The middlegame of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?!

It is worth noting that absolutely everyone was tensely waiting for the results of the parliamentary elections in Armenia (June 20). The results of the elections amazed everyone: "Civil Contract" won 54%; the opposing bloc of R. Kocharyan received only 21% of the votes. An impression is that Armenia voted for peace; however, the situation is largely explained as being due to the hopelessness of the voters while the militant minority in the parliament should be closely monitored. On July 8, N. Pashinyan made his first working visit abroad to Moscow during which V.Putin emphasized that "the winning side has the confidence of the people which allows it to work effectively."

Of interest is the fact that US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken (16.07) held telephone talks with Pashinyan as saying that Washington was supportive of the OSCE Minsk Group process aimed at ensuring a lasting political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In so doing, he called Armenia to engage constructively on this track.

The need to develop a clear agenda for the peace process and find a lasting and long-term solution to the issue was particularly emphasized by the US Secretary of State. In turn, French Ambassador to Armenia Jonathan Lacote declared that the Karabakh conflict has not been settled, so the normalization of the process is possible due to the final determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh."

It is no mere coincidence that the EU President went to the conflict region to understand what a constructive role Brussels can play to support the OSCE Minsk Group.

According to Stanislav Tarasov (16.07), Russia does not rule out the possibility of changing the format of the OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh believing that political resources of the United States and France in this direction have not yet been exhausted. However, he found it difficult to forecast the future of this group. At the same time, the Russian political expert did not exclude the probability of the scenario of two-or rather, trilateral (AR, RA, RF) negotiations to be launched where "there will no longer be a need in MG's activities in its previous format due to the emergence of new settlement factors." In turn, Moscow still believes the status of Nagorno-Karabakh debates to be "untimely". As is seen, the conflict is by no means over for the main external actors, and it is no mere coincidence that the Ambassadors of Russia, the United States, France and Germany rejected Azerbaijan's offer to visit Shusha.

In the meanwhile, At stake are issues of the upcoming future: should we expect direct (or with Russia's mediation) talks between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the restoration of economic and transport ties in the South Caucasus and the signing of a peace agreement by Yerevan and Baku? Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Relations of Armenia Ruben Rubinyan (July 1) called the recognition of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as condition for signing a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, and earlier N. Pashinyan called the international recognition of the NKR an absolute priority.

In the meantime, the fragile truce has been violated: the conflict on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border has escalated since mid-May. Armenia claims that the Azerbaijani military has been on the territory of the Syunik and Gegharkunik regions since May 13. The Azerbaijani authorities insist that the border guards have just changed their deployment remaining within the borders of the Lachin and Kelbajar regions.

On July 14, the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry reported two cases of shelling of Azerbaijani positions near the city of Shusha. According to the Ministry, the shooting was carried out from machine guns by "illegal Armenian armed detachments" from a part of the territory of Azerbaijan where Russian peacekeepers are temporarily stationed. Armenia has denied the Azerbaijani statement that it shelled the country's territory.

It should be acknowledged that Armenia and Azerbaijan reguIlarly exchange accusations of shelling on the boundary lines. Thus, Baku reported that on the afternoon of July 15, units of the Armenian armed forces fired from small arms at the positions of the Azerbaijani army near the village of Yukhary Ayrim, Kelbajar region. In turn, Yerevan reports that units of the Azerbaijani armed forces in the Yeraskh area tried to carry out engineering work in the morning of July 14 to their advance positions. As a result, the Armenian side took necessary measures to force the enemy to stop these actions. The Azerbaijani military opened targeted fire on the Armenian positions, as a result, an Armenian serviceman was killed.

Military expert David Harutyunov notes that there is no Russian presence on the border areas of Nakhchivan-Yeraskh, so the Azerbaijani side is seeking to create a new point of escalation.

