Turkey will come to the fore again in regional cooperation

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Turan: In early November last year, some Western intelligence agencies reported that Russia would attack Ukraine in January-February 2022. Do you think that Turkey took this seriously and made the necessary preparations?

Çiçek: This information of the Western intelligence was serious, Russia was preparing for an attack. As for whether Turkey took this seriously: I think Turkey had been increasing diplomatic discussions in this context. If you remember, when the problems between Russia and Ukraine began, Turkey played the role of mediator. Although Turkey and Russia have sometimes failed to reach an agreement in Syria or Libya, Ankara's position was firm, especially on the Crimean issue. Therefore, as soon as Russia attacked, it demonstrated its position in accordance with the principle of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Turkey was ready for these processes. As for whether it was ready for war: there were preparations for it but the realization of this scenario depended on the ongoing behind-the-scenes discussions. Turkey has been closely watching the struggle between the United States and Russia in the Black Sea for a long time, and it is necessary to comment on the fact that the Montreux Convention is sometimes on the agenda in Turkey in this context. After the attempted military coup on July 15, 2016, we saw significant changes in Turkey's policy, not only in the Black Sea but also in the region as a whole, and these changes have begun to bear fruit.

Turan: On February 22, Russia recognized the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, which it has controlled since 2014, and on February 24, it attacked Ukraine. Western countries, especially the United States, reacted very harshly. Turkey was cautious. How would you comment on this: is President Erdoğan’s "I can neither dispense with Ukraine nor with Russia" policy being implemented or does the United States want the door to be open to some extent?

Çiçek: Western sanctions and Turkey's restraint are not new phenomena. Even after the occupation of Crimea, when Western countries began to impose sanctions on Russia, Turkey took a somewhat different position. Turkey also showed a different position when the decision was made on Iran's nuclear weapons. The reason for this must be sought in how sincere the Western countries are. Because Turkey is trying to develop a policy of balance, and in doing so, it puts its personal interests first. Therefore, Turkey has to act with restraint. Yes, Turkey is acting as a member of NATO; on the other hand, it wants to implement its own position on the issue of sanctions. And we see that the United States, the European Union, Russia, and Ukraine are not too worried about this policy. If the process takes a long time, is it possible for Turkey and these countries to have sharp differences in their positions and to part ways? You have to be patient to see it. In fact, Turkey is aware of this: no matter how many sanctions are imposed, the money for oil sold by Russia is transferred to Swiss banks. We see that the main purpose of the sanctions is to target Putin and the system he has established. In fact, Turkey has faced a similar situation in the recent past (for example, in the Halkbank investigation and trial in the United States), and one of the reasons for its restraint is that it is well aware of such processes. However, I think that if the situation worsens and the demands from Turkey become more stringent, Turkey can reconsider this position.

Turan: UAVs, which began to be sold to Ukraine in March 2019 - under former President Petro Poroshenko - are important in the development of relations between Turkey and Ukraine in recent years. Russia does not or is not able to oppose it. To what extent do you think arms sales will play a role in strengthening Turkey's role in the region?

Çiçek: After the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey strengthened its defense industry, and the production of UAVs and UCAVs gave Turkey a great advantage in the fight against the terrorist organization. The answer to the question of why Russia does not object to Turkey's arms sales to Ukraine should be sought in Syria. While Turkey sees the PYD/YPG as a terrorist organization, Russia is more lenient, and both countries do not pose a problem in this regard. The sale of UAVs to Ukraine is an arms trade, and if Russia protests, it should not be forgotten that Turkey has a lot of counter-arguments. The European press has greatly exaggerated the role of UAVs. There may be two goals here. First, they may be trying to make relations between Turkey and Russia tense. Second, Europe may welcome the role of the UAVs and UCAVs in this war, as Europe itself has not been able to provide adequate assistance to Ukraine in terms of weapons. In addition to the role played by the UAVs and UCAVs in strengthening Turkey's defense industry, it should be expected that its influence in the Russia-Ukraine war will increase Turkey's power in further processes. As a result, the principle of "either friend or foe" in Turkey's traditional foreign policy is slowly fading into the background. Until now, there have been either hostile or friendly policies in the different regions: Turkey and Russia may pursue conflicting policies in Syria or Libya, but in the case of Ukraine, for example, Turkey pursues its own independent policy and Russia does not strongly object to it. Because Turkey, which keeps its door open to some extent in its relations with Russia, also contributes to Russia's survival. I believe in the need to analyze the processes in this way.

