Turkish Elections - Good Luck Turkey!

On Sunday, May 14, 2023, in the 100th year of the Republic of Turkey, 64 million 113 thousand 941 Turkish voters will determine who will be in charge of two important branches of the state - the executive and the legislative body in the next 5 years. The results of the elections are eagerly watched not only by the voters of Turkey but also by many countries of the region and the world.

What makes this interesting is that the AKP (Erdogan) came to power alone a year after its founding in 2001 and remains in power by still maintaining its primacy despite 12 elections and 3 referendums in Turkey in the last 21 years.

So, while the AKP received only 34.28% of the votes in the November 3, 2002, parliamentary elections, the number of votes received by this party did not fall below 40% in any of the 5 parliamentary elections held after that. The results of these 6 consecutive elections were as follows:

Election datesVotes received, in percentNumber of deputies / Total number

The electoral successes of Erdogan's government were not limited to the parliamentary elections. During this period, in addition to 6 parliamentary elections, 4 municipal elections (2004 - 41.67%, 2009 - 38.39%, 2014 - 42.87%, and 2019 - 44.33%), 2 presidential elections (2014 - 51.79% and 2018 - 52.59%) and 3 referendums (2007 - 68.95%, 2010 - 57.88%, and 2017 - 51.41%) were held. In each of these, it was a winning party.

In particular, at critical times, he risked putting important issues to a referendum and achieved his wish in 3 different referendums. The first of these was when a problem was created in the parliament against the election of Abdullah Gül on the grounds that he was against secularism and his wife was wearing a headscarf, and when the result of the election was annulled by the decision of the Constitutional Court, he “disarmed” the party that intervened in the process, held both an election and a referendum that ensured that the President was elected by the people, not by the Parliament. He won with 68.95% of the vote.

The second referendum was held after the Constitutional Court trial demanding the closure of the AKP, and after he resisted the army by rejecting its electronic warning. He reached his goal by receiving 57.88% votes in the referendum, which led to the first coup attempt and the Ergenokon case, by changing the provisions of the Constitution that gave the army the opportunity to intervene in politics, and made the perpetrators of the 1980 military coup inviolable, reduced the powers of the army, subordinated it to the Prime Minister, and paved the way for the trial of Kenan Evren, the chief architect of the 1980 coup.

In the third referendum, on July 15, 2016, he achieved his goal by receiving 51.41% of the votes in the referendum, which envisages the introduction of the presidential system, which was dreamed of but could not be realized by the leaders in power and politics in the last 40 years such as Özal, Demirel, Türkeş, immediately after the military coup initiative.

Dates / Elections / ReferendumsVotes received, in percent

In the shadow of the problems arising in the economy, price increases, inflation, increasing unemployment, millions of Syrian refugees taking refuge in the country, the repercussions of the pandemic, the occurrence of the 2 largest consecutive devastating earthquakes in history and affecting 13 million people, the feeling of exclusion and discontent that has been going on for years in a certain part of the society, foreign pressures, embargoes applied to certain fields in the country, etc., the AKP is still the first party in all pre-election polls, without exception. According to the results of 55 polls released to the public since the announcement of the March 10 decision to hold elections, it is still estimated to receive 36.2% of the vote on average, more than his first vote in 2002. Furthermore, it is worth emphasizing that the AKP won 8% more votes than the average of the pre-election polls in the 2018 elections. That is, 36.2% is the lowest estimate, and this number is likely to be higher than 38%.

This tableau raises a question

What Influences the Behavior of Turkish Voters?

1. Economic Stability

The short-lived coalition governments before the AKP came to power, and the inadequacy of their economic and social policies are one of the main factors affecting the AKP's coming to power.

From the establishment of the 48th government with Mesut Yılmaz on June 23, 1991, to the 58th government established by AKP representative Abdullah Gül in 2002, 11 governments were established in Turkey in 11 years, 9 of which were governments of coalitions formed from different political configurations, and their average lifespan was less than 1 year. During this period, none of the parliamentary elections were held at the scheduled times, all of them were early elections. Moreover, at that time, all the parties in the parliament (DYP, ANAP, SHP, CHP, Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), and MHP) tried themselves as government partners.

During 11 years, consumer inflation increased by 866.5% (annual average of 77.77%), and total inflation by 851% (annual average of 77.36%).

During the 21-year rule of the AKP, consumer inflation increased by 284.98% (annual average of 14.25%), and total inflation by 374.78% (annual average of 18.73%). In the 17-year indicators until the 2020 pandemic, consumer inflation increased by 170% (annual average of 10%), and total inflation by 172% (annual average of 10.1%).

In the 4 years after the 2018 elections, consumer inflation in the country increased by 126.79% (annual average of 36.7%), and total inflation by 210% (annual average of 52.53%). What is particularly noteworthy is that while inflation in the country was single-digit before the 2018 elections, average inflation has risen 4-5 times in the last 4 years. The rapid rise of these figures is an indication that the last period of the AKP leadership could not keep inflation under control. But still, the average inflation rate has not exceeded half of the average inflation rate of the 11 governments before the AKP.

