The Allies� military assistance to Azerbaijan

On January 12, the Allies" Joint Military Committee submitted its recommendations to the Allied power delegates in Versailles. The document was signed by Marshal Ferdinand Foch, General Charles Sackville-West, and Ugo Cavallero. It stated that, if Bolshevism cannot be stemmed, it will be able to spread to dangerous regions such as the Caucasus. Therefore it is important to review once again the possibilities of creating obstacles to prevent its spread to these regions. Taking into consideration the lack of stability in the local governments and the unfitness of their military units, these obstacles should first be created by European armies. This task can be undertaken by two well-equipped divisions. In time, as local military forces will have undergone training and can then be harnessed to these operations, the number of the European troops in the Caucasus could be reduced. "Beyond financial and material provision, this organization of the defensive barrier of the Caucasus would require time (a minimum of three months should be allowed). It would be advisable, therefore, to under take it without delay." The experts believed that until a defense barrier could be set up, the plan to provide the Caucasus with military supplies should be fulfilled under certain conditions and that the Allied fleet in the Caspian Sea should control the situation.

According to experts, if the Allied states agreed with the foregoing suggestions, it would be possible to explore ways of assisting the Caucasus states. On the same day, British delegates prepared a similar document. They believed the Bolsheviks had failed to fulfill their dream of destroying Europe. Therefore, they had started talks with Muslims and began moving eastward. Denikin"s inevitable defeat would form a dangerous corridor in the South Caucasus, which the Allies were trying to save from both ends. It was now necessary to prevent the two forces (Bolshevik Russia and Kemalist Turkey) from uniting. The British believed an attack on Georgia would lead to negative consequences for the Allies. If Georgians could enjoy assistance from the Allies, they could secure their borders. The document suggested that political, military, financial, and logistical aid to Georgia and Azerbaijan was important.

After the Versailles decision of the Allied powers, on January 15, the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates were invited to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ali Mardan Topchubashov and Mahammad Maharramov and the Georgian representatives Irakli Tsereteli and Zurab Avalov were greeted by the secretary general of the ministry, Jules Cambon, British delegate Philip Kerr, and Italian delegate Marquis della Torretta. Cambon presented the official decision of the Paris Peace Conference participants to recognize Azerbaijan"s de facto independence, to Topchubashov. He congratulated the delegates, saying that as recognized states, Azerbaijan and Georgia would be able to address important matters to the peace conference from now on. Mehdiyev wrote in this regard, Monsieur Cambon stated that Azerbaijan and Georgia had been recognized as independent states in accordance with international legal norms. These two states had now been empowered to engage in direct relations with the Allied powers, addressing their needs and demanding their legal rights and equal membership at congresses. In addition, Cambon informed them that recognition of these countries" governments should simultaneously be accompanied with the recognition of their secession from Russia. It could be concluded that from that point on, Azerbaijan and Georgia would be considered sovereign states.

Afterward, when Cambon asked the delegates "to address any concerns," Topchubashov on behalf of Azerbaijan presented basic facts about the state system of his country, expressed his gratitude for its recognition, and noted that Azerbaijan was expecting aid and the de jure recognition of its independence from the major states. After the information about the Allied powers" decision spread, the Azerbaijani representatives began receiving congratulatory telegrams from many diplomatic missions, societies, and unions. Congratulatory telegrams were received from representatives of Georgia, Estonia, Iran, India, and other states; the Ukrainian bureau in Lausanne; the Franco-Caucasus Committee; from Mr. Pittard, the chairman of the Geneva-based league of states that had seceded from the Russian empire; and others.

On January 15, in the afternoon, the military experts in Versailles discussed the issue of military assistance to Azerbaijan and Georgia. To participate in the discussion of this matter, Britain"s War Secretary Winston Churchill, chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Henry Wilson, First Lord Walter Long, First Sea Lord David Beatty, and others arrived in Paris. The military expert congress and the invitation of high-ranking British military staff to Paris began to spark rumors. French radio reported that 10,000 British troops were on their way to Baku. According to the report, Lloyd George had allegedly asked Clemenceau to increase French military presence in Germany so that the German-based British troops could be relocated to Baku. However, all these were merely rumors. By the time of the April events, no British troops or even British military advisors had been sent either to Baku or Tiflis.

