The First Anniversary of Independence and Danger from the North

May 28, 1919, the first anniversary of Azerbaijan"s declaration of independence. The Republican press published numerous materials laying a special emphasis on independence"s role in the destiny of the people. Owing to red-letter date, the Parliament held an extraordinary sitting. Azerbaijan"s independence euphoria was accompanied by growing trouble of Denikin"s jeopardy, especially as Petrovsk and Derbent were reportedly captured. Azerbaijan was facing the danger from the north. It was no mere coincidence that during debates of May 26 Rasulzade reminded, "Daghestan is the gate to Azerbaijan". It was the Denikin" threat and intensification of Kolchak that contributed to the concept of "United, indivisible Russia" and inspired various Russian forces to seek diplomatic support and political trust at the Versailles sittings.

At a special session of Parliament, the acting chairman, Hasan bey Aghayev, made a brief congratulatory speech: Dear visitors! One year ago, on May 28, 1918, the Azerbaijani National Council was homeless, like a bird whose nest had been destroyed. Our independence was proclaimed in the Orient Hotel in Tiflis, two days after Georgia declared independence. The Azerbaijani National Council expected that this event would be a source of happiness for the Azerbaijani people. Was that reality, or was it an illusion? If we consider the life of independent Azerbaijan during the last year, we can see the National Council"s hopes and its expectations for the nation as a reality." Concerning the threat posed from the north by the Volunteer Army, Aghayev said that Azerbaijanis were "ready to defend their independence, ready to offer their life, property, and blood, not fearing enemies or threats from any side."

Aghayev"s speech was followed by remarks from the heads of the diferent factions represented in the Parliament. Mahammad Emin Rasulzade described the enthusiasm that had captured the entire city on Independence Day: Today, the independence of Azerbaijan is especially precious because there is an external threat to our independence, a danger from the outside. But we observe the sincere emotions ascending from the soul of the nation, and we know that they are stronger than any fire, any weapon. Down with the vile hands that are grabbing for our independence! The newspaper Azerbaijan published an article by Uzeyir Hajibeyli titled "One Year" that chronicled the turning points in the year-long history of the independence of Azerbaijan. Alluding to the maligning of Azerbaijani Turks to foreigners, Hajibeyli wrote that, once the Allied forces entered Baku, the Europeans were personally impressed and admitted that their negative opinions of Azerbaijanis had been wrong.

The idea of an "indivisible Russia," sustained by the activities of General Anton Denikin and Admiral Alexander Kolchak, had an influence over Allied policy. Russian forces appearing in different colors were attempting to gain diplomatic support and political trust at Versailles. In early June, the press reported that on May 26, the heads of the Entente states and the prime minister of Japan had addressed a note to Admiral Kolchak concerning recognition of the government at Omsk as the Russian government in toto. The Allied position was prompted by Kolchak"s recent military successes. The majority of the heads of state gathered in Paris hoped for a rapid victory of Kolchak, Denikin, and other White Guard generals and the decisive defeat of Soviet forces. The question of relations with Russia was being actively discussed by the Council of the Four. At their session

on May 20, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson had suggested sending a new appeal to the Russian groups. A member of the English delegation, Phillip Kerr, was entrusted with preparing the text. On May 23, the Council of the Four discussed the "Russian question" twice. During the morning session, a brief exchange of views was carried out, and Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau of France noted that the government of Japan had expressed a desire to address the Allies regarding recognition of the government at Omsk. It was his opinion that the Allies should not have left the initiative on this question to Japan. During the day session, the text prepared by Kerr was read by Wilson and discussed. On May 26, the text was signed by Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando, Wilson, and Saionji and was sent to Kolchak. The accompanying message specified that the Allies and their partners were seeking to introduce clarity into the "Russian question" and that they were far from intending to interfere with the internal affairs of Russia. The Allies linked their dispatch of troops to Russia to the necessity of rescuing the Czechoslovak