The economic growth of the country, the level of national income per capita, the annual volume of exports, investments attracted to the country, and other indicators also affect economic stability and play a role in voter behavior.

While the per capita national income was $3,688 in 2002, this figure rose to a record high of $12,614 in 2013. It increased almost 4 times in 10 years. But later this growth began to decline gradually. According to the indicators of 2022, the national income per person is calculated as $10,655. Although this number seems to have increased by 3 times compared to 2002, it has declined by 20% from the results of the first 10 years of the AKP.

As for economic growth, economic growth has been recorded every year in the last 10 years, even during the pandemic period, and the growth of Turkey's economy has been observed with an average annual growth of 5.33%.

An important indicator in the economy is the volume of exports. In 2002, the volume of Turkey's exports was 36 billion 59 million dollars. In 2012, during the first 10 years of the AKP's rule, the amount continued to increase every year and increased more than 3 times and amounted to 113 billion 883 million dollars. In 2022, the volume of exports reached 235 billion 236 million dollars. This is 6.52 times more than in 2002 and 2.06 times more than in 2012. The share of the manufacturing industry in exports was 94%. This is a factor that has a positive effect on the labor market.

For comparison, while Turkey's total export during the 80-year Republic period until 2003 was 395 billion 22 million dollars, in the last 20 years it was 2 trillion 793 billion dollars. While Turkey's annual average export before AKP was 4.9 billion dollars, the average of the last 20 years is 139 billion 650 million dollars.

Only in the last 2 years, the volume of exports was 460 billion dollars, which is 16.4% more than the volume of exports in 80 years until 2003.

Turkey's economic growth has not only boosted export figures but import figures have also grown rapidly, and the foreign trade deficit has continued to grow, reaching $107 billion in 2022. In 2022, the volume of imports reached 342 billion dollars, and the volume of foreign trade exceeded half a trillion dollars and reach 577 billion dollars.

The behavior of Turkish voters in the elections will be affected by problems in the course of the economy, high inflation, and a decrease in purchasing power; furthermore, the increase in unemployment is more prominent than in previous periods before these elections; therefore, these will be factors that are directed against the government in the voters' preference.

However, the formation of a stable social protection system, the use of free health services and medicines, the availability of infrastructure, and the quality of the public service sector have positive aspects. In recent years, large investments have been made in the health sector, the construction of large hospitals, the expansion of airports, bridges, tunnels, high-speed railway transportation, the opening of universities in every province, the implementation of certain social projects in the field of social protection (TOKI houses, special support programs for the elderly and the lonely, etc.), the absence of serious problems in the public service sector, especially the expansion of public transport and road infrastructures, will be reflected in the election with certain positive points.

Also, it is known from the conducted survey that more than 45% of the poorest population of Turkey voted for AKP, while more than 40% of the richest people voted for CHP. The impact of this factor will also be observed in the election.

2. Security (Counter-Terrorism and Defense Industry)

The 2nd important factor affecting the behavior of voters during the elections in Turkey is the issue of security and the fight against terrorism.

In 2005, shortly after coming to power, Erdogan launched a policy of "Kurdish opening" regarding integration into the European Union, separating the concepts of "Kurds" and "terrorists" whose names were mentioned together. He made the society and the political elite accept that the "Turkish identity" is the supreme identity and, at the same time, there are many sub-identities, including the "Kurdish identity", and the impossibility of denying the Kurdish identity, took many practical steps regarding the rights of the Kurds, released the use of the previously banned Kurdish language in culture, information environment, education, and publications. He supported the integration into the society of many terrorists who climbed the mountain with weapons in hand but who did not participate in terrorist actions. The terrorist attacks that have been going on for 40 years, caused up to 450 billion dollars of damage to the Turkish economy and the death of more than 40 thousand people, were stopped. In 2014, this process was formalized with the Law on Ending Terrorism and Strengthening Social Integration, and the guns fell silent for a while, stability was established in the region, and economic and social relations developed.

In the June 7, 2015 elections, the AKP failed to win the 276 seats necessary to form a government with 258 MPs, despite winning 40.87% of votes in the parliamentary elections for the first time, and lost its chance to rule alone. The reason for this was the hard political campaign of the HDP, which runs a policy based on Kurdish nationalism and won 80 seats in the parliament, gaining 13% of the votes and overcoming the 10% electoral threshold. Since the votes of this party, which failed to pass the electoral threshold in the previous elections, were not counted due to the D'Hondt electoral system, AKP candidates who ranked 2nd in the region entered the parliament.

5 days after the elections, on June 12, 2015, the terrorist organization, which did not listen to the call of the imprisoned terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan to lay down his arms, exhibited harsher rhetoric, and terrorist acts began again. First, the Suruc massacre was committed by ISIL in Şanlıurfa, 33 people died and more than 400 people were injured. Two days later, on July 22, two policemen were shot in the head and killed in his home. The PKK took this terror act upon itself. The government, therefore, withdrew from the agreement called the "Dolmabahçe Agreement" and the process called "Kurdish opening" or "solution process" was left unfinished.

