Summer 1918: The Defeat of the Bolsheviks and the Crisis in Baku

The internal and external situation of Azerbaijan in the summer of 1918 made the liberation of Baku city an urgent matter. Toward the end of World War I, Baku had become an object of struggle between the Ottoman empire, Germany, England, and Soviet Russia. As the Russian White Guard General Anton Denikin phrased it, Baku"s oil plagued the minds and souls of European and Asian political leaders. While the Baku issue and the events occurring within the city should be approached from a domestic political standpoint, Baku was also a pawn in the world war. The military and diplomatic standoffs between Germany, Turkey, Soviet Russia, and England, and the confrontation between the Quadruple Alliance and the Entente states, propelled Baku into the fray. For all these reasons, the liberation of Baku was imperative. The march for Baku had started in the early spring. Both the Ottoman army led by Nuri Pasha and the British army wanted to reach Baku before the Germans reached it by way of Georgia.

The intrigues surrounding Baku have a place not only in the history of the war but also in world history. Peter Hopkirk, an officer in the British Intelligence Service working in the Middle East, wrote: "At the end of the last century Baku had been one of the wealthiest cities on earth. The discovery of vast oil fields in this remote corner of the Tsar"s empire had brought entrepreneurs and adventurers of every nationality rushing to the spot. Experts calculated that Baku had enough oil to heat and illuminate the entire world. So sodden was it with the stuff that

one had only to toss a match into the Caspian off Baku for the sea to catch fire for several minutes ... . For a few short years the town became a Klondike where huge fortunes were made and gambled away overnight. Baku"s new rich, some of them barely literate, built themselves palaces of great opulence on the seafront." At one point, Baku"s oil fields produced more oil than all of the United States.

When Azerbaijan declared its independence in May, the Baku Soviet of Worker"s Deputies and its executive body, the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars, did not recognize the newly established national government and declared war against it by all available means-political, economic, military and diplomatic. The Bakinskii rabochii newspaper published articles denying the Azerbaijani people"s right to selfdetermination

and wrote defamatory articles that spurred ethnic hatred toward the Azerbaijanis. In March 1918, ethnic violence directed against Azerbaijani Muslims in Shamakhi and other outlying districts was orchestrated by the Baku Soviet and Armenian militias. The organization of a so-called Armenian army heightened apprehension among the Muslim parliamentarians of the Transcaucasian Seim and reinforced their willingness to turn to Turkey for protection.

In their march toward Ganja, as well as through their unlawful activities, the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars put further strain on an already fraught political situation in the South Caucasus. Almost all political and economic issues were settled by the barrel of the gun during the time the Baku Commune was in power. Before the newly established Azerbaijani government moved to Ganja, the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars incited civil unrest and began preparations to attack Ganja. On June 2, Josef Stalin, while visiting the city of Tsaritsyn

(today: Volgograd), issued a command ordering the commissars headed by Stepan Shaumian to occupy Ganja. On June 5, Arsen Amirian, a former Dashnak who turned Bolshevik as a result of the revolution, evoked the Paris Commune slogan "Long live the civil war!" in his article "On the Lessons of History," published in Bakinskii rabochii. "Unfortunately," he wrote, "the mistakes made by the Paris Commune are once more repeated by our Baku Soviet ... . Instead of attacking the Versailles of the Caucasus and arresting all the leaders of counterrevolution, we give them an opportunity to gather, strengthen, and establish alliances with foreign enemies. This was a disastrous and an unforgivable mistake. But, "let us let bygones be bygones," as it seems that we are at an advantage. We do not need protection, we need to attack by all means, and I say again and again that we should attack. There is no other way out."

