The strengthening of the Bolshevik danger and Azerbaijan

The fate of the new republics established upon the ruins of the former Russian empire was first addressed by British Prime Minister David Lloyd George in his speech before Parliament on November 17, 1919. This speech reflected events taking place in Russia, particularly Kolchak"s defeat and Denikin"s retreat beginning in October 1919. Heavily funded, armed, and diplomatically protected by Britain and other Allies, Denikin"s volunteers surrendered Orel on October 20, Voronezh shortly after that, and Novokhopersk on November 12, 1919. By the end of 1919, it became clear that the White Guard"s aim to save Russia from Communist occupation was unattainable. Yudenich"s attempt to seize Petrograd failed, Kolchak was driven far into Siberia, and Denikin was retreating to the south and surrendering more and more cities. However, for Azerbaijan and Georgia, who had existed under the threat of being attacked by Denikin, the defeat of his armywas now posing a new more terrible threat. Tadeusz Swietochowski correctly notes that the republics of the South Caucasus did not rejoice at Denikin"s defeat, as he and his men were giving way to a much stronger enemy in the form of the exultant Bolsheviks.These complications did not mean that all of Azerbaijan and Georgia were waging a secret battle against Soviet Russia in an alliance with Denikin. Bolshevik leader Lenin"s inclusion of Azerbaijan and Georgia on a list of "fourteen different states" that launched a joint "attack" with Denikin against Soviet Russia had no basis.

The concern of Western countries, in particular Great Britain after Denikin"s defeat and, beginning in late 1919, Britain"s growing interest in the South Caucasus all stemmed from their fear of Bolshevism spreading to the Near and Middle East. Swietochowski was right in his assertion that if the Bolsheviks were allowed to cross the Caucasus mountains, there would be a realistic possibility of the revolution spreading to Persia, Turkey, and the rest of the Middle East. Prime Minister Lloyd George"s mention of both Azerbaijan and Georgia in his November 17 speech before the House of Commons was linked to that particular concern. In his speech, Lloyd George analyzed the situation in Russia and noted that the aims of the disparate people of Russia were still unclear. As for the Russians, he continued, they were a difficult nation. There was never a time when outside attempts to bring them to their senses had been successful. According to him, the Bolshevik machine was dragged forward by terror and pillage. Lloyd George saw the strength of Bolsheviks in the peasantry. He drew an analogy with the eighteenth-century French revolution where the Jacobins were able to unite the people under the slogan "The Revolution is in Danger," which meant that the lands granted to the peasants by the revolution were in danger. There was no doubt that, in the minds of Russian peasants, this was how the revolution was perceived. Lloyd George believed that anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia were numerous. Among those forces, he mentioned the Baltic countries, Finland, and Poland; Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia in the Caucasus; and Kolchak, Petlyura. And Denikin in Russia proper. At the same time, the British prime minister posed an interesting question: Why could they not unite? The canny politician offered a good answer: Because their fundamental interests differed from one another. According to him, the main goals of Kolchak and Denikin were, first, to overthrow the Bolsheviks and restore the old regime and, second, to preserve Russia"s territorial integrity. While the anti-Bolshevik movements agreed on the former, they were enemies with regard to the latter. He said, Estonians do not want an indivisible Russia, for Lithuanians it is poisonous; I am not certain about Ukrainians ... . If we look at the other states, Denikin says Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Russian Armenia are part of Russia. Uniting them with Russia is the cornerstone of his policy, whereas the new republics will not hear of this. They are fighting for independence ... . In uniting against Bolshevism, they are making it a condition for us to secure their independence, as well as to provide them with money and ammunition.

Lloyd George told the House of Commons that the main problem was in the varying interests of Russia"s anti-Bolshevik movements. On one hand, the White Guardists were fighting for the old, powerful, united and indivisible Russia, while on the other, anti-Bolshevik movements were defending their national independence. In his speech, Lloyd George implicitly advocated aiding the nation-states struggling for independence, specifically Azerbaijan and Georgia. British political circles and Lloyd George in particular had a change of opinion for the better about Azerbaijan, thanks to articles by Robert Scotland Liddell published in The Morning Post in September and in Tariq on November 11. In his first article, Liddell informed his British readers that their impressions of Azerbaijan were far from the truth. He considered Azerbaijan the first republic in the South Caucasus to be able to exist independently. With regard to the Armenians creating a stir over Garabagh in Great Britain and other countries,

Liddell believed that due to its geographic location, the Garabagh should belong to Azerbaijan. As for the Armenian-Azeri ethnic conflict in the South Caucasus, the British reporter wrote, Neither in Russia nor in the Caucasus is it possible to encounter a man who would have a good opinion of Armenians. Russians, Tatars [Azeris], and Georgians abhor them and do not to wish to have anything to do with them. Whether this is true or not, I cannot say, but it is obvious that Armenians have brought their neighbours" hate upon themselves. With this, their propaganda in the West is so powerful that Europe and the whole world are on their side. With respect to Azeris, Liddell wrote that in certain characteristics "Tatars are superior to Armenians." He believed if it were not for the Armenians" subversive activities, it would be possible for the two peoples to live side by side in peace.