In the June 7, 2015 elections, AKP's open and secret negotiations to end terrorism were unsuccessful, the process backfired, the true face of terrorism was revealed, and for the first time, voters showed a yellow card to AKP. All attempts by the then AKP leader Ahmet Davutoğlu to form a government were rejected by the parties in the parliament (CHP, MHP, and HDP); as a result, re-election was held on November 1, 2015. The AKP government, which distanced itself from terrorism in the 5 months after the June election and started operations against terrorists inside and outside the country in July, won nearly 50% of the votes in the elections, received 317 deputy seats, and continued to rule alone.

This process shows that voters in Turkey attach as much importance to the fight against terrorism and security as to the economy, and take these factors into account when they vote. When terrorism reaches a level that seriously disturbs society, security concerns come before economic concerns for voters and this is reflected in the ballot box. If it were not so, the AKP government would not face the situation of not being able to form a government on its own in the June 2015 elections, when inflation was the lowest in 2011-2015 (around 5% on average).

Although Turkey looks like an ordinary nation-state, it is actually the successor of the Ottoman Empire, which has its place in history. It is possible to clearly observe this both in the behavior of citizens and in the foreign policy of the state. Therefore, Turkey always attaches importance to military power and takes systematic steps to make the country's defense system durable. During the Republic period, especially in the last 60-70 years, as a NATO member, the Turkish army met most of its defense needs from weapons and ammunition produced by NATO member countries.

During the first 10 years of Erdoğan's rule, this process did not undergo any serious changes and continued as it was during the time of his predecessors. However, after the start of the Arab Spring in the Middle East countries, and especially in Syria, the events affected Turkey closely. Turkey could not sufficiently resist the attacks from Syria in the border region with the active support of Russia. As a result of the lack of or inadequate air defense system, many Turkish citizens were killed, injured, and damaged.

Turkey asked NATO for support in the shadow of these events. NATO members USA, Germany, and the Netherlands have temporarily deployed several Patriot missiles with Air Defense systems to Turkey. In 2015, less than 2 years later, they decided to withdraw.

In official statements, NATO member countries said that they withdrew the Patriots because they were no longer as dangerous as before but the reality was different. Especially since the second half of 2015, Turkey has started active military operations against the PKK, as well as the process of creating a private Kurdish region in the north of Syria as well as in the north of Iraq, targeting not only the PKK but also its Syrian branch, the PYD-YPG, and this annoyed the US and its allies. Because the US gave Turkey the weapons and supported it sold only in exchange for fighting ISIS and not touching the PYD-YPG, which it considered its allies in the region and supplied with military weapons.

Turkey's defenselessness from air strikes, as well as the open support given to the PKK and its extension by the NATO ally, pushed Turkey to look for alternatives. Turkey's attempts to buy Patriot air defense systems from the United States with its own money also failed. As a result, it agreed with Russia on the purchase of S400s.

US-Turkey military cooperation was seriously damaged by this. Turkey was removed from the F-35 project, the sale of F-16s was stopped without a refund despite the fact that it paid billions in cash for F-16s, F-16 modernization was refused, and very serious legal action was taken. The document known as Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) was adopted. NATO ally Turkey was officially listed as an enemy of the United States... Of course, the fact that the leader of FETÖ, Fethullah Gülen, who was said to be behind the July 15, 2016, military coup attempt, live in a specially protected place in the United States, as well as the role of blaming certain American citizens in this incident, are also undeniable causes regarding the aggravation of US-Turkey relations.

All these events encouraged Turkey to diversify its risks and strengthen its alternative military industry. In the last 10 years, Turkey has become strong enough to meet 80% of military supplies and industry, which was only 20% local before.

Domestically produced attack helicopter ATAK, 5th generation combat jet TAI Hürjet (Freejet), national combat aircraft Milli Muharip Uçak (TAI TF-X Kaan), combatant unmanned aircraft Bayraktar Kızılelma, unmanned combat aerial vehicles Bayraktar TB2, Bayraktar Akıncı, TAI Anka-Aksungur projects were realized. Laser weapons, electronic warfare systems (any action or capability that uses the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to detect, misdirect, and disrupt enemy weapon systems (radar, communications, command and control systems, data networks, and other digital infrastructures)), underwater robots, Anadolu amphibious assault ship, ballistic missiles of various distances, and other conventional weapons, armored vehicles, and tanks began to be produced.

The effect of this tableau on the behavior of Turkish voters is inevitable. As I emphasized above, a certain part of Turkish citizens will vote for the importance of the country's defense capability, the continuity of its security, the continuous fight against terrorism, the "standing position" against foreign threats, and the lack of external dependence. For this category of voters, issues such as economic problems, unemployment, inflation, high prices, social problems, problems in the operation of the justice system, damage to democratic institutions, problems of freedom of expression, and authoritarianism will remain in the background.

