The defense pact between of the Azerbaijan and Georgia

In spring 1919. ships from the Russian navy"s Caspian fleet that had dropped anchor in Baku were disarmed and placed under the control of the government. The government made propaganda outreach to the Molokans living in the territory of Azerbaijan and tried to put an end to recruiting activities for Denikin"s army. On the demand of Khoyski, General Przhevalsky was forced to leave the territory of Azerbaijan. The activities of Lazar Bicherakhov"s Cossack detachment, which was supported by the British, were forbidden in Azerbaijan. Bicherakhov was the main tool of Denikin"s policy in Azerbaijan. As far back as January he had created a Caucasus Caspian government in order to overthrow the legal government. The British were aware of this adventurist plan and wished to solve this problem discreetly, so they invited Bicherakhov to London on a pretext. As soon as he left Baku, the government of Azerbaijan ordered Bicherakhov"s detachments to leave Azerbaijan within 24 hours. When General Erdeli, who was replacing Bicherakhov, protested to General Thomson, he said that the army of Bicherakhov had discredited itself and represented a danger to law and order.

The British, both in discussions with the government of Azerbaijan and in correspondence and statements, had promised that the Volunteer Army would never enter Dagestan. However, the advance of Denikin toward Derbent proved the unreliability of these promises. In May, during negotiations carried out by a diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan, Abdurrahim Bey Hagverdiyev, in Derbent, the Denikin forces agreed not to advance further south. At the end of May, however, alarming news was received about the occupation of Derbent

by part of the Volunteer Army, which caused tremendous anxiety in Azerbaijan. On May 21 Colonel Lazarev at British command notified Prime Minister Nasib bey Usubbeyov that the command of the Army of South Russia did not have any aggressive intentions toward Azerbaijan and recognized the independence of Azerbaijan. However, it was also noted that after Russia was liberated from Bolsheviks, the question of the new republics on the territories of the former empire would be considered at the Constituent Assembly or the supreme governmental body to which the anti-Bolshevik forces would transfer authority. Usubbeyov informed the Azerbaijani Parliament about this letter at the session held on June 5, and the text of the letter and its translation into Azerbaijani was read to members of the Parliament. The prime minister also read a telegram from Erdeli, the commander of the Volunteer Army, which was sent to Colonel Lazarev from Yekaterinburg on June 18. It said, "If the government of Azerbaijan does not attack us, I will ensure that our forces will not cross the Zagatala Caucasus mountains and the Gizilburun line." Usubbeyov told the members of Parliament that he had discussed the telegram with the British command and notified them that he intended to make all necessary preparations for the purpose of defense. The government of Azerbaijan"s attitude to the Volunteer Army was unequivocal. Prime Minister Usubbeyov had already told the Parliament as far

back as June 26 that Denikin could "cross the borders of Azerbaijan only over our dead bodies." On June 5, during the parliamentary debate, Mammad Emin Rasulzade proposed granting the government emergency powers. Under these powers, a general mobilization should be declared, stringent laws applied, and funds allocated from the treasury for preparatory measures against the enemy, with an accounting to be submitted later. Accordingly, on June 5, the Parliament of Azerbaijan set up the State Committee for Defense. The members were Nasib bey Usubbeyov, who was leading the new government; Khudadat bey Melik-Aslanov, Minister of Roads; Aslan bey Safikurdski, Minister of Justice; Samad bey Mehmandarov, Minister of War; and Mammad Yusif Jafarov, Minister of

Foreign Affairs. On June 11, the State Committee for Defense declared a state of martial law over the entire territory of Azerbaijan.

At the beginning of June, Usubbeyov, in a telegram sent to Denikin and British General George Norton Cory, who was protecting him, demanded that they force Denikin"s volunteers to leave Dagestan in 5 days. At the same time, the government of Georgia expressed its protest to the British command regarding actions of the Volunteer Army. Even when the British command intervened, however, the Volunteer Army refused to leave Derbent. Instead, they drew a new line of demarcation along Samur river and the northern border of Zagatala.

