FRAMING OF LANGUAGE AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN POST-SOVIET AZERBAIJAN

Kyle L. Marquardt

Harvard University

marquard@fas.harvard.edu

Draft prepared for presentation at the Conference on Caucasus Studies: Migration, Society, Language; Malmoe, Sweden, November 28-30, 2008.1

Language is one of the main factors in building a nation... If people don`t love their own

country and if they don`t have their own language, they can never become a strong nation.

Heydar Aliev, former president of Azerbaijan2

After the reinstatement of the Republic of Azerbaijan"s independence of course the

importance of the language is increasing... I hope that both the independent government

of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani language will be eternal.

Ali Kerimli, Azerbaijani opposition leader3

As the above quotations indicate, the importance of the Azerbaijani language to the Azerbaijani people and thereby the Azerbaijani state is one of the few topics on which Azerbaijan"s government and its domestic opposition agrees. Azerbaijani thus clearly acts as a "prominently ideologized symbol" of the state and its titular ethnicity, as one might expect in a state where nationalism and the nation largely coincide.4 At the same time, the peculiarities of Azerbaijan"s history have resulted in a situation where the meaning of this "ideologized symbol" remains very much in debate, as Azerbaijan"s troubled past and contentious present permeates political rhetoric surrounding its language policy.

The initial post-Soviet Azerbaijani government of Abulfez Elcibey (1992-1993) emphasized both the primacy of the Azerbaijani language and its relation to Turkish; this government gave way to the regime of Heydar Aliev (1993-2003), who positioned himself in contrast with the Elcibey government. Under the Yeni Azerbaijan Party (YAP) government of Aliev, language policy emphasized the uniqueness of the Azerbaijani language while maintaining a moderate pan-Turkic stance. This policy continued when

1 I would like to thank Timothy Colton, Geoffrey Wright and participants in Harvard"s Central Asia and the Caucasus Working Group for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. In Azerbaijan, the assistance of both Shahin Hajiyev and Nazim Dadasov (who also acted as my Azerbaijani-English interpreter) was essential to this project. I conducted this research while a Thomas J. Watson Fellow. All views expressed here are my own, as are any errors of interpretation or omission.2 In Blair, B. (2001). Interview: Azerbaijan`s President, Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan International. 9: 14-18. 3 Author"s Interview with Kerimli (2006) 4 Fishman, J. A. (1968). Nationality-Nationalism and Nation-Nationism. Language Problems of Developing Nations. J. A. Fishman, C. A. Ferguson and J. D. Gupta. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: 39-52. pg.

43. Ethnic Azeris constitute 90.6 percent of the population of Azerbaijan according to a 1999 survey. In (2009). `Azerbaijan.` The World Factbook Retrieved April 18, 2009, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html.

Heydar Aliev was succeeded in the post of president by his son, Ilham Aliev (2003­present).

During this entire time, however, a question remains as to how much of this policy was symbolic. A useful comparison for language politics in contemporary Azerbaijan can be found in Bhavna Dave"s work on Kazakhstan, wherein she argues that the Kazakh elite declared the primacy of the Kazakh language and thus both the nation"s sovereignty and the primacy of the Kazakhs there. Whether or not Kazakhstan actually became a Turkophone country was largely irrelevant; the symbolism of the gesture was what mattered. 5 Though the russification of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan was much more widespread than that of Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan,6 I argue that the principle purpose of language policy is the same in both countries. Now that Azerbaijani has been declared the official language of Azerbaijan, the issue is perceived to be settled: development of the Azerbaijani language is to be left to natural processes, with little government involvement. Likewise, though Russophones are now largely accepted by politicians across the spectrum in Azerbaijan, they are largely left to their own devices in adapting to the new Azerbaijani-centered order. Furthermore, the overwhelming demographic dominance of Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan means that, although lip-service is paid to maintaining diversity, minorities are expected to adopt a civic identity that is largely the same as ethnic "Azerbaijani" identity.


The APF Government: Post-Colonial and Pan-Turkic Policies Later Portrayed as Dangerous

Following Soviet violence against ethnic-Azerbaijani protesters in 1990 and in conjunction with perceived Soviet support of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh during the final years of the Soviet Union, widespread anti-Soviet sentiment erupted in Azerbaijan, mortally wounding the Soviet Azerbaijani government.7 Like the governments of many other Soviet republics at the time, the Azerbaijani government attempted to adopt a new nationalist facade in response to the upswing of nationalist sentiment. However, the government had competition in the nationalist sphere: the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), one of whose main tenets was Azerbaijani national revival. Utilizing the government"s association with the hated Soviet regime and its continuing losses in the secessionist region of Nagorno-Karabakh, the APF gained the necessary popular support to stage a coup 1992.

