Hidden Processes around Karabakh

Backroom negotiations and closed-door meetings on the Karabakh settlement have long been part of a big political game. From time to time, politicians disclose events of 5-10 years ago, lift the veil of secrecy and we find out details that we had not previously guessed.

One of these "discoveries" was the recent recognition of President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko when he said that Russia and Belarus had offered the Armenian President to return 5 of the 7 occupied regions around Karabakh. This revelation was a confirmation that the so-called "Lavrov's plan" existed. Novruz Mammadov, a representative of the Presidential Administration of Azerbaijan, once reported about this idea of ​​Moscow presuming a phased settlement, but was sharply criticized by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Apparently, Mammadov opened the veil of secrecy ahead of time. However, this is not important, but the fact is that all this happened in the spring of 2016. In this sense, the causes and consequences of the April 4-day war of 2016 look different and in one context.

Today, too, not quite ordinary and not always explicable things are happening, the essence of which can only be guessed. But it is quite possible that they are elements of invisible events or backstage talks.

The most recent of them is the announcement that Azerbaijan withdraws its troops from the border with Armenia in the Gazakh-Agstafa direction and transfers this sector to border guards.

No explanation for this was given. Moreover, it is impossible to find logic in this, given the fact that strategic oil and gas pipelines within the limits of a shelling pass through these territories and the protection of this infrastructure is the most important task of the armed forces.

The withdrawal of troops from this area is not explainable in the light of the previous statements by the Armenian side that in the event of a resumption of war, the oil and gas pipelines of Azerbaijan, together with other infrastructure facilities, will be the first targets for defeat.

There was another event that can be called out of the ordinary, but remained almost unnoticed. Thus, during the meeting of the parliament, the Deputy Chairman of the ruling party, Siyavush Novruzov, suddenly declared that it is necessary to think that there is an Armenian minority in the country. Once the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh will be resolved and "our citizens from among the Karabakh Armenians will receive parliamentary mandates", so we should think about the need to organize a translation for these people from Armenian to Azerbaijani and vice versa (!).

This statement provoked a negative reaction from Parliament Speaker Oktay Asadov, who was never distinguished by ingenuity and awareness. But it is hard to believe that Siyavush Novruzov would have said such a thing without receiving a clear instruction from above.

Another fact, maybe not so obvious, can be considered the estimates of the Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov that the meetings with his colleague Zograb Mnatsakanyan were very important and useful, that they lasted 4 hours in one case and 3 hours in another. Such lengthy negotiations speak of their serious content.

Finally, there was a significant change at the level of the first persons of the two countries. While, until now, the name of Serge Sargsyan was accompanied by the assessment of a "war criminal", then there is nothing like this in relation to Nikol Pashinyan. Moreover, after Aliyev met with Pashinyan in Dushanbe, tensions on the confrontation line eased sharply, shelling and facts of the deaths of soldiers reduced many times. And finally, between the military of the two sides operational communication was established.

Finally, there are the latest events in Karabakh, where there was an unexpected and inexplicable change of military leadership.

What do all these events say if you try to assemble them into a single puzzle? If you are an optimist, you can probably assume that the parties are looking for real steps to strengthen confidence-building measures and are preparing the basis for some compromise solutions. But it is possible that all these facts and events are not interconnected and only create such an impression.

It is possible that after the formation of the new government of Armenia, the strategy of this country's new leadership will become clearer. This can be judged by the reaction from Baku. --0-----