement between the Taliban and the US. They could not bear the joy of the Muslims and did such a thing."

Julani said that they tried very hard not to clash with ISIS and added: ‘When ISIS became an obstacle to the Syrian revolution and started to attack groups and people, even attacking us and killing some of our soldiers, leaders and youth, this conflict was inevitable. But we tried very hard to avoid this conflict, that's why we fought against ISIS. Then they turned into security forces, assassinated and fought here and there. Security forces in the liberated areas have captured many of them and put those who tried to sabotage the Syrian revolution in prisons,’ he said.

Caption Photo: AP

Establishing HTS

On 28 July 2016, the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra announced the dissolution of al-Nusra as an al-Qaeda offshoot and the formation of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). This decision was taken after the US and Russia recognised al-Qaeda as a terrorist organisation and launched attacks, with the hope of ‘uniting with other opposition groups’ playing an active role.

Julani said that after ISIS, when they realised that it was in the interest of the revolution and the Syrian people to disaffiliate from Al-Qaeda, ‘We initiated this on our own, without pressure from anyone, without anyone telling us about it or demanding anything. It was an individual, personal initiative based on what we thought was in the public interest, which benefited the Syrian revolution.’

On the one hand, there was the fight against ISIS, on the other hand, the dissolution of al-Nusra after its split from al-Qaeda, and clashes with some of the other groups on the ground. Julani, while commenting on the struggle between many groups in Syria in the past, states that the lack of a central authority to which people can turn in case of disagreement is one of the reasons for this, and that it should not be forgotten that many factions took part in the Syrian revolution.

He explains the reasons for fighting with other factions as follows:

As for the factions affiliated to the Free Syrian Army, there were factions that claimed to be part of the revolution; some of them were, but in reality they were just gangsters, thieves and bandits.

It was our duty to act after people begged us to save them from those thugs. We tried to stop them from harming people in a friendly way. After that there was a small clash and it was over. The point I want to emphasise here is that all these internal conflicts are not in the interest of the revolution in the first place, and we never want them to happen, we do not support them.

If we engage in such a conflict, we do so out of an urgent necessity to avoid harm and to ward off threats. But the right thing for all factions of the revolution is to unite the ranks, except those that deviate from the general context, such as ISIS. And these must be completely excluded from the scene of the revolution.

28 January 2017: The fall of Aleppo to regime forces and the Astana Talks, initiated by Turkey and Russia, led to splits among the anti-regime factions, with Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, Nurettin Zenki Movement, Ahrar al-Sham Movement defectors and some groups announcing the formation of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). A few days before this decision, the SCAF had attacked FSA-affiliated groups, resulting in 6 organisations (Sukur al-Sham, Fastakim, the Idlib Wing of the Army of Islam, the Mujahideen Army, the Western Aleppo Organisation of the Shamiya Front, and the Revolutionaries of Damascus) joining Ahrar al-Sham.

9 July 2017: HTS launched a military operation against Ahrar al-Sham, its main rival, without the knowledge of the other factions within it. On 21 July 2017, HTS took control of the Bab al-Air border crossing, the Syrian side of the Jilvegozu border crossing controlled by Ahrar al-Sham. This was Idlib's only gateway to the world. Three days later, all Ahrar al-Sham checkpoints in the centre of Idlib were seized by HTS, and the centre of Idlib was completely under the control of HTS.

On 17 May 2017, the US State Department's Rewards for Justice programme announced a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of Mohammed al-Jolani. The US State Department has designated HTS as a foreign terrorist organisation and a specially designated global terrorist entity under the Immigration and Nationality Act. In May 2013, Julani was designated by the US State Department as a specially designated global terrorist and all assets subject to US jurisdiction were blocked and US citizens were prohibited from doing business with him. On 24 July 2013, the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on ISIS and Al-Qaeda placed it on the list of sanctioned terrorists and subjected its international assets to a freeze, travel ban and arms embargo.

New era in Idlib

As Idlib, home to 4 million people, has become predominantly controlled by HTS, Julani has gradually begun to appear before the international press.

Regarding why he did not show his face in the first period, Julani said, ‘The Syrian revolution went through many stages. Showing my face in the first period would have caused some problems. But after the Syrian revolution found its own character, I opened my face. Giving interviews is my duty. I have to explain what is happening in Syria. We are one of the main elements of the country, but we have taken positions according to the period.’

Earlier, in an interview with Martin Smith in February 2021, he said: ‘We represent part of an important event in the Syrian revolution and we have a mission to convey the true image of the Syrian revolution to the world in an accurate way. The Syrian revolution is important for many people in the world. First of all, it is a revolution that has been treated unfairly, rising against a tyrant who is a criminal and a tyrant, killing his people. More than a million people have been killed. There are more than 400 thousand to 500 thousand people. There are women tortured and raped in prisons. There are millions of homes, schools and hospitals destroyed. That is why the truth about this case deserves to reach the whole world in an accurate way. There are some people who are trying to tarnish the image of the revolution; some are enemies, some are not. They are trying to tarnish the image of the revolution and define it in a certain way. Our role and mission in defending the people, defending their security, their religion, their dignity, their property, and standing against a criminal tyrant like Bashar al-Assad, means that it is also our duty to convey this image through your platform or any platform that can convey the truth to everyone in the world.’

