The Unseen Aspects of Intelligence Chiefs’ Visits to Baku

Recently, intelligence chiefs from the world's leading countries have visited Baku. While there has been little public information on these visits, the consecutive nature of these trips to Azerbaijan has raised many questions.

After Patrick Prior, head of the Europe-Eurasia Regional Center of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, visited Baku on September 6, Richard Moore, head of the British Secret Intelligence Service, met with students in Baku on September 14. Following the Western intelligence chiefs, Sergey Naryshkin, director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), arrived in Baku on October 2-3.

The U.S. Embassy in Baku confirmed that Patrick Prior's visit was aimed at discussing ways to strengthen U.S.-Azerbaijan security relations. During his visit, Prior met with Hikmet Hajiyev, Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan and head of the Foreign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration. The embassy had earlier shared: "We warmly welcome Mr. Patrick Prior, head of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency’s Europe-Eurasia Regional Center, to Baku to consult with the Azerbaijani government on strengthening U.S.-Azerbaijan security relations."

Regarding the Russian intelligence chief’s visit, it was noted that Naryshkin held several meetings in Baku, where discussions included the international situation and areas of mutual cooperation between the intelligence services of the two countries.

Why are the intelligence chiefs of the world's leading states visiting Azerbaijan one after the other?

Security expert Ilham Ismayil discussed the issue with ASTNA.

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Question: Ismayil bey, Patrick Prior from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Richard Moore from the British Secret Intelligence Service, and Sergey Naryshkin from Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service have all recently visited Baku. What do you think is the reason for the intensification of these visits?

Answer: Official visits by intelligence chiefs typically occur to provide early warnings about potential large-scale critical situations. Intelligence tends to focus not on what has happened but on what could happen, discussing and issuing warnings. As mentioned, the visits of Patrick Prior from the U.S. on September 6, Richard Moore from the UK on September 14, and the Russian SVR visit on October 5 are likely different from the officially provided information. Since details remain confidential, we can only speculate that discussions involved possible processes that could affect the region, if not directly related to Azerbaijan. It’s plausible that they discussed information about developments that could impact both Azerbaijan and the broader region.

At the time of Prior and Moore’s visits, the tensions between Israel and Iran had not yet peaked. However, when Naryshkin arrived in Baku, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah had been killed, Iran had fired 180 rockets at Israel, and both Israel and the U.S. had officially announced that a response to Iran was forthcoming. It’s also worth noting that Western intelligence chiefs' visits to post-Soviet republics have always been met with jealousy in Russia. Naryshkin’s visit to Baku, three weeks after Moore's, could be seen as a form of compensation.

The main focus of these visits is likely Azerbaijan’s geopolitical significance within the South Caucasus.

Question: Are these visits about certain expectations from Azerbaijan, or are they related to threats against Azerbaijan?

Answer: The main focus of intelligence discussions usually involves both expectations and potential threats. The expectations from the U.S. and the UK are likely related to the normalization of relations with Armenia. The West’s primary goal seems to be to secure a peace agreement before COP 29. Threats to Azerbaijan, both historically and currently, are most likely to come from Iran. I believe discussions also included potential tensions within Iran and how they could affect Azerbaijan, as well as Baku’s possible responses. Of course, these are just speculations, and the actual details of the discussions remain unknown and likely will not be disclosed.

Question: Unlike the U.S. and UK intelligence chiefs, the Russian intelligence chief made public statements that were not well received. Were Naryshkin's statements directed at the West or at Azerbaijan, should it choose to cooperate with the West? What conclusions can be drawn from these statements?

Answer: The U.S. and UK intelligence chiefs made only very general and guarded statements. The U.S. representative’s visit was only briefly acknowledged by the embassy, which mentioned discussions on security issues. Richard Moore’s visit to ADA University was noted. Naryshkin’s visit, however, involved more visible public statements, and it's clear that the information shared publicly only represents the surface level. The factors likely discussed include the impact of the Israel-Iran tensions on the region, the potential unexpected outcomes of Georgia's parliamentary elections for Russia, and Azerbaijan’s response, as well as the future of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, especially if there is a leadership change in Armenia.

Furthermore, Russian FSB Chief Bortnikov’s warning about NATO forces possibly entering the South Caucasus as peacekeepers could explain the purpose of Naryshkin's visit. His trip likely involved discussions with Azerbaijani officials regarding these details.

Question: Azerbaijan has not made an official statement about these visits, but President Aliyev has alluded to external threats in his recent speeches. What kinds of threats or dangers could Azerbaijan face?

Answer: I believe that President Aliyev’s recent references to external threats can be interpreted as a response to these developments. What real threats or dangers could Azerbaijan face? Military intervention from neighboring countries is most likely to come from Iran or Armenia, although this remains a distant possibility. While Iran has threatened Azerbaijan under the guise of targeting the "Zionist regime" and Israel, it is unlikely that Iran would carry out a military strike against Azerbaijan in its current state of internal turmoil. As for Armenia, the West is arming it, but not with the intent of attacking Azerbaijan; rather, it is to distance Armenia from Russia and demonstrate the West's friendship with Yerevan.

The threats are often voiced openly. For example, the West, particularly France, has been exerting pressure for the return of Karabakh Armenians, with various international organizations and politicians actively pursuing this agenda.

Question: Who should Azerbaijan collaborate with on security issues—Russia or the West? What position should Azerbaijan take following these visits?

Answer: So far, Azerbaijan has pursued a balanced policy between the West and Russia, and this strategy has brought certain successes. I believe this policy should continue. If Azerbaijan isolates one side and aligns itself with only one camp, it could face political, economic, and military repercussions. Azerbaijan's interests lie in maintaining a balanced approach. Otherwise, threats and dangers will persist.