AUGUST LESSONS FROM DMITRY MEDVEDEV

Last Thursday, Russia"s President Dmitry Medvedev gave a lesson on political Machiavellianism. Formally in the role of students were the journalists: Alexander Venediktov (head of "Echo of Moscow" radio station), Catherine Kotrikadze ("The first Information Caucasian"), and Sofiko Shevardnadze (TV channel "Russia Today"). But the audience for whom the Sochi interview on August 4 was intended was larger.

The fact that just these media were selected for this interview shows who the president wanted to warn - the Georgian and South Caucasian audience, the democratic community, and international power centers. For the broader Russian public, an interview was presented by official media in the required Kremlin wrap.

Formally, according to the Russian version, the interview was devoted to the third anniversary of forcing Georgia to peace. From the perspective of the international community, it was devoted to the occupation of part of Georgia"s territory by Russian troops.

Russian journalist Aleksandr Minkin noted correctly that the interview was aggressive, arrogant, and disrespectful to neighboring states and their leaders. In fact, Medvedev demonstrated the essence of relations with partners in the CIS and OCST (Organization of the Collective Security Treaty) when, as he admitted later, Medvedev simply informed them of the aims and objectives of the military operation and recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, making it clear that Russia does not need anyone's advice. Moreover, at that time Moscow was flexing its muscle, trying to threaten former Soviet republics which want to distance themselves from of Russia.

The lesson was mastered first of all by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia. According to Medvedev, he invited them to Sochi immediately after the completion of military operations in Georgia and recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by international law, and told them: "You know, for us there is a certain lesson; it is better to continue endless discussions about the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh, whether there will be a referendum, and how to prepare a peace treaty, than to have those five days of war. It was very serious lesson for them. I think this is very noteworthy." Medvedev"s statement indicates that at the forthcoming meeting with President Aliyev on August 9 in Sochi, the talk will be tough and it will be proactive on the issue of extending the lease on the Gabala anti-missile radar station. The talk will be in a form which suits the Kremlin.

According to Medvedev, Moscow is ready to engage in endless negotiations on Karabakh, because such a position allows control over its smaller neighbors, and even to manipulate them on the Russian southern flank. Until August 7, 2008 Georgia was part of this policy, and the Kremlin could easily control the situation in a weak and deteriorating Georgia due to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

However, in 2003 Mikhail Saakashvili came to power and his supporters broke the seemingly stable position of Russia in the western periphery of the Caucasus. Russia had to withdraw its border guards and military forces from Georgia. Attempts to use the conflict in Adjaria, permanent attacks by militants on the Georgian population and security forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia failed. Saakashvili was confidently developing the economy, the armed forces, law enforcement, and strengthened relations with the West. Georgia was rapidly changing before our eyes, and neighboring countries, including Russia envied it.

Medvedev, in his usual manner, as in 2008, looking into the eyes of the audience, continued to insist on the version of sudden attack by Georgian forces on South Ossetia, the same sudden sole decision to start operations to bring peace. The decision to attack Georgia was taken so quickly only because a shell hit the tent of Russian peacekeepers and killed several soldiers. According to Medvedev, later he briefed the Security Council, and the next day he informed the real head of the country, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Such a hasty decision to use force and a belated informing of his entourage and the partners in the OCST points to a planned attack on Georgia; the actions preceding the aggression confirm it. Before the attack, Russia launched anti-Georgian hysteria in the state-controlled media, announced an economic embargo on Georgian goods, aggravated the situation in the self-proclaimed regions, concentrated troops on the border with Georgia under the guise of large-scale military exercises, and started psychological preparation of soldiers and officers in the army about the necessity of punishing hostile Georgia. And one more important point: the Russian propaganda machine worked operatively, just like President Medvedev himself.

All mass media, except for the radio station Echo of Moscow broadcasted reports about non-existing fights and casualties, allegedly thousands of people were killed. Now Medvedev has admitted that in the so-called five-day war, 150 people were killed from the Russian and Ossetian sides. In fact there was virtually no fighting between the Russian and Georgian armies, with the exception of a few misunderstandings, one of which, according to military experts, was the formal pretext for the invasion of a large but poorly trained and demoralized Russian army.

In fact, that invasion was the military and political defeat of Russia. According to Russian authorities, the aggression revealed an anachronism of the army, and the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia led to political isolation of Russia and growing distrust of Russia"s allies in former soviet republics in Moscow.

The global financial crisis which followed the August events exposed the weakness of the Russian empire which was trying to rise. The economic fall was so rapid and large-scale, that it could cause social unrest, if prior to this there was not the victorious invasion in Georgia. The Russian philistine supported aggression, and inflated ratings of the Putin-Medvedev tandem up to 80%. Subsequently, that victorious war against the background of growing nationalism helped to lead Russia through a deep crisis abyss. Perhaps the premonition of great economic collapse pushed the Russian authorities to the military and political blitzkrieg. Famous economist Andrey Illarionov noted that the symptoms of the crisis began to reveal themselves long before the global financial crisis. Of course the Russian government was aware of it.

What did the August 2008 events give Russia in the long run? Georgia got rid of Russia"s systematic political blackmail by two territorial conflicts, and started building a fully democratic state, with no corruption, bureaucratic capitalism, and legal nihilism. It is turning into a full-fledged state, quickly mastering the rules and principles of developed and prosperous nations. Russia is still a corrupt country with political, police, and economic arbitrariness, suppressing the rights and freedoms of its citizens.

In 2008, as a result of a dubious election, Russia got a president who with pride considers himself a bearer of liberalism. To Medvedev, the thousands of people killed by Assad"s regime in Syria are quite different than the 150 people killed in South Ossetia. For Medvedev, the Russian state and the moral principles and political interests are incompatible things. Russia has expressed a preference for interests, and is losing its moral influence, first in the USSR, then in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, etc. This process will deepen. Another global economic crisis may take place, and it will be impossible to avoid it by another military venture. The people are not the same. Answering the network question from the Echo of Moscow "Whose point of view on the events of August 2008 is more persuasive?" 62% of respondents named Saakashvili; 29.3% of respondents named Medvedev; 8.1% of the voters were in embarrassment; 23,953 readers and listeners of the Echo of Moscow, which has spread Medvedev"s interview, voted on the network by the third anniversary of Russia"s invasion in Georgia.-0--