3. Ideological Affiliation

One of the important issues affecting the behavior of Turkish voters during voting is the issue of ideological affiliation.

After the establishment of the republic, the CHP, which was the ruling political party until the 1950s, became the dictating party, ignoring and even "otherizing" the conservative class. In particular, under the name of Atatürk Reforms, there were administrative interventions in the life, customs, religious beliefs, clothing, and equal representation of the society, and numerous restrictions and administrative methods have been applied. Since 1950, the effective implementation of the multi-party system and the holding of democratic elections have motivated the political organization of the conservative class and brought their leaders to power. However, these processes are almost always stopped by military interventions or military warnings.

The first intervention of the military ended with the military coup of May 27, 1960, and the arrest and execution of Adnan Menderes, the leader of the Democratic Party of that time, and several members of his political team... Indeed, Menderes won by landslide and came to power in the elections of 1950, 1954, and 1957, maintained his power, and received support from the majority of the people.

A new Constitutional Commission was established by the military in 1961, and the Constitution was drafted and adopted.

After the end of the intervention of the military and the resumption of democratic contests in the political sphere, the activities of the Democratic Party were stopped and abolished, and the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party) under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel started to operate in its place and declared that it was an open follower of the Democratic Party. In the first democratic election in 1965, the Justice Party again became the first party with 52.9% of the votes and came back to power and tried to maintain the power of the conservatives.

On March 12, 1971, the military again intervened in the politics of the conservatives and issued an internal memory ("muhtıra"), the Demirel was removed from power, and the position of prime minister was entrusted to Nihat Erim from CHP. CHP leader İsmet İnönü also supported the military intervention. In 1972, the general secretary of the party, Bülent Evecit, who opposed this, removed İnönü from the party leadership and became the leader of the CHP with a majority of votes.

In the next elections, Demirel, the leader of the conservatives, came out ahead in the elections again, but he could not come to power alone. Because the religious conservative wing (“national vision”) left the party and founded the Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party). Although various coalition governments were established, they did not last. When the minority government was finally led by Demirel, the right-left conflict spilled out into the streets. In the shadow of thousands of young people killing each other, on September 12, 1980, the military under the leadership of Kenan Evren made another military coup and seized power.

Political leaders were arrested, parties were abolished, political activity was banned, and the 1961 Constitution was abolished.

The conservative political wing was stopped by the military for the 3rd time. Despite this, the political will did not oppose the military coup but submitted. It's no coincidence that people keep on saying the phrase by Demirel "I'll take my hat and go", which was a subject of humor...

Kenan Evren, the head of the military headquarters that carried out the coup, prepared a new Constitution and put it to a referendum in 1982. The Constitution was accepted by 92% in the referendum held under martial law. K. Evren elected himself President in the parliament. He supported Turgut Özal to be the head of the government by establishing ANAP and guaranteed his immunity by the Constitution.

In 1991, conservative leaders Demirel, Erbakan, and Türkeş and the leftist leader Ecevit, whose ban on political activity ended, returned to politics, and in the very first election, conservative leader Demirel emerged as the first party in the elections of October 20, 1991, with the Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party), which he founded instead of the banned Justice Party. This time, Demirel formed a coalition government with İsmet İnönü's son, Erdal Inönü, thus avoiding the wrath of the military. However, conservative voters punished the DYP, which became allied with the left, in the 1995 elections and it fell to third place in parliament.

The National Salvation Party was abolished by the 1980 military coup, and the Welfare Party founded by Erbakan emerged as the first party in the 1995 elections. However, he did not have the necessary majority to form a government alone. After Özal's death, Erbakan made an alliance with Tansu Çiller, who replaced Demirel, who sat on the presidential chair, and agreed that he would be in the Prime Minister's Office in the first half, and Çiller in the second half. In 1996, Erbakan established a joint government with Çiller. However, this did not last long. First, Erbakan's trip to Libya became the subject of discussion. Then, the theater commemorating Palestine Day with the permission of the Mayor of Sincan (a district in Ankara) from the Welfare Party was perceived as a collapse of secularism. The army took the tanks to the streets of Sincan. Then, on February 28, 1997, the National Security Council, which was dominated by the military, again issued a "reactionary warning" to the government, and the process of annulment of the Welfare Party by the Constitutional Court began. Therefore, in June 1997, Erbakan submitted his resignation to President Demirel in order to give the position of prime minister to his government partner Çiller as agreed. Contrary to what was expected, Demirel did not give the task of protecting the government to DYP leader Çiller, but to ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz, who was in the minority. Without a majority in the parliament, ANAP, DSP, and DP together formed the ANASOL-D minority government. In 1998, the Welfare Party was dissolved and its leaders were banned from political activity. The Mayor of Istanbul from the Welfare Party, R. T. Erdoğan, was removed from office in 1998, was sentenced to prison for a poem he read, and was banned from politics.

