Twenty years after the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus remain among its most problematic legacies: The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 erupted over two breakaway Georgian provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues to claim victims each year, and to undermine further reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia.
Where do these conflicts stand today; what factors impede a settlement; whether the resumption of armed hostilities is a serious threat; whether changes in the negotiating format might yield a better outcome; and what, if anything, could the US do to facilitate a resolution?
TURAN’s Washington DC correspondent discussed those questions with Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff, Adjunct Fellow at the Russia & Eurasia Program of Center for Strategic & International Studies
Mr. Mankoff was a 2010-2011 Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow based at the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Early this year he has prepared a report on “The Big Caucasus: Between fragmentation and integration”.
Q. Four years have passed from the war between Russia and Georgia. How does the region
look like today? Where do both sides -Moscow and Tbilisi stand today; which factors impede a settlement between the two?
A. Neither side appears likely to give ground on the central issue of South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s legal status (Russia has recognized them as independent states, while Georgia and much of the rest of the world regards them as occupied territory). With political uncertainty rife in both Russia and Georgia, governments have an incentive to play to nationalist passions, and a disincentive to seek compromise.
The other obstacles to a settlement are the same ones that have existed since the early 1990s: the fact that inhabitants of the two regions do not want to be under Georgian sovereignty, the question of refugees, and the competing geopolitical ambitions of Moscow and Tbilisi.
Q. Even today there’re some concerns about Russia “itching for war” with Georgia. Do you think the West /US will let Russians to intervene into Georgia again?
A. It’s not about “letting” Russia intervene. As Moscow proved in 2008, it has the ability to act in the region regardless of what the West/U.S. prefers. The question is really about how Moscow views its interests and what the impact of intervention would be on them. I don’t think the Russian government expected either the economic consequences or the international isolation it endured over the 2008 conflict. Most likely it will be warier in the future. Of course, if the West decides to re-open the question of Georgia’s NATO membership, Russia could decide it has no choice given how Moscow views NATO and the possibility of NATO expansion, especially in the post-Soviet region.
Q. You're closely researching Russia's influential policy in the region, as well as the Western policy. How would you highlight differences between Russia and the Western policy - their expectations and concerns - in the South Caucasus?
A. Russia and the West have been able to cooperate in the region to a certain degree (e.g. in the Minsk Group), but in some ways, their interests do not overlap. Russia continues to view the South Caucasus as an area where Russian interests should predominate—primarily because of its proximity to the North Caucasus and because of the impact on Russia’s energy strategy.
As for other regional powers, Turkey is increasingly a major player, but is more sensitive to Russian interests than most other NATO members. China has some economic presence too. And while their focus is on problems closer to home right now, the Europeans are important as trading partners (especially as buyers of Caspian energy) and for their encouragement of political change through various EU outreach mechanisms like the Eastern Partnership.
Q. Many here in Washington DC point out that after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war the prospects for settling unresolved conflicts in the region seem more remote than ever.
What kind of changes in the negotiating format do you think might yield a better outcome to facilitate a resolution?
A. A resumption of hostilities is always a threat. Right now the concern seems to be more about Nagorno-Karabakh than South Ossetia/Abkhazia. I don’t think the problem with any of the three conflicts is one of finding the right negotiating format as much as it is a question of what the interests of the various players are.
Q. Interesting, what would be the position of the US and Russia, in case of war in Nagorno-
Karabakh?
A. The US would do all it can to prevent a resumption of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. The
implications for the U.S.-Iranian struggle, not to mention relations with Russia and Turkey could be quite serious. The U.S. would be buffeted from all sides in the event of an actual conflict breaking out and would, I think, concentrate first and foremost on containing it and seeking a rapid ceasefire.
Q. Does the US sacrifice other problems of the region on the expense of security and energy cooperation, as well as its cooperation with Russia?
A. The US has a range of interests in the region that it seeks to balance—these include seeking stability and an eventual resolution of the protracted conflicts; promoting democratization; geopolitical concerns related to energy and trade; relations with regional powers like Russia, Turkey and Iran; and a host of other issues.
Q. There will be an election in the US in 2012. What positives and negatives can it possibly bring to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia and the entire region?
A. Hard to say. The region does not seem likely to be a major priority for whoever the next president is short of a major crisis (e.g. a war with Iran or resumption of hostilities in one or more of the protracted conflicts). The next president is going to have his hands full with fixing the U.S. economy and managing the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East.
Alakbar Raufoglu
Washington, DC
08/14/2012
Leave a review