The resulting APF government was strongly nationalist in tone; 8 as the APF was in power for only one (anarchic) year, this tone is the most memorable aspect of their

5 Dave, B. (2007). Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power. New York, Routledge. 6 In 1989, 34.4 percent of Azeris claimed knowledge of Russian, compared to 60.4 percent of Kazakhs (Soviet Population Census in Landau, J. M. and B. Kellner-Heinkele (2001). Politics of Language in the Ex-Soviet Muslim States. London, Hurst and Company. pg. 56. For a more in-depth 7 My analysis of the rise and fall of the APF follows Hunter, S. T. (1994). Azerbaijan: Search for Identity and Independence. The Transcaucasus in Transition. S. T. Hunter. Washington, D.C., The Center for Strategic & International Studies: 58-95. pg. 68-79. 8 Landau, J. M. and B. Kellner-Heinkele (2001). Politics of Language in the Ex-Soviet Muslim States. London, Hurst and Company. pg. 69.

cultural program, especially insofar as the following Aliev governments have used it to their political advantage. Of vital importance is that the Aliev governments have portrayed the APF government as being anti-Russian and oriented against the speakers of non-Turkic languages, which alienated these populations and led to ethnic unrest. Though it is difficult to pinpoint the causes of ethnic unrest during the APF government given the government"s lack of control over its territory during this period, that the period was marked by ethnic instability is clear: in addition to the ethnic conflict with Armenians over Nagorno-Karabakh, Russians and Russophones fled Azerbaijan, while ethnic unrest occurred among two other principle Azerbaijani ethnicities, the Talysh and Lezghin.

Furthermore, whether or not the nationalism of the APF regime was "true" has been called into question due to its strong pan-Turkic elements; as Shireen Hunter notes, the "cultural policy of the APF government can be summed up in one phrase: the Turkeyization of Azerbaijan." Surrounded by states that it perceived as either active or potential enemies and searching for a national identity, the Elcibey government strongly aligned itself with Turkey, a regional power that had perpetually asserted its fraternal ties to Azerbaijan and was perceived as an essential ally.9 The Elcibey government performed its "Turkeyization" of Azerbaijani culture by broadcasting Turkish television programs, taking the initial steps toward conversion from a Cyrillic to a Latin alphabet, and using Turkish vocabulary in their speeches. Most controversially, it also officially designated the Azerbaijani language as "Turkish,"10 relegating differences between the two languages to dialectical differences. This final aspect of this program was greatly unpopular, leading to protests and demonstrations that forced the APF government to back down and instead refer to the national language as "Azerbaijani Turkish,"11 a designation that still emphasized the relation of Turkish to Azerbaijani, but differentiated the two languages.

Despite this concession, the APF"s overzealous pan-Turkism provided the government of Heydar Aliev a means by which to usurp the mantle of linguistic nationalism: under Aliev, the uniqueness of the Azerbaijani language assumed paramount importance, even while the emphasis on the primacy of Azerbaijani diminished.


Heydar Aliev, Protector of a Unique Azerbaijani for a Independent Azerbaijan

9 Ceylan Tokluoglu notes that "the emphasis on Turkism can be considered as a measure against both internal and external threats."Tokluoglu, C. (2005). `Definitions of National Identity, Nationalism and Ethnicity in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan in the 1990s.` Ethnic and Racial Studies 28(4): 722-758. pg. 737. 10 Hunter, S. T. (1994). Azerbaijan: Search for Identity and Independence. The Transcaucasus in Transition.

S. T. Hunter. Washington, D.C., The Center for Strategic & International Studies: 58-95. pg. 84. 11 Ibid. pg. 84. Whether or not Turkish and Azeri are similar-but-distinct languages or dialects of the same language is a question largely beyond the purview of this analysis. However, it should be noted that while the degree of mutual intelligibility between the two languages (Azeri and Turkish speakers are generally able to communicate using their respective languages when speaking with each other) lends credence to the dialect argument, there are significant grammatical and lexical differences (e.g. Azeri has no present progressive tense, whereas Turkish does; Azeri has retained more of its Persian and Arabic terminology than Turkish, and has added Russian words).

As the government of Elcibey proved itself inept in fighting Armenian forces involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, popular disapproval with the government grew. The government"s inability to control the chaos into which Azerbaijan had descended proved to be the APF"s downfall: unable or unwilling to combat a military coup, in 1993 Elcibey ceded power to the Heydar Aliev, the Soviet-era Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary.

Given that ties to the hated Soviet regime had fatally injured the immediate post-Communist regime, Aliev faced the danger of being perceived as another russified Soviet apparatchik: he himself noted that rumors had circulated in Azerbaijan that he had forgotten his language.12 Aliev countered such claims by presenting himself as a long-standing champion of the Azerbaijani language on an issue fundamental to the independent Azerbaijani identity: the designation of Azerbaijani as one of the two official languages of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic in the constitution of 1978.13