Lloyd George"s November 17 speech to Parliament and his references to the "Russian question" two times in November as well as a letter sent to Topchubashov in mid-November by the chairman of the League of Nations Division for Colonial and Foreign affairs, Paul Bourdarie, caused a sensation in the European media. Specifically, the White émigré media in Paris received the news with hostility. In his letter to the chairman of the Azerbaijani Council of Ministers, Topchubashov wrote, British Prime Minister Lloyd George"s speech before the House of Commons on November 17 is now a fact. The head of the British government mentioned Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia twice as countries that are not willing to reunite with Russia. This speech caused great uproar and all-round interest. If November 17 were not a day off for publishers [i.e., a day when newspapers were not printed], some literature regarding that speech would be compiled by now ... . Russian elements, especially their left wing, are unhappy.

On November 29, a member of that same left wing, E. Staliski, commented extensively on Lloyd George"s speech in the weekly French-language newspaper for Russian émigrés, Pour la Russie. Staliski believed Britain"s attitude toward Russia was twofold. On the one hand, it defended the Russian generals that were fighting Bolshevism for the sake of a "united and indivisible Russia" while, on the other hand, it encouraged the newly formed states to fight for their independence. In the words of Lord Beaconsfield (i.e., former British prime minister Benjamin Disraeli), "a great and powerful Russia is a threat to Britain." With that quote, Lloyd George indirectly expressed his own opinion so that it would not cause anxiety among Paris-based Russian political circles. Staliski bitterly noted that Lloyd George did not wish to recall that international relations had drastically changed since the times of Beaconsfield. On the contrary, all of his arguments were meant to prove the impossibility of reuniting Russia with its seceded parts. Lloyd George"s recent speech leads us to believe that he leans toward calling for Russia"s disintegration. British politicians believed that in order to save Europe and Asia from the Bolshevik threat, it was necessary to localize Bolshevik Russia and to surround it by newly formed states subordinate to Britain. Thus, the Bolshevik threat would be significantly weakened. Pour la Russie wrote, "Localizing Bolshevism is an infantile dream. Surrounding it by small, weak, ill-organized states as a sanitary cordon would not be able to last long." This article demonstrated that Russian émigrés did not wish to let go of their old attitudes toward the peoples of Russia. According to them, a strong Russia could guarantee free development of the people in its "Eastern provinces." They even claimed that "Russian democracy would never think of uniting these people with Russia against their will." Rather, Staliski said, "these people would not survive without Russia."

"Russian democrats" who often appealed to the interests of the Russians of the former empire displayed a dismissive attitude toward the nations who had proclaimed their independence. This in turn caused a protest from representatives of the new states in Paris. As the Western countries" interest in the new republics began to grow, Russian politicians proposed to hold a gathering similar to the conference that had been planned to be held on Princes" Islands in January 1919. The latter was meant to bring together existing Russian political powers and representatives of the new republics. Despite the harsh realities of the beginning of 1919, the representatives of the new republics refused to participate in the Princes" Islands gathering. They once again rejected a proposal by the Russian émigrés to hold such a conference in late 1919. By the end of that year, the implementation of that plan was already impossible. The European media now openly defended the newly established states, in particular, the republics of the Caucasus. Topchubashov explained the positive change in the media and political opinion of Azerbaijan and Georgia thus: The defeat of Yudenich and Kolchak, Denikin"s hopeless state, the Allies" refusal to supply them with money, provisions, and weapons, Germany"s plans for warmer relations with Russia, the Baltic states" attempts to make peace with the Bolsheviks, the negative attitude of the majority of U.S. senators toward the peace conference and specifically, the Versailles Peace Treaty-in general, all these are inspiring and reassuring of positive developments for small nations. Given the situation, Lloyd George"s speech was not in vain.

There is no doubt that the favorable change in media and public opinion is related to the aforementioned events.

After a meeting with American Deputy Secretary of State Frank Polk in Paris at the end of November, Lloyd George"s attitude to the states formed from the former territories of Russia became clearer. During talks with Americans, Lloyd George openly stated that there was no need to help Kolchak and Denikin, that their defeat was fast approaching, and that the weapons and ammunition sent to them were falling into the Red Army"s hands. Lloyd George went on to inform Polk that a unified Bolshevik Russia would pose a considerable threat to Europe.

Therefore, he proposed that "Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bessarabia, the Ukraine, the Baltic provinces and Finland, and possibly even Siberia, should be independent."

On November 29, Polk informed Secretary of State Robert Lansing of this conversation. To clarify Great Britain"s attitude toward Azerbaijan and Georgia, in early December, the British Foreign Office through its High Commissioner for the South Caucasus, Oliver Wardrop, notified chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Nasib Usubbeyov that the British government would protect Azerbaijan"s independence and on the whole was sympathetic to the new republic.

At a meeting organized in London in December for the prime ministers of the Entente countries, issues around the South Caucasus were not discussed separately but within the context of the Russian question. The heads of the major states expressed their regret at the defeat of the Russian generals. They hesitated to accept Britain"s position but themselves had no clear plan for further action. They considered reconciling Denikin with Azerbaijan and Georgia and organizing a joint defence strategy for them. By doing this, they wanted to solidify defense strategies for anti-Bolshevik forces. To this end, they decided to delegate a British member of Parliament named Halford MacKinder to the Caucasus.21 However, MacKinder"s mission failed, as there were too many disagreements among the sides to be reconciled. Azerbaijan and Georgia vehemently refused to form a bloc with Denikin. Denikin, in turn, considered it unacceptable for these states to participate in the negotiations as independent countries.