A day after this article was published, the Baku Commune"s Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs, Grigorii Korganov, ordered an attack on Ganja. The purpose of the attack was to destroy Ganja, the cradle of Azerbaijani independence. A telegram sent by Vladimir Lenin in mid-May played a role in the Commune"s

aggression. Lenin wrote to Stepan Shaumian: "We are pleased with your resolute and decisive policy. Try to blend that policy with careful diplomacy, which is undoubtedly required by the difficult situation, and then we shall win ... . Thus far we are being saved only by contradictions, conflicts, and struggles among the imperialists. To be able to take advantage of these conflicts, we need to understand the art of diplomacy."

On June 12, Shaumian informed Lenin and Stalin by telegraph about the impending attack of Baku military units on Ganja. Simultaneously, massacres against Muslim populations in the regions began. In territories where war broke out, the Muslim population was subject to plundering by the Baku Soviet army, made up of 70 percent Armenians.7 Sometime later Shaumian, who took part in those military operations, acknowledged the atrocities committed against the local Turkic population by the command staff of the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars-

also made up mainly of Armenians. On May 22, the Soviet Russian representative Korganov wrote a report to the Soviet of People"s Commissars. He indicated that the Baku Commune"s army was 18,000 strong and most of the soldiers were Armenians, with only a few Muslims and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. He stated in his report

that "the Armenian peasants and the city democrats are willing to support a unitary Russian republic and Soviet power." On June 18, Korganov reported to the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars that the situation at the front was favoring the side of the Bolsheviks and the "enemy" had taken numerous casualties. He said that, according to information provided by brigadier commander Hamazasp Srvandztyan, the "enemy" had launched an attack in Garamaryam village, where it was met with fierce resistance and retreated in a cowardly fashion. Hamazasp indicated that the casualties only numbered five dead and 49 wounded, while the "enemy" had about 400 casualties. This conclusion is further reinforced by the communiqué that was sent to the military-naval commissar of Soviet Russia, Lev Trotsky, by Boris Sheboldaev, who was at that time deputy-head of the Baku district. He wrote: "The armed forces of the Baku Commune, including officers, consist mostly of Armenians. On June 10, when the brigades and corps headquarters of the Commune army were established, it was evident that the corps commander (ex-colonel) S. Ghazarian, the chief of staff (ex-colonel of the headquarters) Z. Avetisian, and others were Dashnaks at heart. The command staff of the army was worthless and most of the Armenian officers were Dashnaks; this army will be loyal to Soviet rule as long as the "Russian influence" remains, but if the British gain the upper hand, it will be difficult to gauge what the response of the army would be. Considering that 60-70 per cent of the army is Armenian, surprises can be expected."

The overall command of the army was in the hands of colonels Avetisian and Ghazarian, both known anti-Muslim activists. There was also Hamazasp (Srvandztyan), who had fought as a guerrilla leader against the Turks and whom any Muslim was an enemy simply because he was Muslim. Accordingly, Armenian soldiers wantonly robbed, plundered, and committed acts of violence against the Muslim population on their way to Ganja and during attacks on Ganja. Ronald Grigor Suny noted that when the Red Army moved out from Baku toward Eizavetpol, they marched through the villages of Azerbaijani who were seldom friendly and were awaiting their Muslim brothers, the Turks. The Left Socialist-Revolutionary Grigory Petrov, who had been sent to Baku to help the Baku Bolsheviks, wrote of the barbarism he witnessed that was committed against the Muslims at Shamakhi, stating in his telegram to the Soviet Commissars of Baku: "I do not know whether I struggle for the sacred Soviet goal or I am among a gang of thieves." Petrov was in fact senior to Stepan Shaumian and he was sent to Baku as the Extraordinary Military Commissar for Caucasus Affairs, but it was said that he never put on airs and treated Shaumian as his equal.

By the end of June, the march of the Commune forces toward Ganja was halted at Goychay and four days of intensive fighting between June 27 and July 1 decided the fate at the front. The defeat of the Commune forces at Goychay saw many deserters from the Bolshevik army in the face of the ferocious actions of the Muslim army heading in the direction of Baku. Toward the end of July the Army of Islam reached the Baku suburbs and, in order to strengthen its numbers, Azerbaijani men born between 1894 and 1899 were drafted for military service on

July 11. The draft significantly increased the number of Azerbaijanis in the Army of Islam; an influx of Russian supplies of weapons and other military supplies at the end of June did not have a great effect on the situation because of the Army of Islam"s greater numbers.