The congress of military experts continued on until January 16 with Clemenceau acting as chairman. He asked Cambon, who had met with the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates the previous day, to report on the current situation in the South Caucasus. Cambon informed the participants about the republics" urgent financial, military, and other needs and their fitness for self-defense. He noted that the representatives of both republics had asked for political, military, and financial assistance. Initially, they feared Denikin, but the Volunteer Army had now weakened. From his previous talks with the representatives, Philip Kerr had determined that Georgia was ready to mobilize 50,000 men and Azerbaijan was ready to mobilize 100,000 men. This information, in turn, was presented to Clemenceau. However, neither Cambon"s nor Kerr"s report satisfied Clemenceau; he doubted the numbers. In Lloyd George"s view, however, the republics had well-trained combat-ready units, mainly consisting of Tatars (i.e., Azeri Turks). Cambon added that both armies had been established on the basis of the old tsarist army and the national guard. Each republic possessed enough soldiers to defend the front line; only weapons and ammunition were in short supply. The republics addressed this particular issue to the Allies. Cambon also noted that the Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives wanted the independence of the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus to be de facto recognized as well. In particular, the Azerbaijanis believed that if the Bolsheviks pursued Denikin, the Volunteer Army might retreat to Derbent, which would place Baku under the threat of occupation. The occupation of Baku, in turn, would place the entire Caspian basin in danger. Lloyd George thought recognition of the Daghestan would be a clever move, one that Muslims would regard positively. He also noted that, although the Allies possessed enough weapons and provisions, the problem was to deliver them to the region. Clemenceau said that most of the weapons sent to Denikin had fallen into the hands of Bolsheviks. After long discussions, it was finally decided that Field Marshal Henry Wilson would continue discussions the next day in the presence of the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates.

On January 17, a joint meeting was held at the Claridge Hotel where Azerbaijani representatives were staying. The meeting was chaired by Field Marshal Wilson and involved Admiral Beatty, a representative of the British Foreign Office named Robert Vansittart, and the Azerbaijani and Georgian delegates. The main goal of the meeting was to clarify what specific material aid could be rendered to Azerbaijan and Georgia in case of a Bolshevik incursion. The issue of sending Allied troops to the Caucasus was not discussed; the participants touched only upon the issue of military and logistical assistance. When Admiral Beatty asked whether Azerbaijan could defend its portion of the Caspian shore single-handedly, Topchubashov replied in the negative.

On January 19, 1920, at the Paris Peace Conference, the Allied powers discussed the issues surrounding the South Caucasus in detail. The meeting was attended by heads of state. By that time, the Azerbaijani delegation was represented at the Paris Peace Conference in a body. The gathering was attended by prominent figures including Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Nitti, Cambon, Mazzi, Curzon, Churchill, Foch, Beatty, Wilson, and others. Marshal Foch presented the report by the military expert group. The longest debate arose around the issue of transporting aid. Foch, who headed the group, considered it essential to send several military divisions to the South Caucasus.

