Karabakh peripeteia: from history to reality

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-Elmanbey, foreign politicians, in particular, Russian President accused the Azerbaijani party of initiating the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh with a special emphasis on Sumgait developments. But nobody made reference to the deportation of 350, 000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia prior to Sumgait events and the start of the conflict. In all probability, this is due either to the unfamiliarity or the effective propaganda work of our opponents. How did the Karabakh conflict between the two countries begin?

- It should be remembered that approaches of foreign politicians to the Karabakh conflict are many-sided. Positions of the most politicians being well-disposed to the Armenian party notwithstanding, there are, nevertheless, those maintaining positions of the Azerbaijani party as well. In particular, four UN Resolutions adopted in 1993 lay an emphasis on the occupation of the Azerbaijani lands. This is explained as being due to the impartial stand of a few honest foreign politicians. In the meanwhile, Vladimir Putin’s attitude to the Karabakh conflict is a manifestation of geostrategic interests of Russia.

That’s why in his statements Putin lays an emphasis on the fact that the war is underway on the territory of Azerbaijan, so Russia’s interference is impossible. In so doing, he does not run against Azerbaijan. On the other hand, he complains over the lack of security for Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh in the Soviet time. Put it differently, he insists that a Special administration set up by Moscow in 1988 was meant to operate up to the dissolution of the USSR to thus remove Nagorno Karabakh - where the situation was accompanied by bloody clashes - from the composition of Azerbaijan..

That’s what Putin meant to say. Your question draws attention to the omission of Azerbaijanis expelled from Armenia suggesting prejudiced attitude to the conflict. Suffice it to say that 140, 000 Azerbaijanis were killed on the territory of current Armenia and 750, 000 expelled. So it is a malicious slander to charge Azerbaijan with initiating the conflict.

It is commonly known that earlier October 1987 participants of an ecology protection meeting in Yerevan first demanded to transfer the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) to the Armenian SSR.

On December1, 1987 a group of «Armenian intelligentsia» headed by Zori Balayan handed out leaflets among Politburo members informing them about history and present state of Nagorno Karabakh.

It should be noted that leaflets distributed in January 1988 in Nagorno Karabakh among members of the Party, trade union and Komsomol demanded from them to hold meetings at enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The agenda of the meetings put a question of Karabakh’s annexing to “Motherland” (think: Armenia). Note that resolutions of the meetings stressed the necessity of dispatching sealed statements to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. On February 12, 1988 a scandalous session of the town Party-economic body was followed by incessant meetings at an assembly hall of Stepanakert town committee.

It must be acknowledged that on February 20 an extraordinary session of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region adopted a rule ”on petition to the Supreme Soviets of the Azerbaijan SSR and the Azerbaijan SSR about the transfer of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region from the composition of the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR". A brief chronology of posterior events is an eloquent testimony to the fact that the conflict had not been initiated by the Azerbaijani party.

When it comes to the Sumgait developments, i. e. transition of the conflict from «peace» stage to the military one, allegations that all began with the Sumgait events are none other than perversion of the truth.

It should be remembered that inquiry into Sumgait developments revealed persons of Armenian origin among main participants. The truth is that the first Karabakh conflict-related bloodshed took place on February 22, 1988 after murder of two Azerbaijanis near a regional center Askeran. It bears reminding that Sumgait developments occurred in 7 days after the event. Note that 6 out of 32 killed during Sumgait developments were Azerbaijanis while there were no Armenians among Askeran victims.  By the way, in his book “Black garden” Thomas de Waal mentions murder of two Azerbaijanis in Askeran as the first bloody event in the conflict.

- Why did Azerbaijan lose Nagorno Karabakh and 7 other regions in the First Karabakh War? Was there the third party? If that was the case, what was the interest of the third party in occupation of Azerbaijani lands by Armenia?

- I was at war for about three years in the First Karabakh War, so it is hard to remember about the defeat in the war even despite the fact that later 1992 we were close to the ultimate victory. The Lachin corridor was takn over the control, and the front line along Agdere drew nearer 15-2- km to Khankendi.

However, it was a February 1993 intrigue among political and military elites of Azerbaijan that led to the defeat. Continuation of military intrigues resulted in the occupation of the next 7 regions (without striking a blow). This defeat became possible through the involvement of third parties. A military uprising initiated by Suret Huseynov in Ganja and confused situation at the Defense Ministry – all of these things came as a result of active work of the Russian intelligence agency.