Again, the political power of the conservative political party was ended by external (military) intervention. Erbakan was unable to show resistance at the meeting of the National Security Council, which pressured him for 8 hours, and submitted to the signing of the decisions...

Although the ruling of the first party, the Welfare Party, in 1995 with the democratic elections lasted for only 1 year, and the relinquishment, trial, and closure of the power due to the pressure of the army members led to the establishment of Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) in the place of this party, the banning of Erbakan and some politicians in his circle from engaging in politics created a leader problem in the party. The younger Erdogan and his entourage - B. Arınç, A. Gül, A. Şener, M. Gökçek, etc. did not accept the leadership of Recai Kutan and left the party. In 2001, this innovative wing came together and joined the name of the Justice Party, which reminds of the continuation of the conservative tradition, and added the development to it, founded Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) (AKP) and entered politics.

The first years of AKP's rule also began with ideological conflicts. A few days before the November 2002 elections, the Constitutional Court ruled that Erdogan could not be a party founder or deputy. Although Erdogan gave support from outside, Abdullah Gül led the party to the election and he became the first Prime Minister from the party. As the party gained the majority in the Parliament, the first thing it did was to lift the political ban on Erdogan by adopting a new law. Although the law was passed, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer vetoed the law by refusing to sign it. The law came back to the parliament. The vetoed law had to be passed by a two-thirds vote. This time CHP leader Deniz Baykal overruled Sezer's veto by supporting the law. As a result, the law came into force and Fadıl Akgündüz, the deputy elected from Siğirt, resigned and a new election was held there. Erdogan came to the parliament with 85% votes.

Erdoğan, who was arrested for reading a poem in Siğir and removed from Istanbul Municipality and politics, returned to the center of politics - to the Prime Ministership - from Siğirt.

However, Erdogan's return to the Prime Ministership and his party's majority in the parliament did not make his job easier. The chairman of the Constitutional Court, A. N. Sezer, who closed the Welfare Party In 1998 and banned its leader Erbakan and other party leaders from politics, was already elected by the Parliament as the President of the Republic of Turkey in 2000. His first action against the AKP was to veto the law that paved the way for Erdogan. Sezer, as a person from the left, began to abuse his powers in the Constitution. He did not approve almost all the personnel assigned by the government to important strategic areas. He vetoed the laws and even many government officials had to perform their duties on a temporary basis until 2007.

In the first years of his rule, Erdogan behaved more cautiously in order not to conflict with the army members as much as possible and focused his activities more on economic management. A serious conflict took place in May 2007 when Sezer’s presidency ended. Millions of people organized "Republican rallies" in big cities to prevent Erdogan from becoming President.

These rallies were organized by Şener Eruygur, the head of the Atatürk Thought Association and Commander of the Gendarmerie in 2002-2004, together with several non-governmental organizations. It is interesting that when Eruygur was the Commander of the Gendarmerie, while reading the paper he prepared in advance at one of the meetings as a member of the National Security Council and while saying that the government is acting against secularism and acting reactionary, everyone in the meeting froze when Erdogan hit the table and said "Shut up", Eruygur hurriedly left the hall. Then he retired. Again, it is interesting that Erdogan, who held re-elections after organizing the Republican rallies and got what he wanted in the referendum, strengthened, and the generals who threatened with the coup and issued warnings were arrested one by one in 2009 as part of the Ergenekon case. In total, more than 140 generals and admirals were imprisoned. Şener Eruygur was also arrested after the coup plan was found on CHP deputy Mustafa Balbay's computer. The general, who spent the rest of his life in prison, died in February of this year after falling and breaking a rib in prison...

After the Republican rallies of 2007, Erdogan announced that he would not be the President and did not run for office, but nominated Abdullah Gül. But Abdullah Gül's wife wearing a headscarf created a political crisis again. CHP boycotted and did not participate in the plenary session gathered for voting in the parliament. According to the constitution, the president could be elected by receiving two-thirds of the vote in the parliament in the 1st vote, two-thirds in the 2nd vote, more than half in the 3rd vote, and the most votes in the 4th vote. In the first two votes, there was no two-thirds majority, but in the third vote, Abdullah Gül was elected with more than half of the votes. However, the CHP applied to the Constitutional Court and asked for the annulment of the election results. On the same day, the Chief of the General Staff issued an "electronic internal memo" and stated that secularism was in danger. Erdogan's government very harshly and immediately declared that this was unacceptable, that it was interference in the government's activities, that he would not resign, and that the army should be busy with its work.

Later it turned out that when Yaşar Büyükanıt, the Chief of the General Staff, who did not answer Erdogan's phone calls before the government's announcement, called Erdogan after this announcement, Erdogan reminded that the people elected him as the government and said that if he wanted to be involved in politics, he should join politics.

The Constitutional Court accepted the request to annul the results of the presidential elections and annulled the results of the presidential elections. As a reason, it stated that the quorum of the meeting in the parliament should be two-thirds, although it is not stipulated as a requirement in the internal regulations. Thus, since the CHP boycotted the meetings and locked the parliament’s work, the president could not be elected.

