Commonwealth of Independent States: transformation or disintegration?

At Soviet times, the Kremlin, with certain reservations, grouped 14 Republics into three «triplets» and one «quintuplet». Members of one «triplet», the West-backed Baltic countries joined the EU and NATO for ever to have resolved security problems and the risk of being swallowed up by Russia again.

Giving Moscow a lot of trouble presently are members of the second «triplet» (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine). Thus, Moldova headed by newly elect President Maya Sandu stressed the necessity of withdrawing the Russian troops from country’s territory and agreed with Ukraine upon bringing up bilateral relations with Ukraine to the level of strategic partnership and Euro-integration standards.

It is worth remembering that the third «triplet» is typified by a unique, years-long war on the post-Soviet expanse, between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020.  Of interest is the fact that first ever in its present history Russia let an outer actor – Turkey get involved in the conflict resolution. Also, the «triplet» incorporates a state Russia has annexed some territory, first ever after the USSR dissolution – Georgia due to latter’s possible accession to NATO membership.

When it comes to «quintuplet» of Central Asian countries – believed to be linked to Russia to the fullest extent – they have turned into arena of fierce geopolitical and economic struggle between the United States and China. The last mentioned has triggered complex, cliffhanging transformation processes.

A closer look at the foreign policy of the countries cited above reveals that all of them are engaged in developing explicit and latent technologies to get out of Russia’s influence and cross over to other centers of world rule. Opportunities detailed above are qualified threatening any integration projects of Moscow, including the CIS system. What are Moscow’ new technologies to prevent «interstate separatism»? First of all, these include manipulating latent and explicit conflicts to maintain the Russian military and political presence. Contributing to these is military, technical, economic and financial aid to most CIS countries. However, for a variety of reasons this aid is delayed lately.

It is worth citing that Russia has frequently resorted to around-the-corner participation in combat operations on CIS expanse; and in the annexation of territories since 2008 (Georgia, Ukraine) and territorial claims (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, etc.). From practical point of view, these aspirations were accompanied by the creation of military bases and peace-keeping detachments to forcibly associate CIS countries with Russia and even affect intra-political processes directed against Moscow interests. Exception to the rule is the fact that Russian troops or military bases are not deployed in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and it’s anybody’s guess on reasons for this.

To join the CIS membership a potential contender in line with Charter-stipulated obligations must have the consent of all member-countries. At one time, unrecognized formations Chechnya, Pridnestrovia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh expressed a desire to join the CIS. At present, this threat is obviously employed against «reneged» Ukraine and Georgia and prospectively against Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldova. Widely used is the technology of the issue of Russian passports or threats of their issuance.

Some Russian analysts point out that «certain restraint and caution» in the Russian foreign policy is allegedly indicative of Moscow’s pragmatism concerning CIS countries since 2020. But really Russia is running low on resources and technologies to proceed with its expansionist policy. At any rate, the CIS current anniversary year is meant to clarify many issues of member-countries’ growth prospects and the fate of the organization proper. As a matter of fact, the year 2021 is, to some extent, a difference maker for world’s fate in terms of pandemic challenges and formation of a new world vision to properly evaluate the impending reality that shook basics of policy, economy and current values.

It must be acknowledged that in a short while Russia will have to fight with a new US President’s team declaring a strong confrontation with Moscow on the post-Soviet expanse (Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia). The plot thickens due to Turkey’s unexpected involvement in the confrontation. Note that Turkey is engaged in simultaneous display with the United States, EU and NATO, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other hand. At the same time it is concerned with strengthening strategic ties with Moscow’s staunch opponents – Kiev and Tbilisi.

It is worth pointing out that the current situation is exacerbated due to the Beijing factor’ potentiality to predetermine the composition of the forthcoming political party. Note that relations between Ankara and Pakistan, Brussels and Moscow, as well as Beijing’ stand on the matter are expected to lie at the heart of political season- 2021.

This composition is sure to affect all three states of South Caucasus which are presently disaggregated after gaining of their independence. On the one hand, the new US administration has put forward specific preferences for Tbilisi and Yerevan while Baku is threatened with reopening of Amendment # 907 to the Act on Support for Freedom that places a ban on collaboration with Azerbaijan. However, it’s not all as easy as it sounds, for Moscow seems to have blocked the West’ access to Azerbaijan and particularly to Armenia.

It must be borne in mind that an Armenia’s deep integration into the Eurasian Union has actively been elaborated to make Armenia follow and set the agenda with Europe and the United States. Of interest is an implementation of the program of the US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken who stated that the United States was minded to revise its stand on Baku’ support: «I’m going to give a new impetus for US to get involved in searching a sustainable solution to ensure security of Nagorno Karabakh and prevent a new war. Measures on this track provide for strengthening of our efforts within the Minsk Group framework and additional diplomatic steps to prevent a new interference of third parties».

In turn, some analysts believe that in view of troubled relations between Turkey and a new US administration the balance of forces in South Caucasus might change, and Azerbaijan risks finding itself in a sticky situation. However, there are ins and outs: Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have finally signed an intergovernmental Memorandum of Intent on joint exploration and development of «Dostlug» deposit in the Caspian Sea. It is important tom keep in mind that the United States places a higher priority on opposition to Russian hydrocarbon deliveries rather than interference with South Caucasus affairs.

A conclusion of this sort is more than justifiable in terms of marked aggravation of relations between Moscow and Kiev, Kishinev and possibly Minsk. Setting apart this perspective, political experts point out that Russia has joined the most critical stage of global crisis. The way out of the situation lies in the regime change to possibly occur during September elections to the State Duma.

Added to this are other negative tendencies, including large-scale routing of dissidents, censorship tightening and sharp rise in emigration (V. Inozentsev). Circumstances set forth above might lead to the «Crimean effect» - a new war to drive Kremlin into new sanctions (A. Morozov). Provided that the authorities are deprived of any means to maintain domestic stability, the outcome is really foregone. If this occurs, it’d be possible to switch the country to war footing, including the imposition of martial law and cancellation of elections.

Having regard to the fact that the political situation in Russia makes it possible to avoid real political reforms on the post-Soviet expanse, its radical change would lead to the change or transformation of authoritarian regimes in CIS countries.

This is the case of Central Asian countries where democracy experiments (Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) and direct autocracy (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) led to results of the same kind. Kyrgyzstan returned from the parliamentary rule to the rigid presidential government. In turn, Mirziyayev’s optimism over the democracy destiny in Uzbekistan he revealed 4 years ago noticeably decreased in view of struggle for institution of sustainable and effective management system to fight the compulsive bureaucracy.

It is worth remembering that the year 2021 is meant to be decisive for all political elites of CIS states: a question of elite rotation comes up if these elites fail to reform their regimes and oppose numerous risks and threats in modern times. It is a mission of the new generation of elites to decide the CIS future – abolish or transform…