Do you know that in the reviewed period, following the dissolution of the USSR, the political thinking of the Romanovs Empire in Russia was smitten with revanchist ambitions. It is no secret that the Armenian trump card had been employed in the Caucasian policy of Tsarist Russia for nearly 200 years as the most important political instrument. It should be added that plans of Russia to get involved in the Caucasus and the Caspian expanse largely overlapped with Armenian dreams of “Great Armenia”. It was no mere coincidence that having concluded a Turkmenchay peace treaty with Iran and an Adrianople peace treaty with Ottomans, Russia demanded to resettle Armenians from Iran and Anatolia to the Caucasus. As a consequence, in the course of the 19 century scores of Armenians settled down on lands of the Caucasus. It was these migration processes that conferred the demographic predominance of Armenians on the territory of Nagorno Karabakh.

It has to be kept in mind that geopolitical interests of Russia orchestrated this country’s open or closed interference with Caucasian developments in 1993 in favor of Armenians and detriment of Azerbaijan. In other words, Russia was interested and even insisted on political destabilization in Azerbaijan through the network of the former USSR Party nomenclature. It was that political factor that led to the bloody change of power first in Georgia, then Azerbaijan. When adjusted for the fact that the attention of the military-political elite was drawn into the struggle for power in Baku, not the fighting in the field, our people was forced to reconcile with defeat in the First Karabakh War.

- Why did we fail to liberate our lands in the reviewed period? Were there any negotiations over 28 years to achieve peace and reconciliation?

- There are two reasons why we failed to liberate our lands. First, the political elite of the country bumped the strongest party from the process – Azerbaijani army. Note that 45-day combat operations went to show that that this strategy which prolonged the occupation period for the next 27 years was erroneous. Second, peace talks without any progress for many reasons. It has t be kept in mind that first years of peace talks (1994-1998) were intensive. Occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenians was flagrant violation of the UNU principles which led to the adoption of UN drastic and strict resolutions against the occupation fact.

In other words, it was an assertive policy of international community against the occupation that ensured active level of peace talks. Note that the present form of talks started as far back as in 1994 after the establishment of the institution of the co-chairmen of the Minsk conference at Budapest Summit of the OSCE.

What is important to notice is that the Summit agreed to start peace talks on the basis UN conflict resolutions and transfer of mediation efforts to the two countries-cochairmen (Finland and Russia). Note that Armenia had for long taken a destructive stand in the negotiation process largely due to the fact that it provided for liberation of occupied territories.

It should be recalled that the Lisbon Summit of OSCE recommended in 1996 to proceed from security guarantees for Nagorno Karabakh and its population, including mutual obligations over conflict resolution on the basis of “territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia; self-determination of Nagorno Karabakh at the highest ever level". However, in considering that Armenia declined from adopting these principles, they failed to be the subject-matter of the talks.

2It should be added that since 1997 the co-chairmanship was laid on three states – United States, France and Russia. In spring that year the co-chairmen submitted a draft agreement of on conflict resolution. Despite Azerbaijan’s preparedness for constructive consultations on the subject, the Armenian party turned down the project above. In autumn the co-chairmen submitted a new proposal based on “stage-by-stage conflict resolution.

At the first stage, these proposals provided liberation of regions around Nagorno Karabakh, beginning of OSCE peace operations, return of displaced persons to the liberated territories and restoration of main communication facilities in the conflict region. At the second stage, statuses of the Lachin corridor, town of Shusha and finally Nagorno Karabakh were to be identified, following which Minsk conference of OSCE convened.

In October 1997, Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia made a joint statement in Strasburg which said that the last proposals of the co-chairmen were promising basis for resumption of talks within the framework of the Minsk group.

That turned out to be a single serious agreement reached in the course conflict resolution by means of talks. However, after resignation of Armenian President in February 1998 and advent of Robert Kocharyan to power in March, Armenia officially recalled its consent to the “stage-by-stage” conflict resolution. All other attempts to draw Armenia to peace brought no results.

With regard to your question "Why no agreement has been reached“, I’d like to inform you that the political elite of the Armenian state is a prisoner to the dream of the Armenian diasphora about”Great Armenia". In so doing, account has to be taken of the fact that the diasphora matters most in shaping an ideology of the Armenian society. This makes the diplomacy of the Armenian state to lean toward psychopolitical direction.

Everything points to the fact that the Armenian political elite fails to realize that it is possible to accept results of rational thinking and explain this to its society.

Even worse, their psychopolitical obstinacy might cause among co-chairmen an impression of “irreversible reality” and additional motivation that they were absolutely right when acting uncompromisingly. A year later after the Armenian party declined from the agreement the co-chairmen put forward a new proposal based on a concept of “common state”.

Under this concept, Nagorno Karabakh was meant to receive a status of state and territorial unit in the form of Republic and create a common state together with Azerbaijan within the framework of internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan. The point is that Azerbaijan rejected this proposal, for it defied country’s sovereignty and. Since 2002, a format of “Prague process” talks fell to the level of ordinary representatives. Upwards of 100 subsequent meetings and talks were mostly of declarative character.