David Laitin"s model of post-colonial language shift provides a rationale for Aliev"s early nationalism: members of the peripheral elite that mediate between the center and the periphery are never accepted into the central culture, despite learning the language of the center,14 and under such conditions, "the most ambitious and powerful members of the periphery will operate with an eye to their homeland, rather than to the state that controls it."15 By defending Azerbaijan symbolically, Aliev assured that the population of Azerbaijan would view him as a national leader, and not just a conveyor of orders from Moscow. Since both government and opposition figures cite the official language status of Azerbaijani in the 1978 Constitution as being integral part of Azerbaijani identity,16 Aliev"s Soviet-era nationalism in this regard paid off by providing him with great symbolic dividends in the post-Soviet era. Furthermore, Aliev linked this perception to his post-independence presidency by taking credit for the designation of Azerbaijani as the sole national language in the 1998 Azerbaijani Constitution, which he described as a continuation of his earlier policies.17

Having thus protected himself against charges of russification, Aliev could take a more moderate stance toward the Russian language, which served to lessen tensions with Russophones in Azerbaijan. As Martin Landau and Barbara Kellner-Heinkele describe his attitude toward Russian, Aliev "assumed a more sympathetic attitude toward Russian. He repeatedly pointed out that all Azerbaijanis were Russophones and most would prefer to express themselves in Russian rather than otherwise; and he declared that it would be impossible to separate the Azerbaijanis from the Russian language"18

12 In Blair, B. (2001). Interview: Azerbaijan`s President, Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan International. 9: 14-18. 13 In Ibid. 14 In fact, Aliev proudly asserts that "Russians tell me that I speak Russian better than they do themselves." In Ibid. 15 Laitin, D. D. (1988). `Language Games.` Comparative Politics 20(3): 289-302. pg. 62. 16 Author"s Interviews with Qambar, Qurbanli and Seyidov (2006). 17 In Blair, B. (2001). Interview: Azerbaijan`s President, Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan International. 9: 14-18. 18 Landau, J. M. and B. Kellner-Heinkele (2001). Politics of Language in the Ex-Soviet Muslim States. London, Hurst and Company. pg. 79.

The popular disapproval with the pan-Turkic ties of the APF provided the Aliev government with another means to counter accusations of being overly pro-Russian (as might be assumed by his Soviet background) by accusing the APF government of actually betraying Azerbaijani national identity in their pan-Turkism: Heydar Aliev referred to the designation of Azerbaijani as Turkish as "great treachery."19 Once in power, the official designation of the Azerbaijani language switched to "Azerbaijani" from "Azerbaijani Turkish,"20 a move that demonstrated his Azerbaijani government"s distance from Turkey and also appeased Russia, which had been concerned with Azerbaijan"s growing ties with its ethnic-relative state.21

Heydar Aliev also moved to culturally outflank the remnants of the APF, which now largely comprised the domestic opposition to his government, by claiming credit for the implementation of the Azerbaijani script change from Cyrillic to Latin. However, in keeping with his attempts to accentuate Azerbaijani"s particular identity, official propaganda surrounding the script now focuses on the aspects of the script unique to Azerbaijani, thereby differentiating it from the Latin-based Turkish.

As the visual symbol of the Azerbaijani language, the script holds great value as a marker of the language"s (and thus the speakers of the language"s) identity.22 In countries that have changed their script, the Cyrillic script is generally described as a symbol of Soviet oppression; the Latin script is seen as symbolizing a link to the future. Specifically, the script change culturally links post-Soviet states the Latin-script using states of the West and other Turkic states.23

In Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani activists had been agitating for the script change even during the perestroika period, and the pan-Turkic sentiments of the APF made their government receptive to the idea.24 However, though the Azerbaijani script change was initially legislated in 1991 implementation languished25 until Heydar Aliev set a deadline for mandatory script change.26 By doing so, he was able to claim script reform as largely his own doing, as opposed to a success of the APF government.27

19 In Blair, B. (2001). Interview: Azerbaijan`s President, Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan International. 9: 14-18. 20 The word "Azerbaijani" can be used interchangeably with "Azeri." 21 Landau, J. M. and B. Kellner-Heinkele (2001). Politics of Language in the Ex-Soviet Muslim States. London, Hurst and Company. pg. 152.22 For a more in-depth discussion of script change, see Sebba, M. (2006). `Ideology and Alphabets in the Former USSR.` Language Problems & Language Planning 30(2): 99-125. pg. 100. 23 Ibid. pg. 104, 110-111. 24 Landau, J. M. and B. Kellner-Heinkele (2001). Politics of Language in the Ex-Soviet Muslim States. London, Hurst and Company. pg. 131-132. 25 Landau and Kellner-Heinkele note that the Azeri leadership was facing economic pressures and "visibly less committed to alphabet change," and "the extensive programme for alphabet change has been only carried out in part only." Ibid. pg.133. 26 In 2006, the Cyrillic script was visible only on decaying out-of-the-way monuments and some aging marshrutkas (research notes, 2006) 27 The swift implementation date also had the result of affecting opposition newspapers more than government-financed newspapers, thus also providing a blow to the opposition, which Heydar Aliev, as could be expected, did not view to be a significant concern. In Blair, B. (2001). Interview: Azerbaijan`s President, Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan International. 9: 14-18.