Turan: You are a commentator who analyzes the world as it is, especially by closely and on-site monitoring of developments in the Middle East, the Gulf, and North Africa, and by obtaining information from primary sources. To what extent can Turkey's Ukraine policy play a decisive role in its future policy towards the above-mentioned regions?

Çiçek: Turkey's policy towards the Middle East and the Gulf countries should be divided into two stages: the period before and after the Arab Spring. In the first period, Turkey did not have serious problems with the Middle East, the Gulf, and North Africa. The main reason for Turkey's support for the Muslim Brotherhood at the time was that there was no other alternative, there was no other opposition to the regimes. Shortly after the Arab countries' policy of overthrowing Assad in Syria, they took a step back, for example, the West began to share Syria with Russia, and Iran began to share Syria with Russia. Therefore, Turkey's policy regarding the Middle East and the Gulf is beginning to return to the period before the Arab Spring. In this context, the agreements signed in the UAE began to have a significant positive impact on the process. These countries are also beginning to see that designs that are desired to be implemented in the region will not be possible without the participation of Turkey. Therefore, the issues of the defense industry, mutual cooperation, and regional integration are inevitable. Turkey has become a more important country, as they did not like US President Biden's policy towards the Middle East and the Gulf countries. Turkey has long been closely interested in the African continent, in particular, it has a very large amount of investment in Somalia. The situation in Somalia and Yemen is also very important in terms of the control of the Gulf. Turkey has begun to gain important positions in North Africa in the eyes of both states and peoples. But I think it's too early to say what the consequences will be in terms of US-China competition in Africa. Turkey is not in favor of the war in North Africa, but in favor of development within the framework of regional cooperation. Along with the development of the military industry, Turkey's superiority in trade and economic cooperation will increase the opportunities.

Turan: How will Ankara's radical policy changes on the Turkey-Saudi Arabia-UAE line affect the current situation in the region?

Çiçek: This also indicates changes in the policy of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel, as much as in the policy of Turkey. US-China competition in the region has reiterated the importance of regional cooperation. If you do not trust the United States, you will inevitably strengthen regional cooperation. One of the strongest countries in the region is Iran, the other is Turkey. The approach of the Gulf countries to the Shiite state of Iran is decisive, and there can be no question of any rapprochement. Turkey's ability to keep Qatar afloat despite all the pressure from the Arab world by sending its troops there within 24 hours showed Ankara's strength. At the same time, its position in Libya demonstrated Ankara's strength. Turkey's more moderate stance on the Brotherhood and Hamas in recent years has led the Gulf states to reconsider the relations. In the Russia-Ukraine war, the reason for Turkey's indispensability in transporting energy to Europe became clear once again. The issue of NATO's immortality was re-dictated to Europe by the United States in this war, and Europe embraced NATO. But when it comes to energy, Turkey is still at the most important point: Egypt, Qatar, Iran, as well as Turkey have a very strong position in transporting Israeli gas to Europe. After the Arab Spring, Egypt and North Africa correctly analyzed the changes in Turkey's regional policy in the Gulf countries, and each country put its terms on the table again. I think that the integration process in the region will be accelerated. In this process, Syria is very likely to return to the Arab League. After the UAE and Israel, our relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt are also likely to improve. The key question here is how the West will view this cooperation and whether it will accept the loss of the arms market. Russia's attack on Ukraine has increased Turkey's importance for NATO, Russia, and the Gulf states. Therefore, the sooner Turkey completes the process of developing democracy and strengthening the economy within the country, it will again become a model country, which will have a positive impact on the Gulf countries. From Karabakh to Syria and Libya, we have all seen what Turkey is doing and can do. If there is no economic crisis, I think Turkey’s future is bright.