It should be acknowledged that "the position of the Azerbaijani authorities shows that they do not want to unblock regional communications and intend to keep Armenia in a blockade. Contrary to the peace-loving statements, Baku is doing everything to disrupt the peace processes in the region while they themselves are spreading statements that Armenia and Artsakh are allegedly opposing peace and definition of borders," according to Acting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan(July 15). He believes as incomprehensible Azerbaijan's statements about the so-called Zangezur corridor which are in no way related to the work of the commission, as well as the content of the statement of the leaders of the three countries on January 11 in Moscow which states how paragraph 9 of the trilateral statement of November 9 should be implemented.

It is worth reminding that in the meanwhile Azerbaijan is mastering a counter game: if Armenia does not recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, then official Baku also questions the inviolability of Armenia's borders. Azerbaijan puts forward a retaliatory demand for the return of its historical lands – President of the Republic of Azerbaijan I. Aliyev emphasized that "Azerbaijan has more rights to Zangezur and Irevan which had been ceded to Armenia at the beginning of the previous century than Armenia has to Karabakh." The President of Azerbaijan reiterated (July 14) that Armenia was not ready to sign a peace treaty and that it was "big mistake" since the conflict with Armenia has been settled, so the countries should recognize each other's territorial integrity by starting work on delineating the border. On June 25, Aliyev reaffirmed the signing of a peace agreement with Armenia as major condition for establishing peace in the South Caucasus.

It ought to be noted that the policy of mirror responses, checks, counter-balances and -claims is aimed at disavowing the "neutrality" of Paris and changing the position of Washington.

On June 1, Deputy Prime Minister of Armenia Mher Grigoryan announced that the communication commission had suspended its work. Note that Armenia has always been the least active participant in the working group which was set up on January 9 when Vladimir Putin received I. Aliyev and N. Pashinyan in Moscow, and all three signed an agreement on unblocking transport corridors.

Added to this can be that the Trilateral working group on transport is the only official agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan known to the public after the ceasefire declaration of November 10 which reflected Baku's main strategic priority - establishment of transport communications between the mainland of Azerbaijan and its enclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia.

In turn, Azerbaijan stressed that the group held just four meetings the last of which was a videoconference on March 1. Meanwhile, the main issue on the group's agenda is an establishment of communications with Nakhchivan as the sore points in the relations between the two sides.

Particular emphasis needs to be placed on Yerevan's disagreement with the definition of the communication as "corridor", as well as because of its route. What is important to note is that, intentionally or not, the use of the term "corridor" implies a certain sovereignty of Azerbaijan over the route which Yerevan rejects. In response, the problem of the "Lachin corridor" connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh is raised. Any possible peace agreement between the two sides is likely to provide for the use of this corridor by Armenia, although the exact nature of who and how will control the road has never been finalized.

It should be recognized that Armenia insists on an alternative route different from the one Azerbaijan is eager to offer (via Meghri). Yerevan prefers to restore the Soviet-era railway through Idjevan in northern Armenia and Gazakh in Azerbaijan. It is reported that in early May M. Grigoryan was ready to offer this route to the trilateral working group. However, the then tensions between the two sides sharply aggravated after the deployment of Azerbaijani troops along the southern border with Armenia on a territory that Armenia declared its own. Note that tensions on the border was aggravated due to the issues of Armenian prisoners of war and other detainees (Armenians claim that there are about 200 of them), as well as Baku's demand to hand over maps of land mines laid by Armenians at various times.

It should be remembered that the process of "corridors" has always been non-transparent, therefore it is difficult to judge from publicly available evidence whether Armenia is hesitating or simply does not want to give in to the enemy until Moscow takes a final position on the issue. In February, Aliyev already laid down foundations of the railway on the Azerbaijani section of the proposed Meghri route, and in April he threatened to "open the corridor by force" if Armenia continues to stall for time. Also, Baku sent a message that Azerbaijan may respond to Yerevan's actions by closing the Lachin corridor.

An impression is that the world centers of real politics are closely engaged in the final solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; however, it is contrary to reality. The world centers are currently focusing on Afghanistan with growing influence of Taliban in the country to become a source of major concern for Moscow, Ankara, Washington, China and Brussels. Our "small" conflict once again has to wait for the resolution of more important issues, so the only question is who and how of parties concerned will avail of the brewing middlegame.