However, the script posed a dilemma for the government in that one of its main virtues, linking Azerbaijani to the Latin-script using Turkic states, was also one of its main vices: it made Azerbaijani greatly resemble the Turkish language due to the close lexical and grammatical relationship of the languages. Official propaganda related to the Azerbaijani language therefore tends to accentuate the difference between the two languages: both on propaganda posters and the five manat bill (which features the Azerbaijani alphabet)28 the Azerbaijani letter "Ə" is the most prominent letter; it and the letter "Q" are the only two letters contained in the Azerbaijani alphabet and not in the Turkish alphabet. Though Azerbaijan adopted the Latin alphabet, the Aliev government makes it clear that Azerbaijan had adopted its own Latin alphabet.


Pan-Turkism in Azerbaijan Today

While Aliev"s focus on the uniqueness of the Azerbaijani language indicates that the era of overreaching pan-Turkism has passed, the link between Azerbaijani and the other Turkic languages provides opportunities to link the geographically and demographically small Azerbaijan to a greater Turkic community. The government therefore acknowledges this link, albeit within the limits created by the discourse of Azerbaijani uniqueness. Meanwhile, the opposition has maintained its strong Turkic orientation, though this has been tempered with time and the shifting political climate.

Though he continually emphasized Azerbaijani"s uniqueness, Heydar Aliev was careful not to totally renounce Azerbaijan"s links to Turkey and Turkish. In the interview where he spoke of the APF"s pan-Turkic cultural treachery he continued on to say that "It`s true that out of all of these Turkic family languages, Azerbaijani and Turkish are the most similar to each other...when we have meetings with any of the six countries where Turkic languages are spoken, the Turkish President and I are the only ones who can communicate in our native languages. I speak Azerbaijani and he speaks Turkish."29

Whereas in that interview, Aliev distanced Azerbaijani and Turkish from the other Turkic languages, other Aliev-associated governmental political figures are bolder in asserting the mutual intelligibility of the Turkic languages. YAP Deputy Secretary Mubariz Qurbanli remarked that over 200 million people can understand Azerbaijani, and that he can speak to people from Moldova to China in his language.30 The advantages of such a connection are clear: Azerbaijan, with a population of approximately six million, may be small, but the Turkic "family" is immense.

Like government officials, members of the opposition also claim the advantages membership in the Turkic community. However, being wary of the negative reaction to earlier pan-Turkic claims, they are more guarded about pan-Turkic sentiment than earlier. Ali Kerimli, the Chairman of the Popular Front Party, notes that Turkish and Azerbaijani

28 Madeleine Buet provided this insight about the five manat bill (personal correspondence, 2006) 29 In Blair, B. (2001). Interview: Azerbaijan`s President, Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan International. 9: 14-18. 30 Author"s Interview with Qurbanli. (2006).

have the same roots, and he has no problem communicating with Turks;31 Isa Gambar, the Chairman of the Musavat Party, notes that Azerbaijani and Turkish became distinct during the Soviet period, noting that "we are not a small people" because of the ties to Turkish and the Turkic languages.32


A Post-Colonial Russophone Elite and the Problem of Russian

Though Heydar Aliev"s reputation as an Azerbaijani nationalist is largely unquestioned in Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani language poses a problem for the current Azerbaijani regime in that Aliev"s successor, his son Ilham Aliev, has nationalistic credentials that are belied by his reported russification. However, memories of the polarizing APF government in Azerbaijan make criticisms of the president"s personal language preferences ineffective, especially as Aliev exhibits a commitment to Azerbaijani. In fact, Heydar Aliev"s acceptance of Russophones is now largely shared by both the government and the opposition: while the use of Russian in public by high officials is impermissible, its use elsewhere holds little stigma.

Post-independence, perceptions of elite assimilation could be politically damning. The local population, resentful of elite"s past interlocutor role and the attendant corruption, view the elite as compromised. 33 With the return of the Aliev family to power in Azerbaijan, the opposition34 has seized upon Ilham Aliev"s reputation of being russified,35 as a means to portray him as being an anti-nationalist figure who is still beholden to Russia, culturally and politically.36

Popular Front Party Chairman Ali Kerimli notes that "under the Aliev administration the Russian language received a new breath in Azerbaijan...the social language of the president and his friends is Russian."37 Musavat Party Chairman Isa Gambar comments that "there is a link between language and policy...the West provides democratic values, but Russia gives support to authoritarian regimes. As there is an authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan, it wants to hide behind Russia."38

However, charges of russification do not seem to harm Ilham Aliev politically,39 a phenomenon for which there are several explanations. First, Aliev is at pains to portray