Speaking to a US reporter for the first time in 2021, al-Jawlani drew attention with his suit / Photo: PBS

It is not right to wage war on the US and Europeans from Syria

Julani says in an interview with CNN (6 December 2024) that he has gone through periods of transformation over the years:

A person in their 20s will have a different personality from someone in their 30s or 40s, and certainly from someone in their fifties. This is human nature.

Julani was seen in the Aleppo Citadel with the capture of Aleppo and other places. He had with him and in the interview the flag of the Syrian Revolution, which they had not used before. Julani insists that in this new period, their policy is not based on any enmity and that it is not their policy to carry out external operations from Syria:

Yes, we have criticised some Western policies in the region, but it is not right to wage war against the US and Europeans from Syria. First of all, we do not act like rulers in the region. We are fully part of the Syrian revolution and the Syrian revolution cannot be limited to one person. It is a people's revolution.

The other thing is that this is an unfair categorisation. It is a political label that has no reality or credibility, because during our 10-year journey in this revolution, we have not posed any threat to the Western or European society: no security threat, no economic threat, nothing. So this categorisation is politicised.

We call on the countries that have taken these measures to review their policies towards this revolution. Most importantly, above all, this region does not pose a threat to the security of Europe and America. It is not a theatre for foreign operations. First of all, this.

Another point is that there are some wrong policies adopted by the international community against the Syrian revolution. For example, despite the fact that Bashar al-Assad has carried out dozens of chemical attacks against his people, he still continues to be recognised internationally. In fact, it was said that there were more than 100 attacks. And he has destroyed schools, killed children and women, dropped barrel bombs on people in villages and towns, and destroyed great civilisations like Homs and Aleppo.

Julani acknowledges that some of the Syrian circumstances and some of the practices of the past have been wrong, but he says it is not one-sided:

We recognise that innocent people have been killed. If someone did it and was associated with ISIS or others, we say that we do not support these policies. We are against the killing of innocent people, even if we are oppressed and defending our rights.

When this increased and escalated, it led to a divergence between us and ISIS for these reasons, because ISIS adopted wrong policies in managing the conflict and the conflicts that took place or even resorted to killing some innocent people. When it reached that level, we separated and we distanced ourselves from those who were killing innocent people. That was the defining compass.

I repeat again and again that our relationship with al-Qaeda at that time in the past was a phase and it ended and even at that time when we were with al-Qaeda, we were against external attacks and it is completely against our policies to conduct external operations from Syria targeting European or American people. This was not part of our calculations and we never did it.

Anti-government fighters in Syria shout in triumph as a military vehicle drives through the streets of Hama on 5 December 2024 / Photo: Abdel Aziz Ketaz-AFP

What does he think about suicide bombers?

Regarding suicide bombers, he stated that they do not target civilians, but they use suicide bombers for military targets:

You have used suicide bombers, right? Yes, we have used martyrs in some battles. What does that mean? This is a weapon. We don't have aeroplanes that we can use to fight the enemy.

But the question is: against whom were the martyrs deployed? The martyrs were deployed against the Shabiha [state-sponsored militias] and the Iranian and Russian militias that tried to enter the area and at one point attacked protesters and killed innocent people.

We used the martyrs against them. This is not an act of infamy; it is an honourable act. A man sacrifices himself because he wants to defend innocent people who are being killed... so it is a means. It's a means, not an end in itself. If we had aeroplanes, we would use aeroplanes. If we had artillery to replace the martyrdom, we would save those brothers and use those weapons. So what is the difference between an aeroplane that kills innocent people and drops barrel bombs, which is not condemnable, and an aeroplane that wants to protect those innocent people and sacrifices itself so that they can live safely?

Regarding foreign fighters, Julani said: ‘Our Muhajir brothers came to Syria to help us. We thank them very much for their efforts. We will definitely not give up on them. They are a part of us now. They are intertwined with the people. They are happy with the people and the people are happy with them. These people are not a threat to their own state. They are under our politics. And our politics is not based on enmity against any country. We have enmity with those who occupied Syria and killed Syrians. We are fighting them within Syrian borders. I would like to repeat, our muhajir brothers are now a part of us. We will protect them according to our religion and culture,’ he said, recognising that they are part of Syria.

Regarding the targeting of innocent people, Julani said:

Many people with conscience, consciousness and a real understanding of Islam and religion were against the killing of any innocent person, even if it would lead to the killing of many enemies. But one innocent person was to be killed. This is not something that is religiously acceptable and justifiable.

Julani, who uses the term ‘People's Revolution’ for Syria, states that they want to liberate the country from the tyrant:

"We are in a people's revolution, a war to liberate a people from a tyrant who rules this country. We realise that there are many risks surrounding the Syrian revolution, but this is the equation. We compensate for this with the spirit of faith that we carry and our determination in our principles and goals, and we will always work on this. We have the ability to continue making sacrifices, God willing, until the last drop of blood in our veins, until we achieve our goals.

