Diplomatic shifts between Azerbaijan and Armenia: towards post-war compromises

Following the tumultuous 44-day war that swept through the South Caucasus in 2020, the long-standing diplomatic rivalry between Azerbaijan and Armenia seems to be undergoing a transformation aimed at further  solidifying its outcomes. Recent escalations, marked by Azerbaijan's military buildup along the Armenian border and in the Karabakh region, have significantly bolstered Baku's position at the negotiation table, compelling Armenia to accept yet another proposed compromise.

Under this new agreement, Armenia has agreed to utilize the Aghdam road, a vital communication link that bridges the Armenian-populated sector of Karabakh with the rest of Azerbaijan. The first shipment under the Russian flag is slated to arrive in Karabakh on September 10. In return, Azerbaijan will facilitate the movement of humanitarian aid from Armenia through the Lachin corridor, contingent upon the withdrawal of remaining Armenian armed forces from Karabakh. It is crucial to emphasize that there is no dispute over Azerbaijan's authority to conduct border and customs supervision along this road.

Another key demand from Baku, calling for a change in the leadership of the separatist entity in Karabakh, has been met. The Aliyev administration refused to engage with individuals associated with crimes against Azerbaijanis during the first Karabakh war. The newly appointed separatist leader, Samvel Shahramanyan, by virtue of his age, has no such connections to these past crimes. His swift agreement to open the Aghdam route and engage in negotiations with Baku suggests that the leadership change was a prerequisite for Azerbaijan's willingness to engage in dialogue.

Importantly, Azerbaijan's actions have not unfolded in isolation but have garnered approval from international mediators, including the United States, France, the European Union, and Russia. These mediators have consistently underscored the imperative nature of using the Lachin and Aghdam routes, effectively endorsing Azerbaijan's efforts to reinforce its sovereignty over Karabakh.

This diplomatic maneuvering eventually led to Armenia's recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, which encompasses Nagorno-Karabakh. These acknowledgments were first made in Prague on October 6, 2022, and subsequently in Brussels on May 14, 2023, during negotiations between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and President Ilham Aliyev. The final decision to unfreeze the blockade in Karabakh may well have materialized during the G20 summit, where key stakeholders convened. Just before the summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan held discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin, touching upon various issues, including Karabakh, prior to  participation in the summit held in New Delhi.

In the near future, we may witness a new phase of post-conflict peace-building in the protracted 35-year-old Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, which, as a result of Armenia's claims to Nagorno-Karabakh,  given rise to two wars, ethnic cleansing, tens of thousands of casualties, and over a million refugees on both sides. During discussions with high-level mediators, Prime Minister Pashinyan has expressed readiness for urgent peace talks with President Aliyev. Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, who has emerged as a respected regional mediator, recently engaged in a telephone conversation with Pashinyan, offering mediation services to facilitate such a meeting. It is likely that Garibashvili's initiative was extended with the approval of Aliyev and may reflect the conditions set forth by the Azerbaijani side. The public announcement of the conversation between Pashinyan and Garibashvili by both Armenian and Georgian officials indicates Yerevan's willingness to consider substantive proposals on Baku's terms, which were previously articulated by Pashinyan himself, based on the Prague and Brussels agreements reached by the parties.