31 Author"s Interview with Kerimli. (2006). 32 Author"s Interview with Gambar (2006). 33 See Laitin, D. D. (1998). Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. pg. 62-64, 292. 34 A prominent exception is the cosmopolitan National Unity Leader Lala Shevket, who is at pains to note that speaking Russian does not preclude one from being a nationalist. 35 The person of Heydar Aliev, however, remains largely inviolable in this regard, for reasons discussed later. 36 Smith et al note this phenomenon occurring in Central Asia Smith, G., V. Law, et al. (1998). The Central Asian States as Nationalising Regimes. Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 260-290. pg. 140. 37 Author"s Interview with Kerimli. (2006). 38 Author"s Interview with Gambar. (2006). 39 In discussions with Azeri citizens, almost none outside of the opposition discussed Aliev as being russified (Field Notes, 1996)

himself as Azerbaijani speaking, and no one argues that he cannot speak Azerbaijani at all. Second, his use of Russian is framed as evidence of erudition, not russification: as YAP Deputy Executive Chairman Mubariz Qurbanli, commented when asked about claims of Aliev"s russification: "That"s wrong. Our president can speak in three languages: Russian, Azerbaijani and English. I think he also knows French, and I"ve heard that he wants to learn Spanish."40 Additionally, Aliev has assiduously associated himself with his father, portraying his government as a continuation of that of the elder Aliev.41 As Heydar Aliev"s nationalist credentials are now largely considered holy ground in Azerbaijani political discourse, the younger Aliev"s possible weakness in this regard is mitigated. Finally, the language policy of the Azerbaijani Popular Front government of Azerbaijan caused a backlash against their brand of pan-Turkic nationalism, making the population of Azerbaijan receptive to a more moderate approach.42

Indeed, among politicians there appears to be general consensus the russification "problem" is solving itself. While older generations of Russophones will likely not learn Azerbaijani, their children are perceived to be either developing a sense of Azerbaijani pride-of-citizenship and therefore learn Azerbaijani,43 or at least are adapting to the new necessity of learning Azerbaijani to find work.44 The Head of the Public Affairs Department of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Education noted that even students in Russian-language schools now have every opportunity to learn Azerbaijani, as they are taught "the same way Azerbaijanis learned Russian;" more extreme methods of forcing language use would be unethical.45

Politicians interviewed are unanimously for the continued use of the Russian language in Azerbaijan, or at least its continued teaching. Several politicians noted that knowing Russian allows citizens access to the Russian market and Russian culture.46 Opposition politicians are generally less positive than the government about the influence of the Russian language, arguing that its continued instruction impedes increasing English-language instruction, which they regard as the new language of international communication.47 Nevertheless, neither Musavat Party Chairman Gambar nor Popular Front Party Chairman Kerimli are in favor of shutting down Russian-language schools against the will of the population.48 As Shevket notes, the opposition has learned from the

40 Author"s Interview with Qurbanli. (2006). 41 For more information about Ilham Aliev"s use of his father as a symbol of his legitimacy, see Guliyev, F. (2005). `Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism.` Demokratizatsiya 13(3): 393-436. 42 Hunter, S. T. (1994). Azerbaijan: Search for Identity and Independence. The Transcaucasus in Transition.

S. T. Hunter. Washington, D.C., The Center for Strategic & International Studies: 58-95. pg. 64. 43 Author"s Interviews with Gambar and Orudzhev. (2006). 44 Author"s Interviews with Gambar, Qurbanli and Orudzhev. (2006). 45 Author"s Interview with Huseynzade. (2006). 46 Author"s Interviews with Qurbanli and Shevket. (2006). 47 Tokluoglu also notes the Azerbaijani government"s higher degree of positivity toward Russian, as compared to the opposition. Tokluoglu, C. (2005). `Definitions of National Identity, Nationalism and Ethnicity in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan in the 1990s.` Ethnic and Racial Studies 28(4): 722-758. pg. 733. 48 Author"s Interviews with Gambar and Kerimli. (2006);.This general trend toward the increased usage of English and away from Russian was acknowledged by all those interviewed; the replacement of Russian

negative reaction to its past anti-Russian policies, and has thus greatly modified its position.49


Minorities and Minority Languages

Like its policy toward Russophones, Azerbaijan"s policy on non-Azerbaijani speaking minorities is one of outward accommodation with the expectation of eventual assimilation. Statements by both opposition and government politicians about Azerbaijan"s minorities assert their pride in Azerbaijan"s diversity and the seamless integration of minority groups into the Azerbaijani state. Members of both the opposition and the government proclaim that they support the development of each ethnicity"s national identity (though both claim that the other is disingenuous with their claims).

However, these official pronouncements often have a subtext of fear. In the eyes of the government, the events in Nagorno-Karabakh proved the danger in too much support for ethnic identity;50 that an independent Talysh51 state was briefly declared in 1993 and a Lezghin52 independence movement was active in the early 1990s has not been forgotten. Likewise, these groups are seen as easily manipulated by outside forces that wish to harm Azerbaijan"s territorial integrity: an academic at the Azerbaijani Academy of Sciences describes the Russians as instigating the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as separatism among the Lezghins, Avars and Tsakhurs; the Armenians in turn as supporting such movements among the Kurds; the Iranians among the Talysh; and the Georgians among the Ingilois.53