In the meanwhile, "Madrid principles" as today’s most talked about topics provide no full, open for society text. General information says that in fact these principles are an updated version of «incremental solution» (later rejected by Armenia) agreed by Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1997. It has to be kept in mind that initially this plan had been polished up at OSCE Lisbon Summit. The renewal of the document largely considered claims of the Armenian party. That was the core of talks until the Azerbaijani party launched a counter-offensive on September 27.

- Azerbaijan has repeatedly tried to liberate its lands from occupation but failed. Why  was Azerbaijan blackballed from doing it?

- Despite the expansion of occupation the Azerbaijani party could not resign to the loss of Nagorno Karabakh. In the past, this was mostly apparent in political rhetoric at international talks, rarely in the frontline. It is arguable that over the past 10 years there had been fierce skirmish on the frontline. In April 2016 the Azerbaijani party had first turned up the heat to change the contact line that existed since 1994. The Azerbaijani army projected power and liberated an important height in the south front. However, combat operations were immediately halted under the Russian pressure.

It is fair to say that three key factors are required to liberate lands from occupation:

First, Azerbaijan must have a formidable army. Second, the government must have a strong political will. Third, geopolitical conditions must be favorable for military operations. However, the most powerful of three factors is the political will of the government. If strong-willed, there is opportunity to boost the army, gain neutrality of some countries and find allies. The case in point for Azerbaijan is Turkey as a strong ally. Also, Azerbaijan succeeded in gaining a certain neutrality of Russia.

The above is a brief answer to the question "Why until recent times Azerbaijan failed to win support of other countries: the Azerbaijani government demonstrated no inflexible will.

- What caused the aggravation of the conflict situation?

- There are many causes but a key factor was Pashinyan’s advent to power in Armenia. His advent greatly damaged interests of the two (out of four) main political actors of the country – Armenians of Armenia; Armenians of Karabakh; diasphora-church and Armenians of Russia. The question is that Pashinyan is notorious for his anti-Russian stand in his previous political activity. In the course of the revolution-2018 he overthrew a pro-Russian Karabakh clan that ruled Armenia for 20 years running.

It should be realized that Pashinyan’s status as a representative of Armenians of Armenia opposing Russia and “Karabakh clan” forced him to enlist the support of other actors – diasphora and church. It’d be appropriate to note that influence of diasphora and the Armenian church on the Armenian society and political elite is very high. It was no mere coincidence after advent t power Pashinyan set the political agenda on winning this support.

His statement «Karabakh is Armenia, and that’s that!» and Defense Minister David Tonoyan’s statement «We shall wage a new war for occupation of new territories» were in fact obligations to the Armenian diasphora of the United States to gain its support. Put differently, Pashinyan tried to secure his power through rolling into the psycho-political abyss typical for the traditional Armenian political elite. Provocations in the front-line, especially a summer incident in Tovuz and murder of the Azerbaijani general were steps to supposedly strengthen Pashinyan’s support  and force his political rivals to hush up. This time it is all opposite. It was Pashinyan’s outrageous behavior that finally led to the beginning of the war while the lack of his support by Putin enabled Azerbaijan to liberate Shusha.

- The trilateral ceasefire agreement has been signed. What happens next?

- The war will be halt. As noted above, Putin permitted Azerbaijan to take Shusha back. Also, a serious geopolitical message is a statement about “Moscow standard time.”It is obvious that the signing of this statement by Putin’s will has again maintained a thesis “Agreed with Putin” popular since the beginning of combat operations”. The point is that three meetings aimed at attaining normal humanitarian ceasefire proved futile. On the other hand, Putin-initiated talks put an end to the war immediately.

It is important to note that a statement of November 9 leaves a lot of questions unanswered. Will the Constitution of Azerbaijan be valid in Khankendi? Will the so-called NKR survive till today? Under the statement, the Russian peacemakers will be deployed in the Lachin corridor, Khankendi, occupied territories as a whole, as well as on the contact line. This is to say that 27 years later the Russian army goes back to Azerbaijan. In a similar vein, the war has been won by the Azerbaijan warrior but Karabakh will be controlled by the Russian soldier.

Your first question addressed a nuance in Putin’s stand. I interpreted Putin’s statement at the Valdai meeting about security of Armenians in the Soviet time as his regret on liquidation of the Kremlin’s Special administration in Karabakh, 1988 and 1990.  Put it another way, the "Volskiy" administration has been restored, so Karabakh is directly controlled by Kremlin. This is very dangerous and unacceptable situation from standpoint of strategic interests of Azerbaijan. Contrary to Ilham Aliyev’s statement, Putin’s claims put no stop on the contact line, nor conflict resolution. Even worse, the conflict has been frozen till next war. Should this statement turn into «peace agreement», Azerbaijan will, first ever in its history, lose an opportunity to settle the issue once and for all.