Erdoğan immediately decided to hold the elections scheduled for November in July, saying "the right to speak belongs to the people". In the July election, Erdoğan increased the 34% he received in the first election by 12% and returned with 46.58%, 341 deputies. In the elections, the CHP, which locked the parliament’s work with a boycott, lost 66 seats and was able to receive a total of 112 deputy seats. Since the MHP also came to the parliament, the quorum required for the presidential elections was not a problem. Abdullah Gül was elected president with the participation of 341 AKP and 71 MHP deputies.

Thus, Erdogan, who represented the conservative wing, did not step back in his first confrontation with the military, he went ahead with the process and as a result, won more votes and maintained his superiority in the parliament, got rid of Sezer’s whims, put Abdullah Gül on the “throne of the President”, and went to the referendum, taking the right to elect the president from the Parliament and giving it to the people.

After this incident, the ideological conflict did not subside. Revanchists started a judicial process to close the AKP and ban its leaders (71 people, including Erdogan and Gül) from politics. Decentralization against secularism was cited as the reason. On July 30, 6 of the 11 members of the Constitutional Court decided in favor of the closure of the AKP. Only the President of the Constitutional Court, Haşim Kılıç, voted against the closure. Another 4 judges decided to cut off one-third of the financial aid. Thus, the 50%+1 required to close the AKP was not enough. However, a part of the financial assistance received by AKP from the treasury was cut off. Thus, the revanchists immediately equalized the score.

The process did not end there, on July 15, 2016, military units supported by FETÖ launched an armed coup, this time to overthrow the government. The Parliament, the Security Directorate, strategic institutions were bombed, TRT was seized, and there were attempts to physically destroy Erdogan. At the first opportunity in this process, Erdogan asked the people to show resistance through FaceTime on his mobile phone and returned from Dalaman, where he was resting, to Istanbul despite the risk of death, and came to the squares and interrupted the process, even at the cost of the lives of many of his supporters. Most of those who attempted the coup and most of those who made this plan were captured and sent to prison. Of course, the fact that the army does not fully support this process, including the role played by the MHP leader, is undeniable.

Thus, Erdoğan, unlike his conservative predecessors, did not pay attention to the warnings, he responded, he was able to resist the coup attempt despite the use of all weapons, and by changing the constitutional provision allowing military interventions by referendum, he brought the military units under the full control of the legal and de facto government.

The conservative voters who voted for Erdoğan and the AKP appreciate these behaviors and cling to their leaders who defend their votes under all kinds of pressure, even risking his life. In this regard, even if other arguments are against Erdogan, who is thought to "lose a serious vote" in public opinion, this ideological factor plays an important role in keeping his supporters stable. The sensitive issues of the conservative religious class, the problem of head covering, the problem of equality, the issue of İmam Hatip schools, etc., which were previously under pressure, continue to be ahead of other factors for this sensitive group. Support for the continuation of power remains a vital issue for this class. The mistake of the secular people is to constantly keep this sensitive issue on the agenda and attack the conservative class with it.

4. Foreign Policy, International Relations

Another important factor for Turkish voters is the foreign policy priorities of the authorities and the place of Turkey in international relations.

The 21-year foreign policy period of Erdogan's rule should be divided into two parts. The first is the first 10-11 years period. The second is the last 8-10 years period.

One of the first actions of the AKP government, which came to power in 2002, was to accept all the integration documents necessary for joining the European Union and quickly becoming a member of the European Union. Except for the first behavior in the Iraq war, relations with the United States were going smoothly and there was no serious conflict.

Friendly relations with Israel were continued, and the process of rapprochement with the countries of the Middle East was underway. They satisfied the Iraqi people by not allowing the US, which intervened in Iraq, to pass through Turkey. Even the mined areas in the border zone with Syria were cleared, and the "policy of zero problems with neighbors" continued at full throttle.

The rapprochement with Greece was continued, and joint activities were continued to solve the Cyprus problem, they even held a referendum in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for the purpose of establishing a "Common State" on the island and accepted the will to cooperate with the Greek part.

“Football diplomacy” was being carried out with Armenia, although diplomatic relations had not been established, President Gul visited this country and watched football together with his Armenian colleague. More than 100,000 Armenian citizens live and work in Turkey illegally but Turkey closed its eyes to this fact and let Armenia use its airspace for flights.

Cooler relations existed with Azerbaijan, as well as with the Central Asian Republics. However, cooperation with neighboring Iran also went very smoothly. Even the title of honorary citizen of Tehran was presented to Erdogan.

Relations with Russia continued normally, economic cooperation, mutual trade, and cooperation in the field of tourism were conducted in a way that would bring mutual benefits.

The experience of the Arab Spring in the region started to change the geopolitical balance. With the start of a civil war in Syria, Turkey's foreign policy priorities began to change. Because similar initiatives took place in Turkey. In particular, the Gezi events in Taksim in 2013 forced Turkey to reconsider its relations and foreign policy priorities. The last review of foreign policy was after the July 15, 2016, military coup attempt.