When the government of Azerbaijan protested again, the British replied that "the southern demarcation line drawn by Denikin does not correspond to the directive of the British government." They promised to inform London about it. To calm the situation, Denikin wrote a letter stating that he recognized the independence of Azerbaijan until such time as the central supreme government of Russia was restored. But the government of Azerbaijan no longer believed such promises. As Firuz Kazemzadeh noted, the Azerbaijanis well understood that Denikin"s

ultimate goal was to reclaim Azerbaijan and other parts of the former Russian empire.

Voluntary national defense detachments were urgently raised and deployed, along with regular army units, in the north of Azerbaijan and along Samur River. The attitude of the government of Azerbaijan, which had long been accused of "cooperation" with Denikin and the White Guard army, was explained in a letter that Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Adil Khan Ziyadkhanli sent to Jafar bey Rustambeyov, the authorized diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan to the government of Kuban:

The opinion of our government is this: irrespective of who it is, Bolshevik or Menshevik, Denikin"s volunteers, etc., anyone who encroaches on the independence of Azerbaijan is our enemy. ... Our attitude toward the Volunteer Army is this: it has been decided once and for all that Volunteer Army units should not be allowed to enter the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and that Volunteer Army units located in Dagestan should be removed and the army of Azerbaijan should occupy Dagestan up to the demarcation line.

The demarcation line indicated in this letter was the one defined in January 1919 in negotiations between British command and Denikin"s forces. British General Briggs, at Denikin"s quarters, organized a meeting between

Denikin and Rustambeyov in an attempt to establish relations between the government of Azerbaijan and the Volunteer Army. Although Denikin agreed, the government of Azerbaijan refused this offer. The firm stand of the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia against Denikin"s movement southward produced an effect. General Briggs received a telegram from London saying that the British government was not pleased about Denikin"s appointment of General Liakhov to the position of governor-general of the Mountain region and that Denikin"s army was there only "for the purpose of struggle against Bolshevism." If Denikin persisted in ways that were unacceptable to Great Britain, then His Majesty"s government would refuse to aid him further and would discontinue the current assistance.

The transfer by the British of part of the Caspian navy to the Volunteer Army on the eve of the British departure from Azerbaijan provoked further protests from the government of Azerbaijan. In a note of protest submitted to British command on August 3, the government of Azerbaijan characterized this action as a danger to the sovereignty of the republic and a sign of disrespect. Although General Thomson again connected such actions to Denikin"s struggle against the Bolsheviks, the heads of the government nevertheless viewed this diplomatic folly as a blow directed against the security of Azerbaijan.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a report on the situation to the republic"s delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, noting that the threat from Denikin had strengthened cooperation between Azerbaijan and Georgia. At the Caucasus conference in April 1919, this issue and many others were discussed. The Armenian participants at the conference avoided direct comment regarding Denikin, but the danger from the north troubled Azerbaijan and Georgian in equal measure and they declared their solidarity on this question. In the Workers" Soviet of Tiflis, Gegechkori stated that they, together with the proletariat of Baku, would win a decisive victory over the aggressor and that they would not lay down arms until they had crushed the tsarist general. The ambivalent position of the

Armenian republic, by contrast, is attributable, on the one hand, to its location behind the front line, as opposed to Azerbaijan and Georgia, and, on the other hand, to the fact that the Armenians had their own plans in connection with Denikin, as documented in a book by I. Shakhdin published in Tiflis in 1931. The book referred to a secret agreement between the Volunteer Army and the Republic of Armenia according to which Armenia was to assist Denikin"s forces in attacking Azerbaijan and Georgia. This would create favorable conditions for solving by force the territorial claims of Armenia against Azerbaijan and Georgia. The coincidence of Denikin"s and Armenia"s aims was confirmed later by Anastas Mikoyan, who wrote, "Only the government of Armenia surrendered to Denikin and declared its "neutrality." At that time their sympathy was on the side of Denikin, who was gaining strength day by day."

