The United States interest in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan

After World War I, the United States emerged as the most powerful state on the world stage. During the aftermath, the United States became the financial and economic center of the world. Its entry into the conflict in 1917 and its subsequent participation in the victory of the Entente increased the political influence of the United States and strengthened its role in deciding the destiny of the world. The United States achieved this status as a superpower in the new postwar world system, and its president, Woodrow Wilson, became famous as the architect of the peace and a friend of small nations.

The United States came to the Paris Peace Conference with Wilson"s Fourteen Points, which he had declared in January 1918. The compilation of these peace principles embodied the coming of the United States to superpower status. The world Wilson envisaged would be based on principle, not power; on law, not interest -for both victor and vanquished. Although the collapse of the Russian empire and recognition of the new states established in its territory were not mentioned in Wilson"s principles, after the start of the peace conference, the Caucasus region began to attract U.S. interest. That is why the United States, and not only European countries, became a candidate for the Caucasus mandate.

Since autumn 1919, Ali.Mardan bey started establishing ties with the United States with its enhanced role in the world politics. He wrote to Baku, "We are maintaining some relations with American Jews who advise us to send a delegation to America in an effort to allay impressions caused by an Armenian ballyhoo against Azerbaijanis due to alleged mass killings of Armenians in September". As distinct from Great Britain, France, and Italy, the United States expressed the willingness to accept a mandate for controlling the Black Sea straits, Istanbul, and the Caucasian region. It became apparent from talks of Ali Mardan bey with President Wilson, US representatives at the Peace Conference, Under-Secretary Frank Polk and Henry Morgenthau who had long worked in the Near East that the Azerbaijani Republic gave its consent to be patronized by the United States provided latter"s non-interference with internal affairs of the Republic, compliance with "fourteen points" of Wilson without having anything of it. Similar talks were held between Americans and Georgians. On June 11, the Georgian delegation led by Chkheidze had a meeting with Wilson"s advisor, colonel Edward House. The talks ended with Georgia"s consent to the American mandate. Later June the Americans mooted the issue at the Council of Ten. On July 5, the Council of Ten approved Colonel William Haskell as a High Commissioner of Armenia. The decision said that Haskell was assigned as a High Commissioner on behalf of the United States, England, France, and Italy. At the same time, he was responsible for all kinds of aid to Armenia. All representatives of the governments of the United States, England, France, and Italy in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and Istanbul were to start collaborating with Haskell immediately. The same meeting passed a decision that Gen. James Harbord go to Erevan and draw up report on repatriation, general military and economic questions. The same day Lansing telegraphed to Washington about this decision.

In summer 1919, Haskell arrived in the Caucasus. His residence was located in Erivan. At the first meeting with the Armenian government, he declared about his mission to defend Armenia and Armenians regardless of the place of their residence (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey). This is why his post was titled "High Commissioner of the Allies". As a first step, Haskell, under a cover of general-governorship, tried to get Nakhchivan and Sharur-Daralayaz out of Azerbaijan"s control and give it to Armenia. However, in accordance with a decision of the Azerbaijani government, Topchibashov sent August 19 a note of protest to the chairman of the peace conference. It said that the Azerbaijani delegation was looking forward to the recognition of his country"s independence while attempts were made to interfere with peace conference" powers and forcibly redraw borders of Caucasian Azerbaijan, and its residents were becoming refugees in their homeland. Information was afloat that region of Kars, Erevan guberniya, uyezds of Nakhchivan, Sharur-Daralayaz and a part of Erevan uyezd were annexed to the Armenian Republic. The note reminded that the government of Azerbaijan had never out up with transfer of Nakhchivan, Sharur-Daralayaz, Surmali and a part of Erevan uyezd to Armenia. When adjusted for the recent bloody events in the region, a note requested the allied command to address two important issues: 1. Withdraw all military units from Kars province, except for the allied troops; administer the province at population"s will until a decision of the peace conference is adopted; 2. Authorize the Azerbaijani Republic with managing Nakhchivan, Sharur-Daralayaz, Surmaly uyezds and a part of Erevan uyezd. Azerbaijani representatives submitted this note of protest to the peace conference, as well all representatives of the allies in Paris.

In November 1919, Haskell arrived in Paris to make a report on the situation in Transcaucasia. He met with Topchibashov. In his interview, Haskell did not bring up a question of general-governorship in Nakhchivan realizing that this idea was having no prospects. From now on, they adhered to the view that the whole Transcaucasia should be regarded as a mandated territory of a world power. Topchibashov informed Baku about his meeting with Haskell: "He was much pleased with his reception in Baku; he liked very much our ordinary people: it is a peaceful people and not enemy of the Armenian people. The latter would live in peace and tranquility if not politicians...". Responding to questions, the colonel expressed his confidence that the Transcaucasian peoples could have co-existed peacefully. They are closely related economically; however, a world power must help them at first, improve their financial conditions, following which every people concerned could later live independently and be released from the mandatory, in the first turn, "your Azerbaijan", Haskell noted indicating Azerbaijan on the map".