On July 20, the city of Shamakhi, which also was of strategic importance, was liberated on the way to Baku. This delay in the liberation of Baku by the Army of Islam increased the tension in the diplomatic struggle looming around Baku. In early July 1918 a report was prepared by the German Consulate to Constantinople

(as Istanbul was still known in international diplomatic usage) which stated, "If we enter into negotiations with the Bolsheviks, then we could easily seize Baku, its oil fields and its reserves. However, if the Bolsheviks are forced to leave the city, they will set fire to the fields, and in this case neither we nor the Turks would be able to make use of the oil."17 This concern was also expressed by German Ambassador Bernstorff during a meeting with Mahammad Emin Rasulzade, in which he stated that if Baku was attacked by the Army of Islam, the Bolsheviks would destroy the city and set fire to the oil fields.18 It was reasonable to expect that the Bolsheviks could retaliate in this way, seeing that their actions from the beginning were based on a political gamble, as well as the fact that a directive to do this in the event of a defeat had been ordered by the Bolshevik central government. On June 23, 1918, Stepan Shaumian wrote to Vladimir Lenin, "If we cannot seize Baku, then we shall do as you instructed." Mahammad Emin Rasulzade, who was in Istanbul, wrote of his anxieties about the diplomatic struggle on the "Baku issue" to Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahammad Hasan Hajinski: "The premise of the Germans is that if Baku is taken militarily, then the Bolsheviks will set fire to the oil fields and all oil reserves. Everyone understands that oil is

as necessary as water to the Alliance at war. For that reason, the Germans want a peaceful diplomatic settlement to the Baku issue. We have learned through personal channels that there is a special agreement between the Germans and Bolsheviks about the oil. We would like to bring to your attention that the oil issue is more of a Turkish-German issue than it is an Azerbaijani-German issue. According to the Batum agreement the remaining oil belongs to Turkey. It seems that the Turks want to use the Germans in exchange for oil."

The Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars, after not receiving effective military support from Russia, hoped for the diplomatic support of Moscow and for the assistance of Lazar Bicherakhov, the leader of one of the Cossack

military units in Iran, in case the situation worsened. The intervention of Soviet Russia, through the Germans, had delayed the Azerbaijani government"s entry into Baku. Recognizing its inability to prevent the Azerbaijani-Turkish attack, the Soviets wanted to hold on to Baku by diplomatic means, based on agreements made with Germany in 1918. As noted, the situation at the Western front and generally in the course of the war had significantly increased Germany"s interest in Baku. During the negotiations at a conference in June at Istanbul, Germany decided that it wanted Baku"s oil and would use Russia to get it, seeing that nothing had materialized from the joint efforts of Turkey and Azerbaijan. In Tiflis in June, the Germans had offered to dispatch a light military contingent

to help Turkish-Azerbaijani military units to capture Baku, but "the Azerbaijani government was against this German proposal."

While German-Russian talks were underway in Berlin and Moscow, the situation in Baku changed from bad to worse. An item on the agenda was how to defend the city or whom should surrendor. In the end, they stopped at a candidature of tsarist colonel Lazar Bicherakhov, whose Cossack regiment was stationed in Iran. Earlier July the Bicherahov"s detachment moved from Enzeli towards Baku. Lazar Bicharakhov"s unit arrived in Alat on July 5 via the Caspian Sea. On July 7 he accepted the appointment as commander of the right flank of the Baku defense unit. Upon realizing that he was losing at the front, however, Bicherakhov did not fight; at the end of July, he withdrew his unit from the frontlines and retreated toward the west.

