If necessary, the Kremlin will build the scenery of Kiev and hold a victory parade there

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- Can the sinking of the cruiser Moskva be considered a landmark event in the war with Ukraine? It turned out that the flagship, armed with missile weapons, with its air defense, and also obliged to protect other ships, is easily vulnerable. Does this fact, in addition to the general course of the war, change the world's perception of the Russian army in the context of its confrontation with NATO?

- I do not think that the fate of this cruiser can somehow seriously affect the course of the war. During the British-Argentine War (Falklands War, 1982 - Ed.), the Argentines also managed to sink one large ship. But they still lost the war. In addition, in Russia, propaganda presents this as an accident, and not as an attack on Ukraine.

As far as public opinion is concerned, it is highly polarized. There are those who are strongly opposed, but they rarely speak out in public. Here, you can get a serious fine or imprisonment for this. There are war enthusiasts, but they are few. Here they are just ready to write denunciations on others. Most simply protect themselves from uncomfortable information. They either do not answer sociologists' questions, or they answer "as they should." Hence the notorious 80% "for Putin." But in reality, people just want to be left behind.

Some idea is given by graffiti, which reflect the mood in the youth environment. There are very rare inscriptions like Za Donbass, with the absolute predominance of inscriptions like "No to war" or even "Putin is a killer." But this is a very specific section of society, as you understand.

As for the reaction of the population, one must understand that the population is very heterogeneous. There are, in general, three groups.

There are those who seriously support the special operation. This is approximately 25-30% of the population. The reasons are different. These are approximately the same people who actually vote for United Russia in elections; older, wealthier, associated with the civil service or with law enforcement agencies. Or just besotted with television propaganda.

Some people speak strongly against it. These are younger, educated people who are less economically dependent on the state. They practically do not watch TV; they draw information from the Internet. This also includes those who have relatives in Ukraine - this is a fairly significant part of the population. In total, such people, I think, are 15-20 percent. They are in the minority, but this is a rather significant minority, and in big cities they are even more numerous than active supporters of the special operation.

Finally, the majority, approximately 60% of the population, is the so-called swamp. These are people who try to live their normal daily lives and not get into politics. In polls, they give what they think is a socially desirable answer: I support the president's policy - like in Soviet times, but in fact they keep a fig in their pocket. They are neither for nor against, and they do not believe either official propaganda or what opposition channels say on the Internet.

In part, the regime rests on this passive support, but it is conditional. In the event of serious difficulties, such as defeat in a war, this support can quickly evaporate. The authorities are well aware of this, and therefore they need a propaganda victory at any cost. Even if for this you have to build the scenery of Kiev and hold a “parade of victory over fascism” in these scenery, so that later you can show it all on TV.

- Many hopes in the EU and America were pinned on the closure of the international SWIFT system for the banking network of the Russian Federation. It is closed to the Russian Federation, and a large number of sanctions bans have been adopted. However, as Putin said, the Russian financial system is holding its own, salaries are being paid on time, and so on. What conclusions follow from this? Are there deep economic processes invisible to the philistine eye that speak of the effectiveness of sanctions?

- Sanctions are effective in the long run. The quality of life in Russia will gradually deteriorate. But so far this has had little effect on public sentiment. The majority of the population believes that these difficulties are temporary, and foreign brands can be dispensed with. Seriously, the mood of the population can be affected by a significant increase in prices for food and utilities. While all this remains at a more or less tolerable level. In addition, sanctions increase anti-Western sentiments in Russian society and hit, first of all, its most pro-Western part - this is the middle class, those who are used to buying imported goods and going on vacation abroad. Most of the population is simply too poor for that.

The long-term effect of the sanctions will manifest itself with the beginning of autumn. Unemployment, declining income, shortage of some goods. It is not yet clear how the population will react to this. Too much can happen before that time, including some political changes.

Now the rate of dollar increased, and then fell again. The economy has partially stabilized. Oil and gas are still being sold. Cents are rising, but not very critical. Enterprises operate on old stocks, which will last for two or three months. Clothes and everything else can go through China or even Kazakhstan. Therefore, the population does not yet feel much of the consequences of the sanctions. Rather, it feels, but as minor domestic inconveniences.

Shutdowns of enterprises will begin by summer, but then people will go to garden plots and plant potatoes. In addition, due to covid, there are much fewer migrants, so there are many jobs in the service sector - for the poor. So before the fall, most will be killed somehow. And Swift does not affect anything at all, unless you need to transfer money abroad. Businessmen (many), of course, are in prostration - but they are a minority of the population and will somehow get out.

In general, this indifferent majority, about which I spoke, will feel serious changes in their lives only by autumn. Until then, the illusion will remain that all difficulties are temporary, and that gradually everything will return to the state as always. Here, covid has also contributed - everyone is already used to some inconvenience and restrictions, but everyone thinks that they will end sooner or later.

- Someday the military events in Ukraine will end. How do you see the future of Russia in the next 2-5 years, under Putin, and depending on the outcome of the Ukrainian "special operation"?

- It all depends on the outcome of hostilities. Two scenarios are possible.

1. The promised offensive is relatively successful. Russian troops manage to surround a large grouping of the Ukrainian army and begin its gradual destruction. But it may take a month or two. Therefore, most likely, some kind of negotiations will take place, as a result of which Ukraine will cede part of the territories in the east and south and take on a certain neutral status, modeled on Austria or Finland. In addition, "Nazi parties" will be banned and monuments to Bandera will be demolished, and the streets will be renamed. The Russian language will receive the status of the second state language.

However, I think this scenario is rather unlikely.

2. Another scenario assumes that Russia will not have enough forces to develop the offensive. Ukraine will be able to defend more or less effectively until the Russian offensive finally fizzles out. In this case, a certain line of demarcation will also be established and negotiations on a truce will begin, but the conditions will be much less favorable for Russia. Most likely, there will be no “denazification”, and no status of the Russian language. The maximum that Russia can achieve is the expansion of Russian-controlled territory, including Mariupol and the coast of the Sea of ​​Azov. A truce will be signed and the conflict will be "frozen" for a year or more.

In the event of such a development of events, it will be quite difficult for Russian propaganda to sell this to its own population as a “victory”. In this case, combined with the effect of sanctions and rumors of heavy losses, all this may have domestic political consequences. But what exactly is difficult to predict. In the short term, we will most likely see a tightening of the repressive regime. And what will happen in the long run - we'll see.