Cooperation or trap against Turkey?

The joint patrolling by Turkish and Russian forces in Idlib from midnight on March 15, which the parties agreed on March 13 in Ankara after a three-day debate, was a concrete step taken as part of the ceasefire agreement reached in the Kremlin on March 5. In the six-kilometer security zone, the positions of Turkish troops are clearly visible to their Russian colleagues. On the maps available to us, it is easy to notice that Turkey does not have special opportunities to free actions there. For, in a situation where most of the conditions were dictated by Moscow, Ankara was forced to agree to a ceasefire.

At the same time, the main goal of Russia was to keep the road to Latakia, where its naval base located, so that by limiting the capabilities of both the jihadist group, the Free Syrian Army, and Turkey for attacking and maneuvering in region, allow Assad's army to regain strength.

Despite the Moscow ceasefire plan is a kind of minefield for Ankara, it had no choice but to agree with him. Because the ceasefire, at least, allowed Turkey to monitor the region with drones, which, incidentally, Russia is unhappy.

How could the joint military patrol of the two countries affect the fact that on March 15 jihadist groups did not leave the region? After all, the provocations of terrorists could then put an end to the agreement reached on March 5. Moreover, something that most feared happened: the terrorists tried to use children and women as a shield in order to disrupt military patrols.  However, the Russian Ministry of Defense immediately announced the premature termination of the circumvention of positions. There was also something in this statement that satisfied Ankara: in it, jihadists were called "Turkish-controlled forces."

This circumstance increases the likelihood that Turkey and Russia will continue cooperation in the region, but at the same time raises questions. Thus, in military operations in the region, the main target of the Syrian army supported by Russia were terrorist groups firmly entrenched in Idlib, and very few facts of a direct attack on the Free Syrian army, openly supported by the Turkish army? And can the  terrorist groups entrenched in the region by their provocations against the joint Russian-Turkish patrol service on March 15 succeeded in limiting its work, lead to the fact that Russia will offer Turkey: “We have no choice but to fight together jihadists? However, Moscow always openly speaks of Ankara’s support for these groups.

Cannot such provocations now contribute to the fact that the unexpected diplomatic move of Moscow will confront Turkey with the need to fight with the jihadist groups of the region together with it? Declaring that a tough military invasion of Idlib would create a “new wave of refugees,” Turkey has so far prevented chaos from happening here, and all this time Russia has accused her of “secretly protecting the jihadist groups in Idlib.” Will the jihadists' presence in the region ultimately lead to the cooperation of Moscow and Ankara in the fight against them despite the ceasefire (and previous agreements)?

Will Russia require this?

Will Turkey comply with this requirement?

Will events develop in the case of both consent and disagreement of Ankara with the demand of Moscow?

Could jihadist provocations after the ceasefire be a trap for Turkey?