Although Turkey's relations with the EU were very willing at the beginning, they went to break. Indeed, it can be said that the main steps in this direction were taken quickly, and all requests were consistently fulfilled. In 2005, Turkey, which quickly accepted all requests, began to demand an early discussion of EU membership. Using the Cyprus issue as an excuse, the EU showed that it was not in favor of a fast process. In 2007, Turkey asked the EU for a specific date for membership but no serious action was taken. Finally, Erdoğan mentioned in Germany in 2012 that Turkey could end its relations with the EU if it was not included by 2023. Thus, the EU path was virtually closed and no serious steps were taken in this direction after 2012.

Relations with Israel almost stopped after the armed attack on the Mavi Marmara ship carrying aid to Palestine and the famous "one minute" dialogue with the Israeli Prime Minister in Davos Form in 2009. Only in the last one or two years, after the visit of the President of Israel to Ankara, the establishment of moderate relations has been observed again.

The relations with the United States “became lemony” due to the open support and arming of the PKK and YPG-PYD terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria under the name of fighting ISIS. The relations were aggravated by the non-sale of Patriot missiles, the purchase of S-400s from Russia, the withdrawal of Turkey from the F35 project, the refusal to sell F16s, the modernization of F16s, and the addition to the list of enemies (CAATSA). The emplacement of FETÖ, which orchestrated the July 15 coup, the arrest of Pastor Bronson, and the threat of sanctions by Trump brought the tension to a peak. Tensions rose further when US President Biden came to power and said that they should give maximum support to the opposition in order for Erdogan to go. At present, these relations are tense and continued at the level of "forced alliance" - friendly enemies.

Relations with Russia became tense after the downing of a Russian fighter plane in 2015. Then, the Russian Ambassador was killed. However, at that stage, the coup attempt in Turkey and FETÖ's emergence behind the attempt, and the attribution of the downed plane to this group softened the relations again (although then Prime Minister Davutoğlu announced that he gave the order personally to shoot down the Russian plane). In particular, the parties can continue cooperation in the S-400 issue, the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, the sale of blue gas, and finally, within the framework of grain diplomacy during the Ukrainian war. Although there is a conflict of interests in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan, the spirit of cooperation is more prominent, and both sides are aware that they feel a "forced need" for each other.

The increase in Erdogan's international influence is also observed. Systematically criticizing the structure of the UN, with the message "the world is bigger than 5", he emphasizes the necessity of reforming the UN at every opportunity. This attracts the sympathy of many weak countries.

He makes open attempts to establish certain economic relations with African countries.

He is trying to restore relations with Arab countries in the Middle East. Friendly relations with Qatar are at a high level. Relations are so warm that even Qatar entrusts the security of the World Cup to the Turkish police.

Efforts are being made to repair relations with Egypt, which were damaged by the military coup of el-Sisi and the overthrow and execution of Morsi.

By not allowing the overthrow of the government in Libya, he continued to support the current government and got an opportunity to establish high-level relations. The Turkish army fully supports Libya in certain activities and education.

Relations with the United Arab Emirates are being restored.

Relations broken with Saudi Arabia after J. Khashoggi’s murder are slowly being restored.

The strained relations between Azerbaijan during the presidency of Abdullah Gül have already been completely forgotten, especially the military and political support given during the 44-day war brought the cooperation between the two countries to the level of the military alliance. The one-nation-two-state concept continues at a high level at all levels.

Distant but not hostile relations with Iran continue. Relations with the Armenian side are more indexed to Azerbaijan-Armenia relations. However, in the near future, it is inevitable that the presence of a peace agreement will have a positive effect on relations with Turkey.

A summit of Turkic-speaking countries, including Azerbaijan and Hungary, is held with Central Asian states, and cooperation is brought to new levels.

The foreign policy carried out by the Erdoğan government, especially the mutual understanding based on the distance with Western countries, warmer with Turkic-speaking countries, and national interests with neighboring countries, mutual cooperation with both sides without taking sides with Russia and Ukraine, the "Blue Homeland" (“Mavi Vatan”) project, Libyan policy, buffer zone activities in Syria, full support for Azerbaijan, non-participation in the embargo against Russia and continuation of economic, energy, and tourism cooperation, and the re-establishment of relations with Israel are accepted and adopted by a wide segment of the society. In this regard, the preference of voters who will give priority to foreign policy may overlap in this regard.

Conclusion

Finally, the behavior of Turkish voters may depend on other factors not listed here. However, by highlighting the more prominent ones and taking into account the factors that influence the voters' preferences one by one, it is possible to observe that the situation during the previous elections has declined in certain areas and progressed in certain areas. This shows that although the life of the government is long-lived, its dynamism is the factor that legitimizes this longevity. 21 years is a very long time for a government to continue and not change. However, the best part of democracy is that the power goes to political parties by the people's choice. In 21 years, the current government turned to the people in 15 different formats and received the opinion of the people. If the people have not had a serious change of opinion during this period, then they have found more positive shades in the policy conducted so far and have not focused on alternatives. Of course, the identity of the alternatives, their real proposals, their persuasiveness, and the right justification of the necessity and advantages of the change are important in terms of attracting the masses.

