Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin. TASS
Despite the secret agreement with Russia, not only handing over 5 commanders to Zelenskyy but also expressing the opinion in the form of "It is Ukraine's right to join NATO" displeased the Kremlin. Since September 2018, the main point of disagreement in the meetings of the heads of state of the two countries in Sochi and Moscow was Ankara's support for the jihadists in Idlib.
Even after Russia attacked Ukraine, Ankara, which always kept its doors open with Moscow and made huge financial profits, could not help but make its northern neighbor anxious when President Erdoğan made statements 180 degrees opposite to the interests of the Kremlin. Although the two friendly leaders were sometimes able to meet in the shortest possible time without prior planning, Mr. Erdoğan's statements when sending Zelenskyy overshadowed this situation, and it would not be wrong to describe the current situation by changing the famous gazal of Seyid Abulgasim Nabati in the following way:
Saba (light wind blowing in the morning) tell Gülüzar (lover whose cheeks are as red as roses)
Should Putin come to Ankara or not?
Should Tayyip go to Moscow or not?
It is useful to remind this fact that on February 26, 2020, when 33 Turkish soldiers were martyred on Syrian soil, the head of state Erdoğan decided to go to Moscow following a very straightforward policy and succeeded in signing a ceasefire agreement on March 6. Most likely, the Kremlin considered Mr. Erdoğan's handover of 5 Azov commanders to Zelenskyy and his open support for Ukraine's NATO membership as a "killing" blow against him, so that no agreement can be reached for a face-to-face meeting between the two heads of state, who are considered very close friends.
Due to the close and distant connection with this issue (depending on who looks at it from where), we should remind you that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi also decided not to come to Ankara and meet his Turkish counterpart at an international meeting. Some Turkish commentators do not rule out the possibility of Vladimir Putin's role in Sisi not coming to Ankara. Therefore, the processes taking place in this short period of time brought everyone with the right mind to the point of asking a series of questions in the relations between Turkey and Russia: "How will the head of state Erdoğan open this lock? Will he try to open it or not? In what direction will the future relations of the two countries go?". If Mr. Erdoğan does not make any attempt, will his Russian counterpart enter into a dialogue and look for ways to leave resentment behind?
As if giving the Azov commanders to Zelenskyy was not enough, what conjuncture and dynamics forced the head of state Erdoğan to say "It is Ukraine's right to join NATO"? Can Mr. Erdoğan's statements be considered a sharp role reversal (the role of a machine) towards the rewarming of relations with the West? If there is a strong share of truth in this possibility, then did the head of state of Turkey get serious information and analyze the "wet" nature of Russia's work in Ukraine?
Those who follow Turkey's foreign policy should not forget this fact: In March 2011, the head of the government at that time, who asked what NATO was doing in Libya, supported NATO's plan to conduct an operation in Libya not much but 1 week later. After the transfer of the Azov commanders to Zelenskyy, the grain corridor was closed again: Although the Russian head of state, who opened the corridor despite its repeated closure, by not abandoning the request of the Turkish head of state, he said that the "corridor", which has been closed for about 3 weeks, was not related to the handing over of the Azov commanders to Zelenskyy, to put it in a famous phrase in Turkey, "Buna Kadir Inanır" (“Pull the other leg!”).
If Russia is behind Assad's negative response to the message of Mr. Erdoğan, who sent a mild message to the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad on the normalization of relations while he was looking for money in the wealthy Arab countries of the Gulf, then it should not be difficult to predict that Vladimir Putin will make things difficult in the near future of Moscow-Ankara relations. In this case, Ankara may face a wide array of problems.
Can Baku demonstrate its weight in mitigating those problems?
I mean its increasing weight on Ankara every day...
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