Legions from both the Germans and the Bolsheviks. What the Allies and their partners wanted was the prompt restoration of peace, law, and order in Russia. They were confident that the Russian people would put their internal affairs in order, settle the disputes that had arisen within the former Russian empire amicably by means of a legitimately elected State Duma (parliament), and establish relations with neighboring states through the mediation of the League of Nations. The Allies also wished to clarify Admiral Kolchak"s position on a number of issues before they could offer their support to the government at Omsk, namely:

1) the Constituent Assembly would be convened after the capture of Moscow;

2) free elections to the municipal duma, zemstvo, and other self-government institutions would be held;

3) Admiral Kolchak would not undertake to restore the special privilege of any class or estate or way of life destroyed by revolution;

4) the independence of Finland and Poland would be recognized; if boundary and other questions could not be settled by agreements, those questions would be resolved through the intermediary of the League of Nations;

5) if mutual relations between Russia and the territories of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Caucasus, and the Trans-Caspian are not settled amicably, then the situation would be resolved according to the advice of the League of Nations, and the Russian government would recognize the current autonomy of those territories de facto;

6) the authority of the peace conference to decide the future destiny of the Romanian part of Bessarabia would be recognized;

7) as soon as a government was created on a democratic basis, Russia would be included in the League of Nations;

8) the declaration of Admiral Kolchak dated November 27, 1918, regarding Russian debts would be confirmed.

For this reason, chairman of the Azerbaijani delegation Тopchibashev made a statement on May 31 that the expected recognition of the Kolchak"s government as successor to the Russian Empire seriously affects interests of the newly formed Republics, including Caucasian Azerbaijan. It stressed that the people of Azerbaijan with its thousands of victims did not recognize any Russian government and that the territory of Caucasian Azerbaijan could not be a part of the Russian state. As for recognition of Kolchak as a ruler of former Empire"s territory, the delegation lodged a note of protest to the chairman of the Peace Conference and Prime Ministers of Consent Powers which said that the Azerbaijani government had been struggling for half a year against Bolsheviks and cleaned its territory from them incurring great human material losses. It stressed that for a century Azerbaijan had been under the yoke of alien Russian regime and that today the Azerbaijani delegation officially declares, "regardless of current power in Russia, Azerbaijan cannot become a part of Russia, for it recognizes the power of its own Parliament and Government only".

On June 4, Admiral Kolchak responded to the Allies and said that he accepted the conditions laid out in the note dated May 26. He said that it would be possible to refer disputes regarding the Baltic, Caucasian, and trans-Caspian regions to discussion by the League of Nations and to ensure the autonomy of "the national groups." After receiving this satisfactory answer from Kolchak, on June 12, the Supreme Council of the Entente states declared that it recognized the government at Omsk within the above-stated conditions and would render it comprehensive assistance. This note was published in the press on June 13. Thus, the new republics that had sent envoys to Paris for the purpose of obtaining recognition of their own independence now faced a very serious turn of events. The note of June 12, signed by the heads of state in the Council of the Four, meant de facto recognition of Kolchak"s government within the former Russia, except for Poland and Finland. The Allied states opened some communications with it, sent representatives, and declared their intention of providing the government at Omsk with military, political, economic, and financial help.

The recognition of Kolchak"s government roused the indignation of most delegations of the new Republics. To make a joint note of protest, the chairman of the peace conference held a few sittings. Representatives of Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, North Caucasus, Belarus, and Ukraine agreed to sign the note. Signed this historical document were chairman of the Azerbaijani delegation Тopchibashev, chairman of the Estonian delegation Poska, chairman of the Georgian delegation Chkheidze, chairman of the Northern Caucasian Chermoyev, chairman of the Latvian delegation Мееrovich, chairman of the Belarus delegation Lushkevich, chairman of the Ukrainian delegation Sidorenko. The note said: "Decisions of state bodies of Russia cannot be applied to independent states of Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Northern Caucasus, Belarus and Ukraine, and mutual relations between these states and Russia may be regulated as between independent and legally qualified states only, whereas the above correspondence (between the Allies and Kolchak) may be interpreted as negation of this right. The Republics above kindly ask the great powers- participants of the peace conference to urgently recognize their political independence". On June 17, the note was signed and on June 18 Latvian Foreign Minister Meerovich submitted it to President Wilson.