At the end of July, the situation in Baku worsened. The Baku Soviet"s record of violence against the Muslim population had the effect of isolating Baku from its outlying districts. In a mass meeting of non-Muslim workers held in Baku on July 24, the Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik, and Dashnak leaders approved

and seconded a decision to invite the British to Baku in order to defend it from the attack of the Army of Islam. On July 25, an emergency meeting of the Baku Soviet was convened and Stepan Shaumian reported on the political and military situation in Baku. He rejected the proposal of inviting British troops and read the contents of a telegram received from the Soviet central government. The Azerbaijani government, meanwhile, made efforts to liberate Baku through peaceful dialogue and negotiations. On July 24, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hajinski wrote to Rasulzade that he had left for the Baku frontline in order to hold negotiations with the Bolsheviks about the surrender of the city. Hajinski continued: "The situation on the Baku frontlines is in our favor. Though it is a fact that our soldiers could not make much progress along the railway lines, they managed to move up to Karrar Station. However, we have been told that the Bolsheviks are in low spirits. The Baku newspapers we bought from Kurdamir and Salian dated July 18 wrote of disagreements between the Bolsheviks and other parties (at the same time among the right-wing Dashnaks, though I do not believe it). Actually, these disagreements have become a matter of

nationality. Armenian Bolsheviks behave like barbarians in territories they themselves occupy and it is the Russians that are against those actions. There is talk at the Kurdamir front about 800 Russians who had laid down their

arms and abandoned the front as a sign of protest against Armenian barbarism (they gathered Muslims in a mosque and burnt them, murdered women and children, committing indescribably heinous acts). They were arrested in Baku and now are incarcerated on Nargin Island. The Armenians have called for a general mobilization of troops. The Russians protested against it and do not want to fight. The Muslims are also in agreement on this matter. The Shamakhi-Baku route from Shamakhi to Ganja has been occupied by us. Armenian units are frenzied and are headed toward Baku, so fighting is expected on the outskirts of Baku."

On July 30, one of the leaders of the Commune"s army, Colonel Avetisian, informed the Baku Soviet that resistance was futile. On the same day the leaders of the Armenian National Council visited the Soviet of People"s Commissars and demanded the resignation of the Bolsheviks. Outvoted, on July 31, the commissars left Baku for Astrakhan on the ship Ardahan. On August 1, a newly formed government of the Tsentrokaspii was composed of officers of the Caspian fleet - Pechenkin, Tushkov, Bushev, Lemley, Ermakov; socialist revolutionaries Lev Umanskii and Abram Veluns; Mensheviks Qrigorii Aiolla, Mikhail Sadovskii; Dashnaks Alexander Arakelian and Sergei Melik Elchian. Like before, this government had not been related to Azerbaijan, and was a puppet regime composed of aliens. Formally, the power in the Tsentrokaspii was vested in officers and seamen of the Caspian navy but in fact, the real power was in the hands of the Armenian National Council, party "Dashnaktsutun" and other Armenian parties and organizations.

Like the previous government, the Central Caspian government did not include any Azerbaijanis and consisted wholly of foreigners. After its establishment, it addressed the Christian population of Baku, saying, "You are not alone in the struggle against the Turks. The Allied powers will help in the near future." Soon thereafter, the government decided to arrest the members of the Baku Soviet of People"s Commissars as well as Bolsheviks who were trying to escape from Baku. A conference was held following the repatriation and subsequent arrest of the commissars. The committees in the conference charged that the commissars not only abandoned their posts, they also abandoned the front at a time when it put the residents of Baku in the greatest peril. They also said that the commissars took food, military supplies, and weapons that were vital for the city"s defense. The conference charged the commissars with treason and deemed them the people"s enemies.

The maiden step of the Tsentrokaspii government was the invitation to the British in Enzeli to arrive in Baku. On August 4, the first British detachment headed by col. Claude Stokes arrived in Baku. A little later, another group of British, 1000-strong regiment, under the command of gen. However, the advent of Britishers did not improve the situation in the Baku front. From the first days of August, the Turkish-Azerbaijani army succeeded in narrowing the encirclement.