The effective cooperation of the representatives of Azerbaijan in Paris with representatives of Georgia and the Mountain Republic during the spring and summer of 1919 played a significant role in creating Caucasian solidarity on various international issues. It strengthened their resistance to the Denikin threat. The Allies" recognition of the Kolchak government had the same effect of strengthening the solidarity of the new states created on the territory of the former Russian empire in confronting the threat of a "united and indivisible Russia." The

representatives of Azerbaijan at the Paris Peace Conference did not take a step backward from their struggle for recognition of the republic"s independence and protection of its territorial integrity. They attempted by every means to repulse the claims of "Great Armenia," which were being defended by the heads of European states and were clearly directed against the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Denikin"s disregard of the second demarcation line defined by the British on June 11 and his advance south of Petrovsk further strengthened the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the two republics decided to sign a military agreement for their mutual defense. For this purpose, they also appealed to the government of Armenia, which, for reasons that later became clear, declined to join the military defense pact that Azerbaijan and Georgia signed on June 16. According to the agreement, which was fo a 3-year period, in the case of aggression by any state against the independence and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan or Georgia, the parties to the agreement were to provide military assistance to each other. The agreement stipulated as follows:

1. the parties to the agreement bear responsibility to deploy all armed forces in case of any aggression or danger to the territorial integrity and independence of one or both parties stipulated in the agreement;

2. if any of the neighboring states attack one or both parties stipulated in the agreement in order to solve border conflicts by force during military operations started according to the previous article, then this state is defined

as a combatant;

3. the agreement has a strongly defensive nature; if one of the parties on its own initiative declares war or starts military operations without prior consent, then the other party to the agreement is not obliged to participate in these

operations;

4. parties in the agreement are obliged to solve all border conflicts occurring between them by means of agreements and arbitration; in this case, an accepted decision is considered as a final and obligatory decision for both parties;

5. the agreement is for a duration of three years; one year prior to termination of this period, the parties have a right to express their preference for its prolongation or its termination;

6. the parties to the agreement bear responsibility jointly to carry out diplomatic negotiations directed to the protection of the sovereign rights and independence of these states;

7. the parties to the agreement are obliged not to conclude a separatist treaty;

8. the parties to the agreement bear responsibility not to conclude a military agreement with other states without prior notification of their ally;

9. in the event that a federation will be created wherein both parties will join before termination of the period stipulated in the article 5, and this federation ensures the integrity of borders of all states and both parties to the agreement enter, then this agreement loses its effect; and

10. after the official announcement of this agreement, Armenia has two weeks in

which it may join the agreement.

In their notification about the agreement submitted to Paris Peace Conference, the representatives of Azerbaijan and Georgia underscored that it was "solely for the purpose of defense."

Pursuant to the agreement of June 16, the parties signed a military technical agreement, and the defense ministries of Azerbaijan and Georgia established a joint military council. The chairman of the military council was I. Z. Odishelidze, and its members were General Aliagha Shikhlinski, General Mahammad bey Sulkevich (Sulkiewicz), and General Ivane Kutateladze. The military council was to review the scope of military operations and the capacity of the enemy, work out a defense plan, monitor the preparedness of both republics" armies, and develop a strategic position.

At first, the attitude of the British command toward the Azerbaijan-Georgia defense pact was negative, but that later changed when a representative of the Azerbaijan Republic, Aziz bey Tahirbeyov, on mission to Istanbul, met with General George Milne, the commander-in-chief of British forces in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and told him about Denikin"s movements. Milne told Tahirbeyov that Denikin was moving southward without his consent and that he had not been aware of this action. Tahirbeyov sent a radiogram to Usubbeyov to report that Milne had not agreed to Denikin"s actions.