Stating that the conflict in Syria is like a mailbox for some countries, Julani draws attention to the interests and summarises the interests of countries in Syria as follows:

The conflict in Syria has worsened. It is no longer a conflict between the same peoples. Unfortunately for some countries - because of policies driven by their different interests - it has become more like a mailbox for them.

Russia doesn't care much about the regime, but it uses it as an excuse to reach the Mediterranean coast with all its natural gas and warm waters. These are their interests and that's what they are focussing on. They are also trying to get back on the international stage, having lost from the Soviet Union in the early 90s of the last decade.

As for the Iranians, they have very big interests in the region, interests that go back to ancient history, ancient history, the interests of the ancient Persian state, the Persian empire that existed in this region, ruled the region for a period and then withdrew from the region. They fought with the Romans and later with the Byzantines for this region. Now they are trying to regain their former glory. So they are focussing on Iraq, because Iraq was part of their empire. They are also focussing on Yemen, because at one point in pre-Islamic history Yemen was part of the Persian empire.

They are also focussing on Lebanon and Syria. The Iranians say this openly. They say:

'We are going to Syria. It will cost us at first, but it will come back with a big gain: we will get a harbour in the Mediterranean.'

The Mediterranean is, of course, of great importance, and any country with ambitions wants access to it. Russia shares this interest. Iran is also openly saying:

'We are taking resources; we are taking phosphate and transporting it there. We make Iraq and Syria consumers of Iranian goods, and we have about 7 billion dollars worth of goods exported to Iraq every year, and a little less to Syria.'

So this and at the same time, they are using the Shiite doctrine to achieve their goals and the interests they have sought throughout history.

The revolution had almost defeated the regime. In 2015, we were on the verge of reaching very delicate, very important positions. When the regime and the Iranians felt that they were about to lose Syria in favour of the revolution, despite the support they received from the Iranians and despite the lack of support for the Syrian revolution from any country, when the regime and the Iranians felt that they were about to lose Syria in favour of the revolution, Qassem Soleimani himself went to Putin and persuaded him to enter Syria, and of course the Americans and Europeans tested the waters to see how he would perceive it. There was silence. The green light was given for the Russians to enter Syria. After the Russians entered Syria, there was a new attempt or opportunity to revitalise the regime, but thank God, the regime did not go very far…"

Julani is strongly opposed to the perception of HTS as ‘Salafist “ or ”jihadist’ in this transformative context:

"First of all, I believe that limiting the definition of HTS to only ‘Salafist’ or ‘jihadist’ needs a long discussion and I don't want to comment on it now because it would require a lot of research and study. Today we are trying to talk about Islam in its true concept, Islam that seeks to spread justice, that seeks to build and progress, that seeks to protect women and their rights and education.

Therefore, if we accept that there is Islamic rule in the liberated areas, we can say that, God willing, there are universities full of students, two thirds of them are women students. There are more than 450,000 to 500,000 students enrolled in schools. There are fully functioning hospitals in the liberated areas and there are people working to build towns and lay roads. Others are trying to establish an economic system where people can live safely and peacefully. And there is a judicial system that aims to give people back their rights and not just punish criminals in the way some people think when they hear that it is an Islamic or Salafist group. Of course, I am not claiming that the situation in Idlib is ideal."

As for the question‘How do we solve this problem, how do we get out of this trap we are in?’ , Julani is probably the best person to answer this question.

His answer is as follows:

"The solution is simple. That is, we need to focus on the causes rather than the symptoms. The cause of this problem, this great disaster, is this regime. When it is no longer there, this great catastrophe will disappear, this great catastrophe in which people are suffering, neighbouring countries are suffering, the whole world in general is suffering. Therefore, the main thing is to overthrow this regime, to try in every possible way to overthrow it."

To the question ‘Were you happy that the leader of ISIS, Baghdadi, was killed?’ , Julani replies, while everyone accuses him of acting in the spirit of ISIS:

I was not happy that he was killed by the Americans. I wish he had been captured and held to account by the revolution for all his crimes against the revolution. I did not know that Baghdadi was in Idlib.

When he sends a message to the Americans, he wants it to reach everyone, especially the neighbouring countries:

"Our message to them is short. We do not pose any threat to you here, so there is no need to classify people as terrorists and declare a reward for killing them. Besides, all this does not negatively affect the Syrian revolution. This is the most important message. The second message is that American policies in the region, and especially in Syria, are wrong policies that require major changes, as we mentioned in relation to Iran and Russia. But we, the people, the Syrian revolution, do not trust the Americans or any neighbouring country. For 10 years, we have known that this revolution was born alone and will remain alone and will conquer alone, God willing."

Julani knows very well that the conditions have changed.

Julani and his organisation, who say that the conditions have changed, have actually shown that they have separated from the past with the declarations and actions they have published in these recent operations.

In the new period, it would not be surprising to see HTS, which has dissolved itself, and Julani, who has withdrawn from the leadership, and the cities taken are governed by joint councils.

The question is not only the sincerity of HTS and Julani on this issue, but also whether those who are sceptical of them will make room for them and whether the revolution will eat its own children.

We will wait and see.