Prior to going to the Caucasus, Col. Haskell had been instructed with helping Armenians. However, three months he spent in the Caucasus changed his stand on the issue. He witnessed and realized much, he understood that Armenians were far from an image of "long-suffering" people of which trumpeted the western press. During his talks with Topchibashov and Maharramov, Haskell pointed out that "until recently Americans spoke of Armenians as solely suffering. Dispatching of our missions to Turkey and the Caucasus, equally with stay of many Americans in the region, proved to be very useful. Now we are sure that "not all Armenians are good and not all Turks are bad". There are good and bad among Americans as well. "These countries might be united under a generic mandate (shows to Turkey and the Caucasus on the map), however, America is not going to act as such a mandatory". Col. Haskell was not mistaken. Debates of November 1919 in Versailles firmly objected to the inclusion of Azerbaijan and Georgia in the mandate of Col. Haskell. Americans did not insist much on the Caucasian mandate because the question was of America"s another mission in Asia Minor and the Caucasus - a mission of Harbord who submitted a report on the situation in the region to President Wilson. In particular, Harbord opposed the American mandate on the Caucasus.

The developments were as follows. In considering that in 1919 the US interest in the Caucasus increased and political circles began debating over a mandate on the Caucasus, President Wilson made a decision to send a special mission there with the purpose of exploring political, military, geographical, economic and administrative questions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Asia Minor. Research into a protocol of a general meeting of Azerbaijani, Georgian and North Caucasus Republic delegates of June 12, 1919 makes it possible to assert that earlier June Americans was going to send such a mission.

In mid-August, a head of the US delegation to Versailles Frank Polk sent a special letter to the delegations of the Caucasian Republics about the Harbord mission. It said that brigadier general James Harbord and 12 attendant officers were going to visit the Caucasus. The letter asked to inform respective governments about Harbord"s arrival and assist him in fulfilling his mission. To conclude, the letter emphasized that the Azerbaijani government should not take this mission as recognition of the Azerbaijani Republic.

Then the Azerbaijani delegates met with Col. James Rhea, an authorized agent of Harbord mission for Azerbaijan, and provided him with necessary materials. Topchibashov wrote to Baku, "I"ve seen Col. Rhea several times... He is a head of the mission in Azerbaijan. I gave him necessary materials and informed him about latest developments. It turned out that the confederation and particularly the United States would voice their view on entire Caucasus and us after termination of mission"s three months activity. I and Hajinskii met with Col. Loge, a head of all American missions, and the latter promised to help as saying that he would do his best to include, at least, one our representative to the mission. You"d better take advantage of it".

In September-October 1919, the Harbord mission visited Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. During talks in Baku earlier October, Harbord stressed the necessity of cessation of conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia. He was pleased with discipline and training in Azerbaijan, particularly, that of Azerbaijani soldiers. In his view, all these testified to Azerbaijan"s preparedness for independent life. The general expressed hope that the peace conference would take into account all expectations and aspirations of the Azerbaijani people. He laid an emphasis on peaceful foreign policy of Azerbaijan. Before leaving Batum for his home Harbord sent a letter of appreciation to Premier Nasib bey Usubbeyov for collaboration with his mission. He noted, "I and officers of my mission have fond memories of your people and country, and we are hopeful that squabbles of your neighbors won"t hamper your country"s progress".

On October 16, James Harbord arrived in Paris and submitted his report first to Undersecretary Polk and then the US State Department and Senate. Topchibashov tried to meet with him but failed. He reported to Baku, "A week ago Gen. Harbord, a head of US mission in the Caucasus, left Paris for America. He stayed here for two days only. I sent him a courier twice asking to fix a time for the meeting. His aide replied that the general would be glad to see him and telephone him about a date of the meeting. Regretfully, I failed to see him again. Touching upon Harbord"s arrival, some newspapers ("Le temps") noted that he reports back to President Wilson only and that he opposes US mandate over Armenia and being very busy he receives nobody".

The report prepared by General Harbord on the results of his mission leads one to conclude that he was in favor of uniting the South Caucasus and Istanbul under a common mandate but was against the United States taking on this mandate. The Harbord mission brought to an end the interest of the United States in the Caucasus; it also mentioned the unsupportive attitude of Armenia, which became known in political circles of the United States. A thorough analysis of information and documents shows that though the United States had strong military, political, economic, and strategic interests in the Caucasus, it was not able to defend the Caucasian republics from the growing northern danger in an effective way. Conversely, after World War I, the European allies were not only reluctant to allow United States involvement in the Caucasus but were even more jealous of its inroads into the Near East. The United States had to await the end of World War II in order to strengthen its influence in this region.