The resulting attitude, borne of contradictory claims of potential ethnic unrest and peaceful coexistence of the nationalities, is perfectly summarized in an essay written by the former State Counsellor of the National Politics of the Azerbaijan Republic, Gidaiat

with English is generally seen as politically neutral: as Azerbaijani Chairman on Foreign Affairs and Interparliamentary Relations Seyidov notes, English has monopolized the worldwide language market as such a language; there is no political implication of its increased usage. YAP Executive Deputy Secretary Qurbanli concurs with the purely economic assessment. Shevket does as well, criticizing the lack of emphasis on developing the state of Azeri culture via exposure to English. Author"s Interviews with Seyidov, Qurbanli and Shevket. (2006).49 Author"s Interview with Shevket. (2006). 50 Matveeva and McCartney note that Azerbaijan "strongly resists any suggestion of federalization or autonomous arrangement for its non-titutlar indigenous minorities" due to the experience of Nagorno-Karabakh. Matveeva, A. and C. McCartney (1998). `Policy Responses to an Ethnic Community Division: Lezgins in Azerbaijan ` International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 5: 213-251. pg. 240. 51 The Talysh are a Persian ethnic group whose ethnic homeland is located on the border of Azerbaijan and Turkey; they are closely related to the Tat, a group that largely resides in the mountains near the border with Russia. For a description of the Talysh national movement, see Ter-Abrahamian, H. (2005). `On the Formation of the National Identity of the Talishis in Azerbaijan Republic.` Iran and the Caucasus 9(1): 121-144. 52 The Lezghin are a Caucasian ethnic group whose population largely resides on both sides of the Azerbaijan-Dagestan border. For a thorough description of Azerbaijani policy toward this minority, see Matveeva, A. and C. McCartney (1998). `Policy Responses to an Ethnic Community Division: Lezgins in Azerbaijan ` International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 5: 213-251. 53 Guseinov, R. (2000). `Azerbaijan in the Mirror of its Ethnic Composition.` Central Asia and the Caucasus(4): 174-181. pg. 177.

Orudzhev. He begins by noting that "the preservation of its unique historical wealth [is] a top priority of the life of the Azerbaijani multinational society, which constitutes the diverse and rich tapestry of the country"s centuries-long heritage."54 The government supports these initiatives in that national minority organizations receive financial assistance, rent-free access to government facilities, and access to broadcasting and publishing in their national languages.55

Azerbaijan is thus "showing the whole world its attitude toward its national minorities, and they in turn can demonstrate to the world community their true status in a democratic state, which keeps a constant and careful watch on them."56 Orudzhev later adds: "national minorities in the country have no inclination to form their own political parties and movements or to separate from Azerbaijan. Admittedly, there have been such external attempts [to instigate such movements], but to the credit of national minorities in our republic they understood on time the threat they were creating primarily to themselves by such behavior."57

This attitude has resulted in policy reminiscent of Bhavna Dave"s findings about multiculturalism in Kazakhstan: ethnic groups are supported by the government so long as they remain apolitical; the government uses this support to prove itself a modern, democratic state.58 However, the Azerbaijani government also expects national minorities to integrate into the state, importantly by learning the Azerbaijani language. Such a project is generally considered essential for the administration of a country; as David Laitin notes, "a common medium of linguistic exchange is a crucial ingredient of rationalization and therefore state building."59

Azerbaijani politicians" rhetoric on ensuring that all Azerbaijanis learn Azerbaijani indicates that the linguistic rationalization of the state takes precedence over multilingualism. YAP Deputy Qurbanli"s statement that "without knowing our language it is impossible to work here"60 is generally regarded not as a value judgment or criticism, but as a necessary fact of living in the Azerbaijani state. As the opposition Musavat Party Chairman Gambar noted, "if you want to succeed in Azerbaijan, get a position in the government, you have to learn the state language, as is the case around the world."61 However, such a requirement is not seen as terribly onerous for most national minorities, as "the minorities have no opposition to using the Azerbaijani language [so] there is no obstacle to its use."62

Minorities that do learn the language are generally reported as being well-accepted in Azerbaijan; debate between the opposition and the government largely centers on which

54 Orudzhev, G. (2003). `Azerbaijan`s National Minorities Today.` Ibid. 4: 139-144. pg. 139. 55 Ibid. pg. 140. 56 Ibid. pg. 141. 57 Ibid. pg. 142. 58 See Dave, B. (2007). Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power. New York, Routledge. pg. 119-130. 59 Laitin, D. D. (1988). `Language Games.` Comparative Politics 20(3): 289-302. pg. 290. 60 Author"s Interview with Qurbanli. (2006). 61 Author"s Interview with Gambar. (2006). 62 Kerimli"s terminology. Author"s Interview with Kerimli. (2006).

group is more accepting of minorities. As mentioned earlier, government officials argue that APF government"s focus on Turkic cultures caused ethnic problems,63 and that "their lack of professionalism" and the attendant chaos exacerbated ethnic tensions, in comparison to the leadership of the Alievs.64 Opposition members, on the other hand, claim that the policies of the APF government set the precedent for the policies of the current government;65 they also claim that the government uses minority members as token shows of multicultural cooperation.66

