Chimera: dialogue with Damascus on the pretext of adhering to the Adana Agreement

A few days ago, President R.T. Erdogan declared: "In the context of talks with Mr. V. Putin during yesterday"s visit, we understand more deeply the relevance of the Adan Agreement and the fact that we must insist on it." Analysts following the processes in the region commented on these words of R. Erdogan as "V. Putin gave an orientation to Damascus." In an interview with the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Migration of Syria to the SANA agency, it was stressed, "Syria is loyal to the "Adan Agreement signed with Turkey."

However, official Damascus not only called on Ankara to "restore the pre-crisis situation on the border between the two countries" as a sign of compliance with the main provisions of the agreement, but, accusing Turkey of "supporting terrorism", demanded that it withdraw its troops from Syria.

The "Adan Agreement" was signed in October 1998 after secret negotiations between Turkey and Syria (one of the architects of the agreement was the former Turkish ambassador to Baku, Faruk Logoglu). The processes before this developed with lightning speed: Syria has long sheltered the head of the PKK terrorist organization (PKK). After the warnings of Turkey had no effect, the Army Commander Attila Atesh, stopping one kilometer from the Syrian border in Hatay, sent a harsh message to Damascus: "Our patience is running out." Then Hafez al-Assad expelled the head of a terrorist organization for 10 days. In the agreement signed in 2 weeks in Adana, a commitment was demonstrated to the "joint fight against terrorism" and even for this purpose, "the Turkish armed forces were allowed to cross the border five kilometers into the territory of Syria."

After the visit of the then Turkish President, Ahmet Necet Sezer, to Damascus to attend the burial ceremony of Hafez al-Assad, who died in the summer of 2000, relations between the two countries warmed a little more. Since 2002, when the AKP came to power, and until spring 2011, this relationship developed on an increasing scale: in 2009, when Bashar Asad was in Istanbul, the visa regime was canceled during five minutes at the banquet table (there is still a visa regime between Azerbaijan and Turkey).

However, with the beginning of the "Arab Spring", Ankara instantly changed its policy in the region, linking it with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood organization, and worsened relations with Damascus. Foreign Minister Davutoglu during a 6-hour meeting with Assad in the summer of 2011 tried to convince him to resign.

In the fall of 2012, the Prime Minister Erdogan said, "If Allah wishes, in less than two weeks we will make namaz in the Umayyad Mosque". These words expressed the essence of Turkey"s policy towards Syria and the region as a whole; and in the summer of the same year, Mohammed Mursi, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, who has very good relations with the Turkish authorities, was elected president of Egypt).

Later, Turkey"s tough Sunni policy toward Syria deepened, and the "leaving of Alavit Assad" became the paradigm of Ankara"s Syrian policy, so it is not only difficult but also impossible to assume that it will change during the AKP rule. The current ruling ideology presents R. Erdogan more "as the leader of the ummah (people, fellow believers, ed.), than the head of state"

Saying "ummah", they mean the servants of "Sunni Islam". Therefore, to resume the dialogue with Damascus, political power must obtain the consent of the Turkish Foundation for Religious Affairs, which is the basis of the hegemonic religious ideology of the state, the consent of countless associations, funds of the Sunni trend, and even mosques. Any step taken without such consent will also provoke a sharp reaction among supporters of the ruling party, sharply tuned by the clergy accordingly.

In their view, in Turkey, led by Erdogan, to start a dialogue with the "Alavit" Assad means, "to go against the ideals". The head of the Russian state (definitely 300 times stronger than Turkey), having a 300-year tradition of Turkic and Oriental studies, of course, knows this. Then why does he orient the power of Turkey, with which he has very close relations, to the "Adan Agreement", signed 21 years ago?

Is not the reason for this the apparent dedication of Washington and Ankara for more than 1.5 months to the "security zone" in northwestern Syria? Is not the Kremlin's answer to this "enthusiasm" the fact that its pointing finger is directed to the "Adan Agreement", and in fact - to Damascus?

The further, the more difficult the situation becomes...