Field Marshal Wilson supported Foch by adding that if Britain did not show initiative in controlling the Caspian Sea, it would be impossible to save the South Caucasus. Defense Secretary Churchill agreed with Wilson and stated that if Britain failed to control the Caspian, all the weapons shipped to the Transcaucasia would be lost to the Bolsheviks. Lloyd George vehemently protested the military experts" proposal on the grounds that they had not taken politics into consideration. He asked Marshal Foch, if the South Caucasus cannot be saved without sending troops there, and if the aid sent there will be lost, then it would be logical to deny any assistance. "We have already been asked to send materials to those tribesmen. I want to know if that is militarily expedient." Foch was right in believing that the Caucasus could be saved from Bolshevik aggression by admitting troops. The military experts saw the solution in sending troops to the region, while Lloyd George and his following insisted on providing the republics only with weapons and ammunition, and he wanted to clarify whether the republics could make rational use of this assistance or would lose it to the Bolsheviks as had Denikin. The chairman of the conference, Georges Clemenceau, addressed the following questions to the military experts: what forces directly threatened these countries and, regarding Lloyd George"s comment, would the assistance provided by the Allies be used efficiently? Lord Curzon informed him that he had talked with representatives of the Caucasus republics who were currently in the waiting room. They were extremely concerned about a Bolshevik attack. They were certain that if weapons and ammunition were delivered on time, the threat could be alleviated. Otherwise, the fall of their governments would be inevitable. Lord Curzon said a decision could not be made without consulting them. Clemenceau agreed with this idea and decided that the Azerbaijani and Georgian representatives should be heard. After delegates from the Caucasus joined the gathering, Clemenceau said to them, Gentlemen, the conference has been discussing the urgency of sending to Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaijan, food, arms and ammunition. We are told that you can give us information about an intended Bolshevik attack upon your people and of the means at your disposal for defence. We wish to know if at this juncture you would be in a position to exploit the help that we might be able to send you. We are quite disposed to do something effective, but we want to know the present states of your countries and whether such aid would be effectively used against Bolsheviks, or whether it is more likely to happen, as it did with Denikin, that the Bolsheviks would be strong enough simply to capture from you the materiel sent and thus to make matters worse. As appointed representative, Irakli Tsereteli spoke on behalf of both delegations. He noted that Georgia and Azerbaijan were in serious need of the Allies" help. Tsereteli said, We are equally likely to be attacked by the Bolsheviks, but we do not know whether we shall be or not. Were we helped by the Entente, the Bolshevik might hesitate to attack us. In any case, we need the material assistance of the Great Powers if we are to defend ourselves. To Clemenceau"s question "I am to understand that you are asking us to send troops also?" Tsereteli replied that this would be the best kind of aid, Bolsheviks would attack the Caucasus sooner or later. He noted, The state of mind of our people is such that, should the Bolsheviks attack, and if at the same time we received the material support of the Entente, we hope to defeat every attack. But such material aid is necessary immediately...When Denikin was in our land, our despairing peoples fought his troops by every means in their power, and a current of sympathy with the Bolsheviks appeared. To-day, our people see their independence recognized and we are convinced that all the forces of the Highlanders will be used to resist a Bolshevik invasion and to defend our independence. It is under those circumstances that we build so much hope upon receiving help from the Supreme Council. We do not wish war: we are even ready to come to an agreement if that were possible with the Bolsheviks, but only upon the condition that they also recognize our independence. Georges Clemenceau asked Tsereteli: "You would really sign an agreement with the Bolsheviks?" Tsereteli replied: Yes, on condition that they pledged themselves not to invade our country and that they did not try to introduce propaganda among our people. But I must repeat, if we were strong, and the Entente were to help us, Bolsheviks would be obliged to recognize our independence and give up their attempts. To Lloyd George"s question, "How many men can Azerbaijan put into the field?" Mahammad Maharramov, an advisor to the Azerbaijani delegates, informed him that, if weapons and ammunition were shipped, Azerbaijan would be able to mobilize 100,000 men. To Lloyd George"s question, "Have you the troops at the moment?" Maharramov replied: "We have a little army, in the command of a native Azerbaijani general, about a 50,000 strong, perhaps more, disciplined; but there are only from 10,000 to 12,000 of these men with arms." When Lloyd George asked Tsereteli the same question, Tsereteli said his country possessed 15,000 well-trained troops divided into sixteen battalions. If they were provided with equipment, they could mobilize 50,000 people in 2 weeks. Lord Curzon from the floor addressed a question to the Azerbaijani representatives: "Reports that I have received say that a certain number of officers in Azerbaijan are Turkish officers. Does the presence of these Turkish officers in the army leave us the guarantees necessary in a fight against the Bolsheviks?" Maharramov said, to fight the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan, the population had asked Turkey for help. At the time, the Turkish army had liberated the Caucasus. A certain number of its officers were in fact former residents of Azerbaijan and Dagestan. After the Turks left the Caucasus, there had been no more than fifty Turkish officers remaining in Azerbaijan. They were originally from the region, and the Azerbaijanis were certain they would fight the Bolsheviks for freedom along with the entire nation. Topchubashov, who also spoke at the conference, noted that Azerbaijan had no foul intentions with regard to the Bolsheviks or Denikin. It did not intend to intervene in Russia"s internal affairs. However, in order to defend itself from the two threats, it was ready to use all means possible, most important, through efficient use of the aid provided by the Allies. According to Topchubashov, the British fleet at Enzeli could provide enormous help by protecting Baku. He also urged the Allies to recognize the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus, which could serve as a buffer zone between the army advancing from the north and the South Caucasus republics. After Topchubashov"s speech, Lloyd George inquired about the reasons for Denikin"s potential attack on Dagestan. Tsereteli said that Denikin viewed Dagestan and the South Caucasus alike as provinces of Russia. Nitti wanted to know whether the recognition of the Caucasus states could create an atmosphere of resistance against the Bolsheviks. Tsereteli gave an affirmative answer and added that if the recognition became de jure, the strength of the resistance would significantly increase. Maharramov joined the discussion by stating that Azerbaijan was against the dividing of Denikin"s fleet. In light of Denikin"s failure, there had been a positive shift toward Bolshevism observed among the sailors. They were likely to side with the Bolsheviks, creating a threat to Baku and the entire South Caucasus. Lloyd George wondered whether Baku could be defended upon the arrival of weapons from Europe and how many soldiers could be mobilized for that purpose. Maharramov said that Baku already possessed a strong garrison. When Clemenceau wanted to clarify the size of the garrison, Maharramov mentioned the number 7,000. The remainder of the discussion continued without the participation of the Caucasus representatives. At this stage of the conference, Churchill asked Foch if the Caucasus defense was to be viewed as an independent matter or as part of the general matter of anti-Bolshevik defense. Marshal Foch said he viewed it as the latter. When Churchill asked whether Denikin or the Bolsheviks constituted a worse threat to the Caucasus, Ferdinand Foch stressed that the Bolsheviks were more threatening.

He added that first and foremost, the Bolshevik advance into the south should be prevented and the newly established states should be strengthened. He suggested the creation of a union of East European and South Caucasus states aimed at resisting Bolshevism. After Marshal Foch"s remark, the discussions continued without the participation of the military experts.

This meeting was the final one not just of the Paris Peace Conference but of the political career of France"s Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau. When Clemenceau died in 1929, Topchubashov as the head of the Azerbaijani delegation at the peace conference expressed his deep condolences to the French government. He emphasized Clemenceau"s important role and services in the recognition of Azerbaijan"s independence. In his statement, he wrote, "The death of one of France"s greatest political leaders Georges Clemenceau deeply saddened us. We Azerbaijanis will always remember that the independence of Azerbaijan was recognized under Clemenceau"s chairmanship."