A possible negative effect of being accepted into greater Azerbaijani society is that minorities risk losing their languages. Though accurate reporting about the language retention of minorities in Azerbaijan is difficult to find, when asked about language loss among minorities in Azerbaijan, Orudzhev confirmed that some language loss is occurring, noting that the government cannot force an individual to learn his or her ethnic language.67


Azerbaijani as a Symbol vs. Development of the Language

Even in states like Azerbaijan where the choice of the national language is not in question, the implementation of the language as the national language remains problematic: it is not yet the case that the language itself is developed to a degree that it would be sufficient for all official and technical purposes.68 In Azerbaijan, a decidedly laissez-faire attitude exists toward developing the Azerbaijani language, indicating that the government does not view such a program as highly important: declaring the language to be the national language is deemed to suffice in terms of setting a trajectory for revitalization.

Martin Landau and Barbara Kellner-Heinkele note that economic and organizational deficits in Azerbaijan have caused difficulties in popularizing new terminology as there is no organized method by which new vocabulary can be disseminated and enforced.69 Interestingly, though all the opposition members whom I interviewed claimed vaguely that the Azerbaijani language should be developed, and that the government should do more to aid this process, the criticism was generally muted. While Popular Front Chairman Kerimli claims that the Azerbaijani language is lacking technological terms, and that the government should create a commission to develop a dictionary for such terminology, he also notes that Azerbaijani has a very rich base upon which to build and

63 Author"s Interview with Orudzhev. (2006). See also Guseinov, R. (2000). `Azerbaijan in the Mirror of its Ethnic Composition.` Central Asia and the Caucasus(4): 174-181. pg. 178. 64 Author"s Interview with Orudzhev. (2006). 65 Shevket is an exception, arguing that the initial policies of the APF did cause ethnic conflict, but that the members of the APF learned from their mistakes in this regard. Author"s Interview with Shevket. (2006). 66 Author"s Interviews with Kerimli and Gambar. (2006). 67 Author"s Interview with Orudzhev. (2006). 6868 See Fishman, J. A. (1968). Nationality-Nationalism and Nation-Nationism. Language Problems of Developing Nations. J. A. Fishman, C. A. Ferguson and J. D. Gupta. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: 39-52. 69 Landau, J. M. and B. Kellner-Heinkele (2001). Politics of Language in the Ex-Soviet Muslim States. London, Hurst and Company. pg. 154.

that he has no fear about its future development. Musavat Party Chairman Gambar believes that "natural processes" will lead to the adoption of words for new terminology from other languages and thus the development of the Azerbaijani language.70

Perhaps more surprisingly given the anti-Russian and Kemalist71 sentiments of the earlier APF government, none of the opposition leaders support governmental attempts to "purify" the Azerbaijani language of its Russian or non-Turkic loan words. For example, Gambar notes that while there are many Russian words in the Azerbaijani language, the influence of Turkey and Turkish will cause all those Russian words that have not become "native" to Azerbaijani to be naturally replaced; Kerimli believes that the evolution of the language should be an evolutionary process.72

The government appears to share this opinion. Former Azerbaijani president Heydar Aliev asserted that the Kemalist language reforms were a great mistake as they served to further divide the Turkish and Azerbaijani languages.73 YAP Deputy Executive Chairman Qurbanli, though noting that the government is working on the development of the Azerbaijani language, also argues that this program should not be performed in a "primitive" manner (e.g. purification of all international terminology).74

No one interviewed expressed any fear of the influence of Turkish on weakening the particularity of the Azerbaijani language; most of those interviewed in fact expressed hopes that the Turkish influence would aid communication between Azerbaijanis and Turks. The development of the Azerbaijani language thus occurs mainly in the symbolic realm; the content of the language remains largely untouched by political figures.


Conclusion

In Azerbaijan, language is a potent symbol of the national identity of its titular population and thus its status as an independent country united around the titular nationality. However, the precise nature of the Azerbaijani language has been a topic of intense debate between opposing political forces, which have used the symbol of the Azerbaijani language as a means to assert their own designs for Azerbaijan"s future.

The pan-Turkic orientation of the APF government resulted in their adoption of a Turkish Azerbaijani identity for Azerbaijan; Heydar Aliev was able to use popular indignation with this apparent renunciation of Azerbaijani uniqueness, as well as his Soviet-era protection of the Azerbaijani language and his successful implementation of the (unique) Azerbaijani alphabet, to assert himself of a guardian of a specific Azerbaijani identity. This portrayal has become a core portion of his and his son"s personalistic style of

70 Author"s Interviews with Kerimli and Gambar. (2006). 71 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk ordered widespread language reform in Turkey in the 1920s, changing the script from Arabic to Latin and replacing "Islamic" constructions and vocabulary (e.g. those from Arabic and Persian) with either "Turkic" words or French, in an attempt to distance the Turkish language from its Ottoman past.72 Author"s Interviews with Gambar and Kerimli. (2006). 73 In Blair, B. (2001). Interview: Azerbaijan`s President, Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan International. 9: 14-18. 74 Author"s Interview with Qurbanli. (2006).

