With high speed towards real independence

The anti-Russian riots that occurred on June 20, 2019 before the Georgian parliament were especially closely watched in the post-Soviet republics with similar problems in relations with Moscow. The nature of such problems is the same. The former republics of the USSR, having regained their independence, are trying to escape from the choking embrace of the Kremlin and, as a result, lose part of their territory or receive the threat of territory loss. Almost all CIS countries, except Kazakhstan, faced such a scenario. Here, a wise dictator, in anticipation of the sad end of a quick exit from the influence of Moscow, he himself constantly put forward initiatives to strengthen ties with Russia. Nazarbayev himself was ready to strangle Moscow in his arms. Such a strategy has proven to be effective. Until now, Moscow has not attempted to take away from Astana either a part of the territory or create an effective separatist movement in the country.

Analysts" opinions about the speed of the liberation of the republics from the embraces of Moscow differ.

1. Too rapid movement to the West becomes a cause of revenge on the part of the Kremlin - one must be patient, some say.

2. We must get rid of the dictates of the Kremlin as soon as possible, even, perhaps, at the cost of losing part of our territory. For whatever you do, Moscow will not rest until it has established full control over you.

In favor of the first statement, you can point to Azerbaijan, which in the early 1990s hurried to withdraw the Russian troops from the country, began active cooperation with Turkey, signed an oil contract with Western oil giants without agreement with Moscow and, as a result, the pro-Western government was overthrown, and 14% of the territory is occupied. The same happened with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine ... They all hurried to the West, but the West did not really hurry to meet them, the West did not render any real help here.

As a counterargument, we can consider a curious document, created in 1993 by the Russian pro-government elite as a guide for action for the Russian government in case of strong centrifugal tendencies in the territories previously controlled by Moscow. Here is an excerpt from the Theses of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (1993), which was headed by such prominent Russian political leaders of the time as A. Adamishin (at that time, First Deputy Foreign Minister D. Revrikov (Yeltsin"s Assistant for Foreign Policy), S.Stepashin (then the head of the FSB), S. Shakhrai (at that time, vice-premier of the Russian Federation) and others:

"Integration with a large number of countries of the former USSR ... or (in the event of their collapse) with regions that have broken away from them is almost inevitable from a strategic perspective. There is no alternative to this process, and the only problem is its forms and conditions."

The Russian elite was ready for the aforementioned centrifugal tendencies; in 1993, it developed a plan to prevent them. The essence of this plan is Integration (read occupation) with regions that have broken away from the republics of the fugitives. What happened to Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, Donbass ...

Proponents of a quick move to the West also argue that even in the event of a threat from Moscow, such a movement should be launched as soon as possible. After all, such a quick movement gives you time to carry out the necessary reforms for development - entry into the world market and, in general, a comprehensive association with the international community. And continuing to move in the wake of Moscow, the country will simply lose precious time for development and more and more plunge into the abyss of economic and spiritual crises, similar to those that now embrace Russia...

It can be said that anti-Russian demonstrations in Tbilisi are of a landmark nature. On June 20, demonstrators chanted slogans against Russian neo-colonialism. In response, Russian President Putin the next day banned civil aviation flights carrying Russian tourists to Georgia, which could damage the Georgian treasury, according to various estimates, ranging in size from 250 to 750 million dollars. For a poor Georgia, this is a significant loss of funds. And if the normalization of relations with Moscow does not happen, which is probably zero, the events will follow the scenario "Immediate deliverance from the Russian embrace". In this case, trade with Russia will fall, and Georgia will have to make considerable efforts in order to bring its production, legislation and lifestyle in line with Western standards, to carry out painful fundamental reforms. Now it is necessary to carry out reforms.

The speed with which the new independent states move in the direction of the world democratic community will have to be decided by each country individually, in accordance with its realities and the temperament of the population. Georgia has chosen a fast track. Let"s wish it success.