January events are comparable with Budapest-1956 and Prague-1968, Jamil Hasanli

Baku/19.01.18/Turan: The popular protest movement in Azerbaijan in the late 1980s and early 1990s was significantly different from events in other parts of the USSR in scale, anti-Soviet nature and mass character, said the chairman of the National Council of Democratic Forces (NCDF), doctor of historical sciences, professor Jamil Hasanli in an interview with Turan, commenting on the reasons for the January 1990 events.

"The movement for freedom has risen in Azerbaijan, and demands were demanded for restoring the independence of the republic. On the other hand, the protest against separatism in Nagorno-Karabakh and attempts to tear the region away from Azerbaijan intensified. The factor of dividing the people into North and South Azerbaijan played a role, and prompted the destruction of the border infrastructure on the border with Iran. Nowhere else in the USSR did this happen," Hasanli said.

Beginning in December 1989, a new stage of the popular movement began - the process of the peaceful overthrow of Soviet power, the destruction of borders - in Nakhchivan, Lankaran, and Jalilabad. In the regions of Azerbaijan, Soviet power was overthrown, or dual power was established. The real purpose of bringing troops into Azerbaijan was to save the Soviet power.

The suppression of the peaceful movement in the blood, showed the essence of Soviet power. This operation finally undermined the confidence of the Azerbaijani people in Moscow," Hasanli continued. Could bloodshed be avoided? Hasanli believes that in principle this was possible, if the Kremlin had the will.

However, they had different goals. Already after January 10, representatives of the Central Committee and Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Defense began to arrive in Baku. Here the main specialist of the USSR on the Middle East, Yevgeny Primakov, was sent.

Later, Minister of Defense Yazov himself arrived.

The leadership of the republic persuaded him that it was impossible to enter troops in any case.

However, Yazov openly declared that the local leadership failed and now the power would restore Soviet power and destroy the structures of the Popular Front.

"Therefore, I do not agree with experts who compare the entry of troops into Baku with the events in Tbilisi and Vilnius. In those cities, there were local conflicts and there was a clash between the civilian population and the police and army forces there. The events in Baku in terms of scope, form of execution, tragic consequences reminded more the entry of Soviet troops in 1956 in Budapest and 1968 in Prague. For the first time in Soviet history, the Soviet army conducted an operation to occupy the Soviet republic," Hasanli stressed. To introduce the state of emergency a 65.000 military contingent was deployed.

The troops entered Baku from three sides - Balajar, along the airport road (from Gala), from the south - Bailov and even landed on Primorsky Boulevard. It is interesting that Yazov delivered a decision in Baku to remove Vezirov from the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPA.

"An interesting conversation took place between Vezirov and Gorbachev a few days before the introduction of troops. Vezirov asked Gorbachev to stop the next Armenian provocation in Karabakh.

Gorbachev said that the Armenian leadership set out another version. After that, Vezirov said that if Azerbaijan lost Karabakh, Gorbachev would lose the USSR, which irritated Gorbachev. This was later told by Peretz, former assistant Vezirov and deputy director of Azerinform.

Vezirov's words became prophetic and Baku events catalyzed the process of the collapse of the USSR.

The Soviet leadership was seriously concerned about the prospect of Azerbaijan withdrawing from the USSR. Gorbachev called Heydar Aliyev on the eve of the January events and accused him that he was behind the trials in the republic and warned that troops would be brought into the city. Heydar Aliyev answered that he had nothing to do with what was happening. By the way, Muslim Magomayev in one of his interviews also told about the phone call of Heydar Aliyev that troops will be deployed in Baku, and consequences will be heavy. However, the people were not informed about this. "Now the leaders of the people's movement are accused that, knowing about the deployment of troops, they did not inform the population. But they did not have accurate, reliable information, but the leaders of the republic had it.

Immediately after the tragedy, Heydar Aliyev really took a bold step by holding a press conference in the Permanent Representation of Azerbaijan in Moscow. However, then he laid the entire responsibility on Vezirov," Hasanli said. Is the relevant political and legal assessment given to the January events?

Answering this question Hasanli said that in 1992-93, too, and after the coming to power of Heydar Aliyev, appropriate decisions were made. However, many points remain unclear to the international community.

It is about the provocations of security agencies and secret services, including those related to the Armenian pogroms.

The same Peretz recalls that on January 15 Primakov asked him about the situation in the city. In response, Pepper said that large-scale pogroms were prevented, thanks to the efforts of the Popular Front. This caused a nervous reaction

The same Peretz recalls that on January 15 Primakov asked him about the situation in the city. In response, Peretz said that large-scale pogroms were prevented, thanks to the efforts of the Popular Front. This caused Primakov's nervous reaction. At that time, the Soviet leadership tried to mislead the international community and spread information about the seizure of power in Azerbaijan by Islamic fundamentalists. Part of this provocation was Primakov's proposal to Sheikh Allahshukur Pashazade to take power in the republic.

"Despite the fact that the overall political and legal assessment is given to the events, but there are still dark moments. After coming to power in the Republic of Heydar Aliyev in 1994, the parliament again considered this issue, and in a not understandable manner, the name of Primakov, who was the decisive culprit of the tragedy, was removed from the list of perpetrators," Hasanli said. -06B--