governance (it was Heydar Aliev alone who could and did protect the Azerbaijani language, the Azerbaijanis and Azerbaijan). However, both his government and that of Ilham Aliev have continued to use Azerbaijani"s Turkic ties to demonstrate that Azerbaijanis belong to a wider Turkic community, showing that Azerbaijan is not a "small nation." At the same time, the Aliev governments have portrayed themselves as protectors of Azerbaijan"s Russophone population, a wise political move given the popular disenchantment with the ethnic polarization caused by the APF government. Given the prevalent political mood, the remnants of the APF have diluted their original pan-Turkic nationalist stance so that their references to pan-Turkism and nationalism closely mimic those of the government; it is largely in their references to the supposed overly russified stance of Ilham Aliev that their original nationalist orientation remains visible.

The actual language policy resultant of these symbolic claims has been largely laissez­faire: minorities and Russophones are officially encouraged to speak their languages, and in fact receive some government support for their activities, but they are expected to learn Azerbaijani of their own volition and act within the constraints of Azerbaijani political discourse to participate in the public sphere. Minorities, with the exception of older Russophones, are generally perceived to be receptive of these demands; the implication of this policy for the future language retention of these groups remains unclear. As regards developing the Azerbaijani language, the declaration of its supremacy is considered to be sufficient; political actors, especially those in the government believe it should be allowed to evolve naturally, without government interference.


W orks Cited:

(2009). `Azerbaijan.` The World Factbook Retrieved April 18, 2009, from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html. Blair, B. (2001). Interview: Azerbaijan`s President, Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan

International. 9: 14-18. Dave, B. (2007). Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power. New York, Routledge. Fishman, J. A. (1968). Nationality-Nationalism and Nation-Nationism. Language

Problems of Developing Nations. J. A. Fishman, C. A. Ferguson and J. D. Gupta. New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: 39-52. Guliyev, F. (2005). `Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism.` Demokratizatsiya 13(3): 393-436. Guseinov, R. (2000). `Azerbaijan in the Mirror of its Ethnic Composition.` Central Asia and the Caucasus(4): 174-181.

Hunter, S. T. (1994). Azerbaijan: Search for Identity and Independence. The Transcaucasus in Transition. S. T. Hunter. Washington, D.C., The Center for Strategic & International Studies: 58-95.

Laitin, D. D. (1988). `Language Games.` Comparative Politics 20(3): 289-302. Laitin, D. D. (1998). Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. Landau, J. M. and B. Kellner-Heinkele (2001). Politics of Language in the Ex-Soviet Muslim States. London, Hurst and Company.

Matveeva, A. and C. McCartney (1998). `Policy Responses to an Ethnic Community Division: Lezgins in Azerbaijan ` International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 5: 213-251.

Orudzhev, G. (2003). `Azerbaijan`s National Minorities Today.` Central Asia and the Caucasus 4: 139-144.

Sebba, M. (2006). `Ideology and Alphabets in the Former USSR.` Language Problems & Language Planning 30(2): 99-125.

Smith, G., V. Law, et al. (1998). The Central Asian States as Nationalising Regimes. Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 260-290.

Ter-Abrahamian, H. (2005). `On the Formation of the National Identity of the Talishis in Azerbaijan Republic.` Iran and the Caucasus 9(1): 121-144.

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Interviews:75


Azerbaijani Government Officials

Seyidov, Samad. (Rector of the Foreign Languages University; Chairman of the Committee on Foreign and Interparliamentary Relations). 18.01.06. Baku.

Orudzhev, Gidaiat. (State Counsellor of the National Politics of the Azerbaijan Republic).

29.01.06. Baku. Qurbanli, Mubariz. (Yeni Azerbaijan Party Deputy Executive Secretary, Parliament

Member). 15.02.06. Baku Huseynzade, Bayram. (Head of Ministry of Education Public Affairs Department).

06.03.06. Baku


Azerbaijani Opposition Leaders

Gambar, Isa. (Musavat Party Chairman). 03.02.06. Baku. Kerimli, Ali. (Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan Chairman). 03.02.06. Baku Shevket, Lala (National Unity Movement Leader). 25.02.06. Baku


Leaders of Ethnic Minority Organizations

Ihilov, Semyon. (Chairman of Azerbaijani Jewish Community). 19.01.06. Baku. Suleyman, Tahir. (Editor in Chief of Diplomat, Kurdish Newspaper) 27.01.06. Baku. Burkhanov, Ibrahim. (Meskhet Turkish "Vatan" Society Leader). 01.02.05. Baku.

75 All titles are those held by the individuals at the time of being interviewed; with the exception of the interview with Samad Seyidov (which was conducted in English), Semyon Ihiliov and Lala Shevket (which were conducted in Russian), all interviews were conducted in Azerbaijani with the aid of an interpreter.