The fact that Erdogan is very hardworking despite his age and illness, his ability to read processes correctly, maintaining his harsh rhetoric in the fight with his opponents without changing his line and pulling his opponents to that level, his ability to keep his words, his determination to achieve his goal, his initiative, his charisma, his commitment to his values, his preservation of the image that he is a man of the people, making showing high results in elections a philosophy of his life, winning all 17 elections and referendums in the last 30 years, being the leader who managed to stay in power for the longest period of time in the 100-year-old Republic of Turkey with elections, and the fact that there are many people who like and dislike him as a leader outside the country make him attractive in the eyes of his fellow voters.

As for the aspects that have a negative impact on the voters, the more pronounced economic problems, the boredom caused by a long stay in power, corruption and nepotism, authoritarianism, interference in the functioning of the law, and a divisive rather than an inclusive style of language are the aspects that have a negative impact on voters.

The opposition also has strengths and weaknesses.

The strength of the opposition is that it has 21 years of power in front of it. Economic problems are at the highest level in 21 years, prices have risen, inflation has increased, and purchasing power has decreased. There is metal fatigue in power. Personally, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is an honest, simple person, he is not rude, authoritarianism is not noticeable in his personality, and he has not been affected by corruption. These are arguments that can be used against the government and in favor of the opposition.

As for the weakness of the opposition, the main opposition candidate is older than Erdogan. He has not had any political success before. He has not won any election. He has no charisma. He did not show his initiative, it is not a specific idea that brought the 6 partners together, but the desire to overthrow Erdogan in front of them. This is a fragile union, and with the fall of Erdogan, the goal may be over. It is a very fragile union because of different political-ideological parties. The support of the HDP, which does not distance itself from terrorism in order to win the election, is repulsive.

As for their partners, they have no political weight or outstanding success. Davutoğlu and Babacan have no independent success stories, other than what they did in Erdogan's team under his leadership. Davutoğlu held the position of Prime Minister during the most criticized period of the Erdogan era.

The zigzaggy policy of Meral Akşener, the leader of the İYİ Party (Good Party), is not welcomed at all. Despite being the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs during the rule of DYP, she confessed, "I overthrew the power of the DYP-RP", being among the founders of the AKP and withdrawing, being a member of the staff of the MHP and dividing the party, and finally accusing the Table of Six and withdrawing from the table and then returning as if nothing had happened do not give the image of a reliable politician-leader. I don't see the need to dwell on the fact that the other junior partners of the Table of Six do not have the potential to receive a 1% vote when considering together.

In short, those who want to end Erdogan's 21-year rule are mostly those who have been in politics for 21 years, and not new faces or new ideas.

Along with the positive sides of the program put forward by the Nation Alliance, there are promises that are not met unambiguously in Turkey and are not accepted especially by the conservative side. However, the biggest problem may be the effects of false statements made during the election campaign. For example, Kılıçdaroğlu's statement, "As soon as we come to power, we will change Turkey's foreign policy by 180 degrees", is a very serious mistake. From a geopolitical point of view, making statements about relations with Russia is playing into the hands of everyone except Turkey.

Earlier, his speech against the "Blue Homeland" project, saying "What are we doing in Libya?" and now saying "We will change the foreign policy by 180 degrees.", is a sign that he is determined to do what he said. This is a serious backward step in terms of Turkey's national interests and factors that will affect Turkish voters.

In conclusion, the conclusion I came to as a result of this analysis is that this is the period when Erdogan's power in Turkey is the weakest. As an energy-dependent country, heavy economic losses in the pandemic, damage caused by natural disasters - earthquakes, tense and cold relations with great powers, the decline in the socio-economic well-being of the people, and problems in the justice system seem to be the factors that make it difficult for him to be elected.

Despite this, the party in front of him has not been able to fully show the image that it will advance, develop, solve problems, create a sense of trust in society, and promote social peace without Erdogan. The fact that the opposition has many heads and different voices come out from each head are factors that cause hesitation in convincing the voter.

Also, two-thirds of the voters are voters who saw and lived before the Erdogan era. This also shows their ability to compare.

In short, when the parties are weighed in the eyes of Turkish voters, taking into account all the factors, it is seen that the candidate of the People's Alliance, Erdoğan, predominates.

Even if this image misleads us and the other side of the scale - the candidate of the Nation Alliance, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu - wins, there is a great possibility that very serious problems will await him, he will be in trouble with terrorism, and first of all, different opinions will come to the fore in his team and he will not be able to last.

Regardless of which party wins, the winner of this election will be the people of Turkey. Because, thanks to the people, a democratic, pluralistic election process is being conducted, which is watched by the whole world. It is proud. Good luck Turkey!