Representatives of the Caucasus in Paris had twice - on June 15 and 18 discussed the situation at "Claridge" hotel. Attending the first meeting were Azerbaijanis, Georgians, and North Caucasus; the second meeting - Azerbaijanis and North Caucasus. The both meetings noted that Denikin, like Kolchak, posed a threat to the Caucasian Republics and that it was necessary to restore status quo that existed before the collapse of the North Caucasus Republic. "Note of Seven Republics" and a note of protest of the Caucasian Republics that was submitted to the peace conference on June 23. Unlike the notes of June 5 and 17, this note of the Azerbaijani delegation protested against not only Kolchak but Denikin as well. Article 6 of the note was directed against Denikin"s offensive: "The internal organization of the Caucasian Republics and the return to normal life and work are impeded by military actions and menacing behavior of the Voluntary army. Note that this army has already occupied a substantial part of the republics of Northern Caucasus; it poses threat to the Transcaucasia as a whole". The delegations ask that this Voluntary army which is unsupported by the allies and not encouraged to fight the Caucasian peoples, has been suggested to liberate the occupied territory and have respect for rights of the Caucasian Republics". Finally, the allies were told that all matters arising from the Caucasian Republics are too agreed with their governments or representatives in Paris. Sensing the need in resolving problems on a centralized basis, they sent a request to the secretariat of the Peace Conference to set up a commission for Caucasian matters like the Baltic commission.

In June 28, the delegations of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Georgia, Northern Caucasus, Azerbaijan, and Poland sent another message to the peace conference. They said, "Today"s occupation of the territory of Northern Caucasus by Gen. Denikin"s army and resultant threat to the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan go to show that the Russian reactionary forces are seeking to re-colonize the newly independent states on the territory of the former Russian Empire. Document signatories laid an emphasis on the fact that financial and military aid of the allies contributed to Denikin"s offensive. Delegates from all independent states are protesting against this form of interference. They insisted that they were prone to unite all freedom-loving peoples, and they received a threat against one people as a threat against all. They declared that from the right to self-determination standpoint to be instituted not by the Russian Assembly but by the Peace Conference, it was essential to preserve the territorial integrity of all Caucasian states and take into consideration the will of peoples as declared by their parliaments".

A report sent to the delegation by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs spelled out the danger to the new republics, including Azerbaijan, from the Denikin forces fighting for a "united and indivisible Russia." Military aggression had escalated into armed conflict with Georgia over the territories of Tuapse, Sochi, and Sukhumi on the Black Sea. In February 1919, negotiations between the Mountain Republic and Denikin were not crowned with success. The latter insisted that the Volunteer Army was fighting Bolshevism, but Bolshevism existed to the north, not in the south. The Republic of North Caucasia had declared independence in the beginning of May 1918, created its parliament in May 1919, and had been recognized by the Allied command in Baku. On November 27, 1918, General William Thomson said that the North Caucasus government would be recognized as the only legitimate government there until the fate of the Caucasus was decided at the international peace conference and that Denikin"s Volunteer Army would not be allowed to enter the territory of the North Caucasus Mountain Republic. Now, however, General Thomson avoided responding directly to the request of the government of the Mountain Republic. The Allies" mission in Teymur-Khan-Shura under the direction of Colonel Rawlinson returned to Baku after Denikin"s attack. Although the two British battalions in Petrovsk were supposed to prevent Denikin"s Volunteer Army from entering Dagestan,in truth they viewed the army"s movement to the south with indifference.

The government of Azerbaijan took a number of urgent measures with respect to the military and political activities of Denikin volunteers within the country. A letter of February 15, 1919, was addressed to General Thomson concerning attempts by representatives of the Volunteer Army and the Armenians to create military units. Prime Minister Fatali Khan Khoyski made an extraordinary announcement to the Parliament of Azerbaijan regarding the Denikin threat. He noted that factions, including Armenians, in support of Denikin were being secretly armed, that such activities humiliated the dignity of the government, and that it was urgently necessary to prevent such activities.